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
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Contents

1.	Criteria for Evaluating Hypothetical Egyptian Loan-Words in Greek: The Case of Αἴγυπτος R. DREW GRIFFITH, Queen's University, Kingston	1
2.	Odysseus' "Winnowing-Shovel" (Hom. <i>Od.</i> 11. 119–37) and the Island of the Cattle of the Sun S. DOUGLAS OLSON, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities	7
3.	Herodotean Symbolism: Pericles as Lion Cub BRAD MCNELLEN, Vanderbilt University	11
4.	Notes on Euripides, <i>Iphigenia in Tauris</i> MARTIN CROPP, University of Calgary	25
5.	In Xenophontis <i>Symposium</i> Observatiunculae Criticae BERNHARD HUSS, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign/ Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München	43
6.	Hermippus, Fragment 22 Wehrli DAVID SANSONE, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign	51
7.	Suspense in the Phaeacian Episode of Apollonius' <i>Argonautica</i> CALVIN S. BYRE, University of Oklahoma	65
8.	<i>Glaucumam ob Oculos Obiciemus</i> : Forbidden Sight in <i>Miles Gloriosus</i> RADD K. EHRMAN, Kent State University	75
9.	Propertius 1. 3: Cynthia Rescripted SHELLEY KAUFHOLD, University of Utah	87
10.	Observations on the Text of Artemidorus, <i>Onirocritica</i> Book 1 JOHN A. HOULIHAN, Louisiana State University	99
11.	Parallel Lives: Plutarch's <i>Lives</i> , Lapo da Castiglionchio the Younger (1405–1438) and the Art of Italian Renaissance Translation CHRISTOPHER S. CELENZA, Michigan State University	121

Criteria for Evaluating Hypothetical Egyptian Loan-Words in Greek: The Case of Αἴγυπτος

R. DREW GRIFFITH

Jay H. Jasanoff and Alan Nussbaum, in their recent critique of the Egyptian etymologies for Greek words proposed in Martin Bernal's *Black Athena*, espouse an extreme form of positivism in evaluating (and largely rejecting) those proposals. They write that convincing examples of loan-words in Greek exhibit three features: "the semantic match between the Greek words and their Semitic and Egyptian counterparts is exact," "the identity of meaning is correlated with a striking similarity of form," and the loan-words "are for the most part completely isolated, not only in the sense that they lack convincing [Indo-European] etymologies but also in the sense that they are not visibly derived from other, simpler Greek words or roots." Jasanoff and Nussbaum allow for a certain degree of phonetic naturalization during the borrowing process, but explain this by saying that "the sounds of the source language are replaced by their closest equivalents in the target language."¹

When it comes to specific loan-words, they write that "under any reasonable standard of philological rigor, the only genuinely old Egyptian borrowing in Greek" is Αἴγυπτος.² They are not alone in considering Αἴγυπτος, whatever its uniqueness in that regard, a virtually certain example of an Egyptian loan-word. Heinrich Brugsch's conjecture is commonly, and

¹ J. H. Jasanoff and A. Nussbaum, "Word Games: The Linguistic Evidence in *Black Athena*," in M. R. Lefkowitz and G. M. Rogers (eds.), *Black Athena Revisited* (Chapel Hill and London 1996) 177–205, at 184 and 188–89; cf. M. Bernal, *Black Athena I-II* (London 1987 and 1991). For more sympathetic appraisals of Bernal's etymologies, see G. A. Rendsburg, "Black Athena: An Etymological Response," *Arethusa*, Special Issue (Fall 1989) 67–82 and J. D. Ray, "An Egyptian Perspective," *Journal of Mediterranean Archaeology* 3 (1990) 77–81. On the broader question of Egyptian loan-words in Greek, see most recently J.-L. Fournet, "Les emprunts du grec à l'égyptien," *Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique de Paris* 84 (1989) 55–80.

An earlier draft of this note was much improved by many helpful suggestions by Prof. C. J. Ruijgh and by the anonymous referees for *ICS*. They, of course, are not responsible for any of the views expressed here.

² Jasanoff and Nussbaum (previous note) 188.

with good reason, accepted³ that this word is derived from the Egyptian term, *h(w)t-k3-pth*, /hatkap^eta/, “the house of the *ka* (soul or spirit) of (the god) Ptah” (*Book of the Dead*, spell 15. 1 etc.), which is the religious name of *Mn-nfr*, “(Pharaoh Phiops I is) established and beautiful” or Memphis, the capital city of Egypt some forty kilometres upriver from the Nile delta. This city-name appears as *Hi-ku-(up-)ta-ah* in the Akkadian of the Tell El-Amarna Tablets (84. 37, 139. 8).⁴ That the word had been borrowed into Greek already in the Mycenaean period is proved by the existence in Linear B of the adjectival form, a man’s name, *A₃-ku-pi-ti-jo*, Αἴγυπτιος, based on the adjective derived from Αἴγυπτος (KN Db 1105 + 1446).⁵

The present article proposes to test Jasanoff and Nussbaum’s criteria for evaluating loan-words against the oldest example that they allow, considering in turn the semantics, the phonetics, and the degree of isolation of Αἴγυπτος.

As to semantic content, while Egyptian *h(w)t-k3-pth* denotes a city, in Homer Αἴγυπτος denotes in the masculine the river Nile (*Od.* 3. 300 etc.) and in the feminine the land of Egypt (*Od.* 17. 448 etc.). In post-Homeric usage the word came to be used exclusively of the land and a new name had to be found specifically for the river. (The Linear B evidence suggests that this development had already begun in Mycenaean times: Aegyptius was an “Egyptian,” rather than a “Nilotic man.”) The Nile is an important landmark and so deserved a name, yet the Egyptians themselves did not give it one, calling it either simply “the river” (*ītrw*) or, in the appropriate season, the annual “inundation” (*h^cpy*).⁶ The Greeks named the river after the most important city upon it and, needing a name for the whole country, quite naturally—for Egypt is the gift of the river (Hdt. 2. 5)⁷—applied that name in the feminine gender to the land as a whole. (Other peoples used other strategies: Akkadian calls it *Mi-iṣ-ri-i*, “the border land”⁸ [cf. Hittite *Mi-iṣ-ri*, Hebrew *Misrayim*, Genesis 12. 10 etc., Mycenaean *Mi-sa-ra-jo*, KN F 841]; the Egyptians themselves called it various things, most notably *Kmt*, “the black (land)” [cf. Χημία, Plut. *Mor.* 364c], a term arguably

³ H. Brugsch, *Geographische Inschriften altägyptischer Denkmäler* (Leipzig 1854) I 83; R. Pietschmann, “Aigyptos,” *RE* I (1894) 979 (with reservations); A. H. Gardiner, *Ancient Egyptian Onomastica* (Oxford 1947) II 124 §394, II 211 §435; A. B. Lloyd, *Herodotus. Book II* (Leiden 1976) II 4; and Bernal (above, note 1) I 95, II 443.

⁴ S. A. B. Mercer, *The Tell El-Amarna Tablets* (Toronto 1939) I 300–01, II 464–65.

⁵ L. R. Palmer, *The Interpretation of Mycenaean Greek Texts* (Oxford 1963) 179 and M. Ventris and J. Chadwick, *Documents in Mycenaean Greek*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge 1973) 136.

⁶ A. De Buck, “On the Meaning of the Name H^cPJ,” in *Orientalia Neerlandica* (Leiden 1948) 1–22.

⁷ J. Gwyn Griffiths, “Hecataeus and Herodotus on ‘A Gift of the River’,” *JNES* 25 (1966) 57–65.

⁸ M. Civil et al. (eds.), *The Assyrian Dictionary X.2* (Chicago 1977) 116 and L. Koehler and W. Baumgartner, *Lexicon in Veteris Testamenti libros*, 3rd ed. (Leiden 1995) 591.

familiar to the Mycenaean epic bards.)⁹ The ambiguity that resulted from applying the same term to both river and land was resolved by coining, perhaps from Egyptian *nɜ w-hɜw(t)*, “the mouths of the front part,”¹⁰ the term Νεῖλος (Hes. *Theog.* 338, Solon fr. 28 West, *Danais* fr. 1 Davies, Bernabé) to designate the river. There is nothing strange in all of this. Cities can give their names to lands, and Homer uses Σιδόνιοι to refer to the Phoenicians in general; cities can also share their names with rivers, for Σύβαρις and Σίρις in the feminine denote cities and in the masculine the rivers on whose banks they stand. Semantically, therefore, the development from *h(w)t-k3-pth* to Αἴγυπτος conforms perfectly to Greek usage. It falls far short, however, of Jasanoff and Nussbaum’s requirement of an “exact semantic match.”

The situation regarding the phonetics is probably similar, although complicated by our ignorance of the transmission-process. While in classical authors Egyptian words beginning with *hwt* are hellenized like Ἀθῶρ (from *Ht-hr*) and *Pth* is transliterated as Φθά,¹¹ in early borrowings the second-declensional ending is normal, both for masculines and feminines (*Aἴγυπτος* was both, having a different gender for each of its two meanings). This is shown by many nouns with the pre-Greek -vθ- stem, e.g. ἡ ἀσάμινθος (Mycenaean *a-sa-mi-to*), ἡ Κόρινθος (Mycenaean *ko-ri-to*), and ὁ λαβύρινθος (Mycenaean *da-pu₂-ri-to-jo*). The -νπτ- element in Αἴγυπτος conforms perfectly to the Akkadian form, *Hi-ku-(up)-ta-ah*, its probable model. The gamma may be explained by postulating as a secondary intermediary language one of the pre-Greek tongues of Minoan Crete: From the fact that the Linear B signs *ka*, *ke*, *ki*, *ko*, and *ku* express both Greek /k/ and /g/ (so that, for example, *ke-ra* represents both κέρας and γέρας), we can deduce that the Minoan language originally expressed by the Cretan syllabic script made no phonological opposition between voiced and unvoiced stops. The only morphological puzzle is the first syllable, which for some reason combines the /a/ postulated for the vocalization of Egyptian *h(w)t* and the /i/ into which it has been, again for unknown reasons, changed in the Akkadian form. The resultant diphthong has the happy effect of creating the considerable metrical flexibility, highly desirable in dactylic hexameter verse, revealed by Αἴγυπτος,¹² though both the rules of logic and the Mycenaean evidence preclude our thinking that metrical considerations caused this form. Thus, phonologically as well as semantically, the development is unexceptionable. But here, too, Jasanoff

⁹ R. D. Griffith, “Homer’s Black Earth and the Land of Egypt,” *Athenaeum* 84 (1996) 251–54.

¹⁰ H. Goedicke, “Νεῖλος—An Etymology,” *AJP* 100 (1979) 69–72.

¹¹ P. Montet, quoted in Lloyd (above, note 3) II 4.

¹² The word appears in the *Odyssey* in all the oblique cases except the vocative, including both the uncontracted and contracted genitive forms, and with the postposition -δε, and it is positioned with the foot-division falling before either the ultima or the penult.

and Nussbaum's requirements are at fault, for there is anything but a "striking similarity of form" between /hatkap^cta/ and /aiguptos/.

When it comes to Jasanoff and Nussbaum's third requirement, that of lexical isolation, we observe that there exists beside Αἴγυπτος, qua river-name, the simpler Greek root αἰγ- closely related to it in form and meaning. Rivers are often associated with goats in classical Greek toponyms, cult, and myth. (None of our evidence for this association dates to the Mycenaean period, at which time Αἴγυπτος had already assumed its classical form, but the nature of the Linear B texts virtually precludes their providing such information, and it is reasonable to assume that this connection is much earlier than its first attestation.) We have place-names such as the River Tragus in Arcadia (Paus. 8. 23. 2) or the roadstead of Aegospotami in the Thracian Chersonese (Hdt. 9. 119. 2), where the Athenians were finally defeated by Lysander (Xen. *Hell.* 2. 1. 18–19). Many other places near, in, or belonging to the sea have names formed from the αἰγ- root—Aegeae on Euboea, where the Greeks returning from the Trojan war suffered a great storm (Alc. fr. 298. 6 Voigt), Mt. Aegaleos in Attica, whence Xerxes watched the battle of Salamis (Hdt. 8. 90; this word is indirectly attested in Mycenaean as the name of the province on the other side of the homonymous Messenian mountain, *pe-ra₃-ko-ra-i-ja*, *pe-ra-a-ko-ra-i-jo*, Περαγολαλία, Περα-αίγολαχιοι), Aegina, the Aegean itself—and there is an obvious marine connection to the common nouns αἰγιαλός and αἰγές, which means "waves" according to Hesychius and the *Suda* s.v. and Artemidorus, *Onirocritica* 2. 12 (120. 1–2 Pack). It is uncertain whether αἰγές is the survival of a pre-Greek word for "sea,"¹³ a metaphor of goats for waves, as whitecaps are the horses of Manannan Mac Lir in Irish myth,¹⁴ or a derivative, cognate with αἴξ, from ἀίστω, "to move with a quick shooting motion" (LSJ s.v.; cf. Sanskrit *éjati*).¹⁵ These marine words are relevant to rivers, because Greek makes no over-nice distinction between fresh-water and salt-, as both fall under the purview of Poseidon (Aesch. *Sept.* 310–11, Catull. 31. 3).¹⁶

¹³ R. L. Fowler, "ΑΙΓ- in Early Greek Language and Myth," *Phoenix* 42 (1988) 95–113, esp. 99–102.

¹⁴ P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* I (Paris 1968) 30, s.v. αἰγιαλός. For the horses of Manannan, cf. W. B. Yeats, "Cuchulain's Fight with the Sea" ("Chaunt in his ear delusions magical, That he may fight the horses of the sea") and Lady Gregory, *Gods and Fighting Men* (London 1904; repr. Gerrard Cross 1970) 105. Poseidon sends a bull out of a sea-wave at Eur. *Hipp.* 1213–14.

¹⁵ P. Thieme, *Die Heimat der indogermanischen Gemeinsprache*, AAWMainz 11 (Wiesbaden 1954) 43; J. T. Hooker, "ΑΙΓΑΙΩΝ in Achilles' Plea to Thetis," *JHS* 100 (1980) 188–89.

¹⁶ See G. O. Hutchinson, *Aeschylus. Septem contra Thebas* (Oxford 1985) 94–95, ad *Sept.* 310–11.

In cult, horned animals are offered to rivers.¹⁷ Bulls are preferred at Troy and in Sicily (*Il.* 21. 130–33, *Diod.* 4. 23. 4), but bulls and goats are homologous in cult¹⁸ and Greece is a land of goats.¹⁹ Pubescent goats are an appropriate offering to springs (*Hor. Carm.* 3. 13); moreover the Athenians competed in their τραγῳδίαι or “goat-songs” for the privilege of sacrificing a goat to Dionysus,²⁰ the taurine god (*Carm. pop.* 871 *PMG*, *Ion* 744 *PMG*, *Soph. fr.* 959 *Radt*, *Eur. Bacch.* 100, 920–22), whom Plutarch describes (*Mor.* 365a) on the inspiration of a Pindar-passage (*fr.* 153 *Maehter*) as πάστις ὑγρᾶς φύσεως . . . κύριος.

In myth, too, horns are linked to rivers. A river’s branches are its “horns” (*Hes. Theog.* 789 etc.), and in the case of the Nile the Greeks were most familiar with its branches, the “mouths of the front part.” Amalthea, the goat (*Aratus, Phaen.* 163, *Callim. Jov.* 49), gave her cornucopia to Heracles in exchange for the horn that he broke off the river Achelous (*Apollod. Bibl.* 2. 7. 5), who, like other rivers (*Eur. Ion* 1261, *Or.* 1378, *IA* 275 etc.), is bull-formed (*Archil. fr.* 287 *West*, *Soph. Trach.* 10–14).²¹ Capricorn (*Αἰγόκερως*, originally **αἰγοκέραος*), believed to be among the forty-eight constellations taken over by the Greeks from Egypt (cf. *Lucian, De astrologia 7*),²² has the form of a goat–fish hybrid (*αἰγίπαν*, *Eratosth. Cat.* 27). Interesting in this context is the αἴξ (Arist. *HA* 593b23), a water-bird²³ whose flight—it has been suggested on the basis of German folklore surrounding the similarly named *Himmelsgeiß*—was thought to presage storms.²⁴

In light of this evidence, I suggest that the Greeks connected the Nile with goats, the more so since Ptah himself is horned, his incarnation being the Apis-bull (*Hdt.* 2. 38, 153, 3. 27–30)²⁵ and his function that of creation, like the ram-headed god, *Hnmw*.²⁶ Late grammarians certainly explained the term Αἴγυπτος along these lines, either because Egypt has “fat goats” (*αἴγες πίονες*, *Etym. Magn.* 29. 10) or because the Egyptians worship them and so allow the Nile to be “drunk by goats” (*αἴγιπτος*, *ibid.* 29. 8–9). The Egyptian goat-cult, centred at *b3-nb-Ddt*, “ram (or soul) of Lord *Ddt*,” or Mendes in the delta since the second dynasty (*Manetho* 609 F 2 [p. 20]

¹⁷ R. B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought* (Cambridge 1951) 237, 249. With this custom is to be compared the offering of human hair—another emanation of the head—to rivers (*Il.* 23. 140–51, *Aesch. Cho.* 6–7).

¹⁸ A. B. Cook, *Zeus: A Study in Ancient Religion* I (Cambridge 1914) 501.

¹⁹ J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge 1927) 206.

²⁰ W. Burkert, “Greek Tragedy and Sacrificial Ritual,” *GRBS* 7 (1966) 87–121.

²¹ H. P. Isler, *Acheloos* (Berne 1970).

²² W. H. Smyth, *A Cycle of Celestial Objects* II: *The Bedford Catalogue* (London 1844) 472–73.

²³ D. W. Thompson, *A Glossary of Greek Birds*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1936) 30.

²⁴ M. L. West, *Hesiod. Works and Days* (Oxford 1978) 366–68.

²⁵ Lloyd (above, note 3) II 171, ad *Hdt.* 2. 38.

²⁶ R. O. Faulkner, *The Ancient Egyptian Book of the Dead*, 2nd ed. (London 1985) 191–92, Glossary s.vv. “Khnum” and “Ptah.”

FGrH), was striking to Greek eyes,²⁷ not least because it included public sexual intercourse between women and goats (Pind. fr. 201 Maehler, Hdt. 2. 46, Plut. *Mor.* 989a).

We will never know whether the identity of the initial syllable of Αἴγυπτος with the αἰγ- root is a coincidence or—as I think more likely—a case of popular etymology,²⁸ and modern philologists are not tempted by any derivation akin to those offered by the *Etymologicum Magnum*, both because the ending -υπτος, although it has completely transformed the original, has not produced a Greek word-forming suffix, and because by chance we can trace the word almost step by step as it enters Greek. Nevertheless, the word is not completely isolated from other, simpler Greek words, and if their influence (as opposed to coincidence) has indeed helped to determine its form, this naturalization has involved considerations quite different from a desire to replace the sounds of the source language by their closest equivalents in the target language.

The moral of this story is that Greek accommodated loan-words to its own native forms in ways rich in *Volkspoesie*.²⁹ We must never forget, as Kenneth Dover has said in another context, that “aesthetic caprice must be included among the determinants of linguistic form,”³⁰ nor should we be too quick to rule out as borrowings words that in sense, sound, and degree of isolation do not conform to the narrow expectations of a rigidly positivist approach to historical linguistics.

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²⁷ The Greeks, for whom the gods were of one race with humans (Pind. *Nem.* 6. 1) and so ἀνθρωποφυέες (Hdt. 1. 131), always found the Egyptian theriomorphic conception of divinity remarkable (cf. Socrates' oath μὰ τὸν κύνα τὸν Αἴγυπτιον θεόν, Pl. *Grg.* 482b5).

²⁸ C. Watkins, *How to Kill a Dragon: Aspects of Indo-European Poetics* (Oxford 1995) 170, suggests that αἰγύπτιος, “vulture” (< *ἀργυπίος) is modelled on Αἴγυπτιος rather than the other way around.

²⁹ Similarly, Greek arguably accommodated the Persian proper name *a(h)ura-pāta, “protected by Ahura (Mazda),” as ἀβροβάτης (Aesch. *Pers.* 1072, Bacchyl. *Epin.* 3. 48) from the phrase ἀβρὸν βαίνειν (e.g. Eur. *Med.* 1164): so M. Leumann in a private letter to B. Snell (see *Bacchylidis carmina cum fragmentis* [Leipzig 1963] 10–11, ad loc.); this suggestion has, however, been rejected by R. Schmitt, “Bakchylides’ ἀβροβάτας und die Iranier-Namen mit Anlaut ABPA/O-,” *Glotta* 53 (1975) 207–16.

³⁰ K. Dover, *Marginal Comment: A Memoir* (London 1994) 25. W. Burkert, *The Orientalizing Revolution*, transl. by M. E. Pinder and W. Burkert (Cambridge, MA 1992) 35, writes that “the Greek language, at any rate the literary Greek that we know, absolutely rejects the use of unadapted foreign words; they are accepted only in perfectly assimilated form as to phonetics and inflexion.”

Odysseus' "Winnowing-Shovel"
 (Hom. *Od.* 11. 119–37) and the Island of the
 Cattle of the Sun

S. DOUGLAS OLSON

When Odysseus encounters Teiresias in the Underworld in *Odyssey* 11, the blind prophet does not give him detailed instructions for making his long way home, as Kirke had said he would (10. 539–40). Teiresias clearly knows what sort of information Odysseus is after (11. 100). All the same, he concentrates on only two things, one of them seemingly unconnected with the hero's return-voyage to Ithaka: the danger posed by the cattle of the Sun (11. 104–13) and the pilgrimage Odysseus must eventually make inland to sacrifice to Poseidon (11. 121–31).¹ To Teiresias, the decisive problem in Odysseus' future is clearly the wrath of the sea-god, to which the entire crew of the hero's one surviving ship is subject due to his blinding of Polyphemos (11. 100–03; cf. 9. 526–36). Whether all the men come back to Ithaka together or only Odysseus returns depends on whether they manage to leave the Sun's cattle unmolested (11. 104–13), as they ultimately prove unable to do (12. 339–65). Poseidon's anger guarantees a difficult journey home in any case (11. 100–04, 111, 113–15), however, and after Odysseus has somehow got rid of the Suitors (11. 115–20), he is accordingly to take an oar on his shoulder and make his way into the mainland on foot until he comes to people unacquainted with the sea (11. 121–25).² There he is to sacrifice to Poseidon (11. 129–34), thus introducing the god's cult into a spot where it did not exist before and so presumably winning his favor, and then return home a second time to await a "sleek old age" and a mysterious but easy death ἐξ ἀλός (11. 132–36).³

¹ For the extraordinary complexity of Teiresias' prophecy and its role in Homer's story, see J. Peradotto, *Man in the Middle Voice: Name and Narration in the Odyssey*, Martin Classical Lectures n.s. 1 (Princeton 1990) 59–93.

² For the problem of the relationship between the twin wraths of Poseidon and the Sun, cf. B. Fenik, *Studies in the Odyssey*, Hermes Einzelschriften 30 (Wiesbaden 1974) 208–30, esp. 209–16; S. D. Olson, *Blood and Iron: Stories and Storytelling in Homer's Odyssey*, Mnemosyne Supplement 148 (Leiden 1995) 205–23.

³ Odysseus repeats the final portion of the prophecy to Penelope on Ithaka near the end of the poem (23. 267–84 ~ 11. 121–37). For the significance of the hero's gesture and the sacrifice that accompanies it, see W. F. Hansen, "Odysseus' Last Journey," *QUCC* 24 (1977)

Teiresias' remarks to Odysseus thus have their own internal logic, even if they do not answer the specific questions the hero has come prepared to ask, and the prophecy in fact has other features which help make it a single intellectual whole. The mark that Odysseus has reached the end of his travels inland, Teiresias tells him, will be that another wayfarer who meets him will call his oar an ἀθηρηλοιγός (lit. "chaff-ruin"), i.e. a winnowing-shovel (11. 126–28).⁴ The surface point of this confusion is that Odysseus will at last have come to a country whose inhabitants know nothing of ships, so that the man the hero meets will fail to recognize the object resting on his shoulder (cf. 11. 122–25). At the same time, however, the anonymous traveller's remark can be taken as a significant comment on what happens on the island of the cattle of the Sun. We know from numerous ancient sources that after beans or wheat were harvested, they were trampled by animals on a threshing-floor (X. *Oec.* 18. 4–5) and then—provided a sufficiently strong breeze was blowing—thrown up into the air with a winnowing-shovel (*Il.* 13. 588–90), which caused the grain or seeds to be separated from the chaff (*Il.* 5. 499–502; cf. Hes. *Op.* 597–99; X. *Oec.* 18. 6–9).⁵ So too on the island of the cattle of the Sun, Odysseus and his men are put to the test by the appearance of high winds (12. 313–14, 325–26), and when he goes apart from them (12. 333–37), they are quickly marked out for destruction (esp. 12. 374–88, 417–19). That Odysseus' oar is mistaken for a winnowing-shovel is thus a sign not only of how far from the sea he has come but also of the scrutiny he has undergone: He alone of all the crew has in the end been saved.⁶ That this is part of the point of Teiresias' prophecy is confirmed by a further peculiarity of the blind seer's language. Ἀθηρηλοιγός (11. 128) is a kenning, i.e. a riddling word that stands in for and thus points to some other, more pedestrian term familiar to the poem's audience.⁷ Eustathius and ΣQBHV gloss ἀθηρηλοιγός with the word πτύον ("shovel"), which is the name used for a winnowing-shovel in the description of threshing at *Iliad* 13. 558 (cf. A. fr. 210 Radt). What

27–48, esp. 38–42; C. Segal, "Teiresias in the Yukon: A Note on Folktale and Epic (Odyssey 11, 100–144 and 23, 248–287)," in R. Pretagostini (ed.), *Tradizione e innovazione nella cultura greca da Omero all'età ellenistica: Scritti in onore di Bruno Gentili I* (Rome 1993) 61–68, esp. 62–66. For the storytelling tradition to which the tale belongs, see W. F. Hansen, "Odysseus and the Oar: A Folkloric Approach," in L. Edmunds (ed.), *Approaches to Greek Myth* (Baltimore 1990) 241–72.

⁴ For the similarity between the two objects, cf. the deliberately metaphorical language at Opp. *H.* 4. 498–99 (of winnowing grain) πνοιῆς χερσαίοις τε διακρίνοντες ἐρετμοῖς / καρπόν.

⁵ For further discussion and bibliography, see S. B. Pomeroy (ed.), *Xenophon. Oeconomicus: A Social and Historical Commentary* (Oxford 1994) on 18. 4–9.

⁶ Theoc. 7. 155–56 suggests that sticking the winnowing-shovel into the heap of clean grain may have been a ritual signal that the harvest was complete; cf. Σ ad loc., citing [Call.] fr. 799 Pf². For possible connections between this signal and Odysseus' gesture, see J. E. Harrison, "Mystica Vannus Iacchi (continued)," *JHS* 24 (1904) 241–54, at 246.

⁷ For images of this sort, see I. Waern, ΓΗΣ ΟΣΤΕΑ: *The Kenning in Pre-Christian Greek Poetry* (Uppsala 1951). For ἀθηρηλοιγός (not discussed by Waern) as a kenning, see A. Heubeck, *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey II: Books IX–XVI* (Oxford 1989) ad loc.

seems never to have been pointed out is that a πτύον can also be called a θρίναξ,⁸ and a θρίναξ is quite specifically a wooden shovel with three or five short teeth and used for winnowing grain.⁹ The word is first attested in the fifth century (Ar. *Pax* 567; *IG I³* 422.134), but there is no reason to think that it was not in use hundreds of years before that, and θρίναξ in fact appears to be the root of the name Θρινακία, which is how Teiresias refers to the island of the cattle of the Sun when he mentions it for the first time at 11. 107.¹⁰ The spot where the winds separate Odysseus from his worthless crew, in other words, is precisely “Winnowing-Shovel Island,”¹¹ and it accordingly comes as no surprise that the sign which will mark the moment when the hero can at last make his peace with Poseidon will be an oar mistaken for a “destroyer of chaff.”

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⁸ Hsch. Θ 756 Latte θρίναξ· πτύον σίτου; Cyr. p. 342 Schmidt θρίναξ· σκεῦος γεωργικόν· ὃ καὶ λέγεται λικμητήριον . . . ἡ πτύον τοῦ σίτου; *Suda* Θ 498 θρίναξ· τὸ πτύον. ὅργανον γεωργικὸν ὀδοντικόν; cf. Σ^bΑΤ Hom. *Il.* 13. 588.

⁹ Nic. *Th.* 113–14 with Σ; Antiphil. *AP* 6. 95. 4 = *GPh* 874; Philipp. *AP* 6. 104. 6 = *GPh* 2762. Early in this century, a similar tool was still in use in Crete, where it was called a θυρνάκι, i.e. a θιρνάκι, diminutive of θίρναξ/θρίναξ; cf. J. E. Harrison, “Mystica Vannus Iacchi,” *JHS* 23 (1903) 292–324, at 301–05. “Winnowing-fan” is an unfortunate term for the tool, which is not used to produce a breeze; cf. Harrison 310–12.

¹⁰ Thrinakia was sometimes identified with Sicily, which according to Thucydides was originally called Τρινακία (*Th.* 6. 2. 2; cf. Call. fr. 40 Pf²; Nic. *Th.* 529), presumably because the island has three capes (*τρία ἄκρα*), as Timaios of Tauromenion (*FGrH* 566 F 37 ap. Σ A.R. 4. 965; cf. Eust. p. 1675.6 ~ Σ^{BV} Hom. *Od.* 11. 107; Str. 6. 265; Σ Lyc. 966; Σ Nic. *Th.* 529; St. Byz. p. 635.11 Meineke) explains. Cf. J. Bérard, *La colonisation grecque de l'Italie méridionale et de la Sicile dans l'antiquité: L'histoire et la légende*, BEFAR 150 (Paris 1941) 319–38. Naturally this tells us nothing about the significance or origin of the name in Homer.

¹¹ St. Byz. p. 635.13–14 Meineke, followed by H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* I (Heidelberg 1954) s.v. θρίναξ, and P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* II (Paris 1970) s.v. θρίναξ, notes the likely connection between θρίναξ and Θρινακία, but does not explore the tool’s actual function or draw any larger conclusions. Cf. also *Suda* Θ 499 θρίναξ· ἡ Σικελία.

Herodotean Symbolism: Pericles as Lion Cub

BRAD MCNELLEN

A recurring question that finds place in practically every general discussion of Herodotus' work concerns the single mention of Pericles' name in the *Histories*.¹ Specifically, scholars have asked why Herodotus chooses to report that Pericles' mother, Agariste, dreamt that she bore a lion cub on the night before Pericles' birth.²

The "traditional" understanding is that Herodotus made a brief tribute to Pericles in an excursus aimed at vindicating the Alcmaeonids from charges of treason, uncritically repeating the family's version of history. Although not the first so to theorize, Felix Jacoby is customarily recognized as the creator of this view, owing to the prominence of his Pauly-Wissowa article characterizing Herodotus as an ardent partisan of the Alcmaeonids.³ The authority of this position seems to be questioned but little in casual classroom treatments of Herodotus, and is still maintained in a few scholarly quarters.⁴

However, there are now more than a few scholars who have re-evaluated Herodotus' purpose in the Alcmaeonid excursus, with Hermann Strasburger penning the groundbreaking article some forty years ago.⁵ Likewise, Charles Fornara and John Hart wished to see Herodotus less as completely dependent on his source material, and more as an independent analyst.⁶ More recently, there have been in particular two examinations of

¹ I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers of *ICS* for their helpful observations, which have strengthened my argumentation considerably. Any misapprehensions or other errors are, of course, my own responsibility.

² Hdt. 6. 131. 2.

³ F. Jacoby, "Herodotos," *RE Suppl.* II (1913) 226–42, himself following the tradition of H. Stein's early claim that Pericles was referred to "wie einen Gott"; cf. W. Aly, *Volksmärchen, Sage und Novelle bei Herodot und seinen Zeitgenossen* (Göttingen 1921) 158.

⁴ Rather recently O. Murray, "Herodotus and Oral History," in H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg and A. Kuhrt (eds.), *Achaemenid History II: The Greek Sources* (Leiden 1987) 93–115. Also cf. F. D. Harvey, "The Political Sympathies of Herodotus," *Historia* 15 (1966) 254–55, to oppose Strasburger; see next note.

⁵ H. Strasburger, "Herodot und das perikleische Athen," *Historia* 4 (1955) 1–25, especially 16–17.

⁶ C. W. Fornara, *Herodotus: An Interpretative Essay* (Oxford 1971), to whose landmark views on Herodotus' message for his audience I am much indebted; J. Hart, *Herodotus* (New York 1982).

Herodotus' treatment of the Alcmaeonid family in general. Robert Develin argued for a neutral, objective report;⁷ somewhat in the tradition of Strasburger, Rosalind Thomas demonstrated how Herodotus' "Alcmaeonid excursus" may well have a critical tone.⁸

In this paper, I propose to add a new dimension to the current skepticism of the "traditional" understanding of Agariste's dream by looking at the episode in the context of Herodotus' narrative as a whole. Specifically, I wish to focus on how Herodotus utilizes lion cubs symbolically; in light of previous context, what would identifying Pericles as a lion cub mean for Herodotus? I will venture to argue that, given its textual background, the association can well be quite uncomplimentary. Such an examination, I hope, will provide deeper insight into Herodotus' narrative themes and authorial objectives.

Prior debate on the Alcmaeonid excursus has not ignored the lion symbol itself, but has been confined to a rather general level. How and Wells' commentary on Agariste's dream and G. W. Dyson's early piece (entitled "Λέοντα τεκεῖν") generally represent the "traditional" view.⁹ The story of the dream was apparently well known, enough to warrant a parody by Aristophanes, and was doubtless circulated as Periclean propaganda.¹⁰ In addition, some famous Greek monuments of lions as symbols of noble, regal power (e.g. the gate of Mycenae, the commemoration of Leonidas and the other Spartan dead at Thermopylae) further suggest that Herodotus could not have meant the association to be anything but honorific.

However, the more recent scholars frequently point out that, as a symbol alone, the lion had ambivalent force in Greek thought.¹¹ In myth, lions tend to appear as ferocious, strange, and certainly dangerous; the Nemean lion, the lions who draw Cybele's chariot, and the partially leonine Sphinx of Thebes are but three legendary examples, and in Homer the lion often appears as nothing more than a symbol of bloodthirsty savagery.¹² Indeed, as for lion cubs in particular, the ambivalence shows itself in a well-known theme that may have been proverbial in Athens. To "raise a lion cub in the house" was to invite disaster. What at first appears to be a pleasant,

⁷ R. Develin, "Herodotus and the Alkmaeonids," in J. Eadie and J. Ober (eds.), *The Craft of the Ancient Historian* (London 1985) 125–35. I think it particularly appropriate to quote Develin's statement of purpose (134–35) as applicable to the present offering as well: "I would not wish this to be interpreted as a more general lack of regard for Jacoby's contribution. Rather would I stress that it is a disservice to the great investigators of the past if we allow devotion to their magisterial statements to develop into scholarly sclerosis."

⁸ R. Thomas, *Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens* (Cambridge 1989) 261–82.

⁹ G. W. Dyson, "Λέοντα τεκεῖν," *CQ* 23 (1929) 186–95.

¹⁰ Aristophanes, *Thesmophoriazusae* 514–16.

¹¹ See especially Fornara (above, note 6) 51–55. See also J. A. S. Evans, *Herodotus* (Boston 1982) 98 and M. Ostwald, "Herodotus and Athens," *ICS* 16 (1991) 137–48, especially 142. Although J. Gould, *Herodotus* (New York 1989) 117–18, also identifies the lion as ambivalent, he rejects some of the conclusions that I will draw here.

¹² Cf. *Iliad* 3. 23–26 and 15. 592 and 630–36. Cf. also Hdt. 4. 191.

even docile animal will later grow up to be not the pet and guardian of an Androcles, but what its nature dictates: a violent beast with unchecked ferocity and no regard for higher-order human concerns, such as past beneficence. The most famous occurrence of this conceit is of course found in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, where Helen is likened to the lion cub: Paris brings home an apparently attractive prize, only to find that it will turn out to cause Troy's ruin.¹³

Herodotus' inclusion of Agariste's dream was indeed a matter of choice, and although Herodotus is fond of reporting dreams—particularly with regard to eastern nations, whose traditions emphasize them—propaganda such as this may have been one story of a dream that Herodotus might well have decided to omit.¹⁴ The historian himself makes it clear early on that he is not above ignoring or rationalizing tales intended to “glorify” someone, as was the case with the young Cyrus.¹⁵ Ever resourceful and clever, selecting and organizing his material with higher structural and thematic goals in mind, Herodotus is capable of turning even a popular story to his own ends, and challenging his audience to reflect anew upon the apparently familiar.¹⁶

We must remember this in our own inquiry about the meaning of Agariste's dream, and thus go beyond general principles of Greek thought to examine what lion cubs stand for strictly within the context of the *Histories*. Herodotus takes full advantage of the lion's ambiguity; for him, the lion cub symbolizes potential for power that will nonetheless end in frustration, failure, and destruction from “within the house”; this last is repeatedly associated with an analogous idea of unnatural birth.

In the *Histories*, the lion cub first appears in a digression explaining how the Persians were able to take Sardis. At this point, Croesus has already ignored Solon's advice to “look to the end”; instead, he has blindly

¹³ Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 717–81. Perhaps the definitive treatment of this scene is B. M. W. Knox, “The Lion in the House,” *CP* 47 (1952) 17–25. Knox argues that the scene is transitional: The lion cub also symbolizes the temptations of *hubris* that will result in excess and death for Agamemnon. The idea also occurs in Euripides, *Suppliant Women* 1222–23, as well as Aristophanes, *Knights* 1037 and *Frogs* 1431–33, where Alcibiades is so symbolized. This is especially appropriate for perhaps the most ambivalent figure in Athenian history, and in this connection we might also recall Plutarch's anecdote about Alcibiades' desperation in a wrestling match: Bitten in violation of the rules, his opponent characterized Alcibiades' behavior as womanly, but Alcibiades likened himself to a lion (*Alcibiades* 2. 2).

¹⁴ F. Solmsen, *Two Crucial Decisions in Herodotus* (Amsterdam 1974) 17 n. 48, states the matter well: “Herodotus makes clear that reporting does not imply consent or acceptance, and he repeatedly indicates his preference. Nor would I doubt that he dismissed much that he heard and ignored versions that he did not consider worth reporting.”

¹⁵ Hdt. 1. 95. 1. J. M. Cook, *The Persian Empire* (London 1983) 27, cleverly speculates that in his haste to “debunk” the various traditions concerning Cyrus' youth, Herodotus in fact rejected the version that seems to be the most reliably supported by the cuneiform sources, namely that Cyrus started out as the young king of Anshan.

¹⁶ On structure and organization in the *Histories*, see especially H. Immerwahr, *Form and Thought in Herodotus* (Cleveland 1966) and J. L. Myres, *Herodotus, Father of History* (Oxford 1953).

trusted in his material situation and, in turn, has prioritized safeguarding it. He thus attacks Persia preemptively, assuming that the Delphic oracle assured him victory in perhaps the most famous of its responses: "If you attack the Persians you will destroy a great empire."¹⁷

Now, we learn that a similar false sense of security had also helped to doom the city generations ago. With apparent nonchalance, Herodotus reports that a concubine of Croesus' ancestor, Meles, bore a lion cub that had the potential to make Sardis invulnerable, if only it were carried around the circuit of the walls. Meles, however, supposing that one spot was too precipitous for any enemy to negotiate, did not carry the cub past it. This is where the Persians gained access to Sardis, as a Lydian soldier inadvertently showed the way while retrieving a lost helmet.¹⁸

Herodotus' lack of skepticism about such an unusual birth may stem from the story's appropriateness for the historian's narrative objectives. The lion cub born into the house of Croesus is indeed the proverbial "lion in the house," beginning a process of destruction from within. Croesus, of course, is ultimately responsible for completing this process and, amongst the Greeks, the lion was indeed well known as the symbol of Lydian royalty. Moreover, it was especially associated with the very thing that spurred Croesus to self-destruction: his wealth. Not only did the lion appear on Lydian coins, but more importantly for Herodotus' narrative, a gold lion was the centerpiece of the treasures that Croesus sent to Delphi.¹⁹

In this regard too, the lion is failed potential: Croesus' generous gifts did not, as intended, buy Apollo's protection for the Lydian's life of luxury. Indeed, the oracle itself warned Croesus to give up that lifestyle voluntarily if he and his kingdom even hoped to survive.²⁰ This was not a surprising injunction, considering that Herodotus characterizes Croesus' effete habits as contrary to Lydian *nomos*; indeed, *nomoi* define culture.²¹ Appropriately, it was only with Croesus' riches gone that Apollo preserved the one thing left to him: his very life. What finally motivated Apollo to intervene were not the material gifts, but the *pathēi mathos* that Croesus at last achieved.

Again indeed, the "lion cub in the house" well represents the effects of Croesus' policy. Although attractive at first, material gain and imperial

¹⁷ Hdt. 1. 53. 3.

¹⁸ Hdt. 1. 84.

¹⁹ Hdt. 1. 50. 3. Herodotus accounts for the apparent exaggeration of this offering's weight by claiming that it had been partially melted in a fire.

²⁰ Hdt. 1. 55. Croesus is derisively called a "tenderfoot"; he is told to flee Cyrus, the "mule king" (half Mede, half Persian), by running along the pebbly Hermus, thereby ruining his dainty feet and the lifestyle that they represent. By following the advice, Croesus could have painlessly fulfilled the Delphic oracle's earlier pronouncement of recompense to the Heraclids from the fifth generation succeeding Gyges (1. 13. 2).

²¹ See e.g. S. Humphreys, "Law, Custom, and Culture in Herodotus," *Arethusa* 20 (1987) 211-20.

success become obsessive, and equally harmful ends in themselves.²² In effect, such pursuits turn out to be their own undoing, in this case both for Croesus and for his nation. It is all too fitting that when the Lydians, betrayed by their king's behavior contrary to Lydian *nomos*, unsuccessfully revolt against their Persian overlords, Croesus advises Cyrus to force all the Lydians to alter their *nomois* as well, in order to ensure that the nation will never regain any military, not to mention imperial, capability.²³

The same themes underlie Herodotus' second mention of a lion cub. Another dynasty is about to be destroyed from within, and the prospect of an unusual birth is involved. In attempting to secure his power, Cambyses has already started undermining his family and his nation. Accepting a story derived from Darius' Behistun text, Herodotus reports that Cambyses feared potential rivalry of his brother Smerdis, and had him secretly killed, a preemptive murder with intentions akin to Croesus' motives for attacking Persia.²⁴ Also like Croesus, the Persian monarch has generally lived contrary to *nomos* as well, but to such a greater extent, and with such a disrespectful attitude, that Herodotus judges him mad for it.²⁵ In particular, Herodotus characterizes Cambyses' marriage to his own sister as completely inconsistent with Persian *nomos*, and sanctioned by the Persian royal judges only under coercion; now, a child has been conceived from the incestuous union. In fact, Herodotus may have been excessively eager to portray Cambyses as a flaunter of *nomos* in placing the marriage before Cambyses' successful invasion of Egypt, and in so strongly insisting that the Persian's only motive was lust; he thus discounts the possibility that Cambyses, elsewhere so hostile to Egyptian *nomos*, would want to emulate pharaonic custom by taking his own sister as wife, as was probably the case in actuality.²⁶

Enjoying the conqueror's leisure in Egypt, Cambyses stages a fight between a lion cub and a pair of puppies. So long as one puppy was tied up, the cub easily dominated the other; but when the first puppy broke free, the two combined to kill the cub. This practically and symbolically signals the

²² As the chorus of *Agamemnon* commented in the lion cub parable, "the unholy deed gives birth to many more like it" (758–60).

²³ Hdt. 1. 155.

²⁴ For a recent edition of the text, see R. Schmitt, *The Bisitun Inscription of Darius the Great, Old Persian Text* (London 1991). Darius claimed that after Cambyses "died his own death," it was not Cambyses' brother Bardya (Smerdis) who inherited the throne, as everyone believed, but rather a double, the Magus Gaumata; this is a common name paired with a generic title. Darius dutifully killed this usurper and took power himself. This ancient equivalent of the modern "evil twin" cliché, once staunchly believed (e.g. How and Wells' commentary, I 393 n. 1), is now almost universally rejected.

²⁵ Hdt. 3. 38. 1.

²⁶ Pace K. M. T. Atkinson, "The Legitimacy of Cambyses and Darius as Kings of Egypt," *JAOS* 76 (1956) 167–77. If one accepts the current theory that the Achaemenids were Zoroastrian, kin-marriage would be expected anyway, but this particular situation was problematic; for a discussion, see M. Boyce, *A History of Zoroastrianism II* (Leiden 1982) 75–77.

beginning of Cambyses' undoing. In practical terms, Cambyses kills his sister-wife as a result; he fears a perceptive hint in her distraught observation that, unlike the puppies, Cambyses no longer has a brother who could come to his aid in a crisis. Thus, Cambyses himself destroys his unusual, unborn child and the future of his dynasty as well, at least for the moment.²⁷

The symbolism of the event operates in more than one way. Although the sister-wife likened Cambyses to one of the puppies, what ensues reveals that the lion cub turns out to stand for Cambyses, and the puppies the Magian brothers who are about to begin a coup against him. As the Magi's efforts depend upon one of the brothers' close resemblance to Smerdis, we realize that Cambyses' step to strengthen his position actually enables his downfall. Given the numerous ways in which Cambyses put himself in danger, it is only fitting that he completes his destruction "from within": As he prepares to go back to Persia to face the Magi, he dies from an accidental thigh wound suffered in mounting his horse.²⁸ Thus, the son of Cyrus, from whom so much was surely expected, ended up squandering his inheritance and ending Cyrus' line for good.

The third instance of a lion cub in the *Histories* only seems to confirm the symbolic messages of the first two. In a passage much ridiculed by ancient commentators, and virtually ignored by modern ones, Herodotus states that a lioness can give birth but once in her life. As it is born, the cub fiercely claws at its mother's womb, destroying the organ from inside. In its very nature of being the most powerful beast, then, the lion is too powerful for its own good; its very strength ensures that, theoretically, the species will eventually destroy itself.²⁹

Basically, this might on the surface seem to be a gratuitous observation, occurring outside the bounds of any discrete historical episode. However, Herodotus here appeals to the general "laws of nature" regarding the lion itself as a way of grounding the "laws of history" that he is deriving with the use of the lion symbol. Nature has a way of limiting the concentration of the fanciful, and the powerful; so human behavior, which generates "historical law" and which Herodotus attempts to demonstrate as fundamentally similar across cultural boundaries (below the level of *nomos*), has a way of limiting the concentration of wealth. Indeed, Herodotus says just about as much in introducing his own view of historical

²⁷ Hdt. 3. 32. 1–2, identified as a Greek story. Confirming this conclusion, Herodotus next reports an alternate Egyptian tradition in which the sister-wife is more direct: She peels a cabbage in front of her husband, saying that he is doing the same to his house. Enraged, Cambyses kicks her in the stomach, causing both miscarriage and death.

²⁸ Hdt. 3. 64. Here, Herodotus reminds the audience that the thigh wound itself also suggests how Cambyses brought ruin upon himself. He had disgraced Egyptian *nomos* by stabbing the Apis bull in the thigh and killing it; Herodotus reports that the Egyptians understood this to be the critical event in shaping Cambyses' fate (3. 30. 1).

²⁹ Hdt. 3. 108. 4. Aristotle, *Historia animalium* 579a2, claimed that such a scenario was "ridiculous," an artificial explanation for the low numbers of the species.

causation upon rejecting the infamous “cherchez la femme” parody to open his narrative;³⁰ we can also look again to Aeschylus for the symbolic connection between the “lion in the house” and the self-destructive effects of excessive wealth in the playwright’s description of Helen as an ὄγαλμα πλούτου and the attendant choral remarks.³¹

In terms of Herodotus’ historical narrative, though, the placement of the digressive observation about the lioness does indeed mark a critical transition between episodic groups, one that precisely emphasizes the universality of the historian’s conclusions. Herodotus next uses the lion cub not to describe an eastern potentate, but as a symbol of an analog in Greece itself: the tyrant. In his condemnation of the institution of tyranny, the Corinthian Socles relates the history of the Cypselids. As Corinth was oppressed by an oligarchy, two oracular responses from Delphi predicted how the baby Cypselus would change the situation. The first described him as a millstone which would fall upon the rulers and bring justice to Corinth; the second, however, symbolized him as the product of an unusual birth: a lion cub born to an eagle. The cub would go on to “loosen the knees of many.”³²

Herodotus’ conception of the lion cub very suitably applies to the standard pattern of Greek tyranny itself, as exemplified by Plato and Aristotle, and as Herodotus himself summarized it in his very Greek account of Deioces the Mede.³³ The tyrant rises as a liberator, and initially rules in splendor, with much potential for the welfare of his people; even the anti-tyrannical Herodotus must admit this about Pisistratus.³⁴ However, the tyrant soon concentrates on his own enrichment at his people’s expense, and thus eats away at his city from within, committing murders, breaking *nomos*, and indulging in excess.³⁵

This is precisely how Cypselus’ career would proceed, and the knees loosened by that unusually born lion cub would belong both to the deserving and undeserving alike; the oracle’s customary ambiguity proves

³⁰ Hdt. 1. 5. 4.

³¹ Agamemnon 741; cf. below on the next line and Herodotus’ story of Cypselus’ survival. The similarities to Herodotus’ sentiments on the fickle character of wealth are chiefly in 750–56; cf. more generally the famous outline of the process of *hubris* and *dike*, 763–81.

³² Hdt. 5. 92β. 2–3. On the tyranny at Corinth and the symbolism of the oracles, see V. J. Gray, “Herodotus and Images of Tyranny: The Tyrants of Corinth,” *AJP* 116 (1996) 361–89, especially 371–76. Although Gray also understands the lion negatively, she so interprets the millstone as well, admitting that the attendant prediction of justice would thus be problematic, and thus concluding that the symbol anticipates the final result of Cypselus’ rule.

³³ Cf. Plato, *Republic* 8. 566b–67c and Aristotle, *Ars rhetorica* 1357b30. For Herodotus’ account of Deioces, see 1. 96–101. It is telling that Herodotus’ first statement about Deioces is that he made history out of a “lust for tyranny”; see note 50 below.

³⁴ Hdt 1. 59. 6. On Herodotus’ opposition to tyranny, see especially J. Gammie, “Herodotus on Kings and Tyrants,” *JNES* 45 (1986) 171–95.

³⁵ Compare also Otanes’ characterization of the tyrant in the “Constitutional Debate,” 3. 80. 3–4. This Greek perspective attributed to a Persian is fundamental to Herodotus’ views on the subject.

more than appropriate. Nonetheless, the Corinthians did figure out what the responses portended, and resolved to murder the baby Cypselus, who survived in perhaps an equally appropriate way: The infant smile which forestalled the would-be killers is the functional equivalent of the “soft glance of the eyes” with which Aeschylus’ “lion in the house” supposedly captivated the Trojans.³⁶

This is the background against which Herodotus chooses to set the story of Agariste’s dream. Pericles’ representation as a lion cub notionally compares him to Croesus, Cambyses, and Cypselus, but the immediate context of the report makes the link even stronger. The mention of Pericles ends the digression on the Alcmaeonids, which started with an account of how the family obtained the wealth with which it could achieve prominence. We learn that it was none other than Croesus and his false sense of security that gave Alcmaeon his start. The Lydian invited his Greek guest to take as much gold as he could carry and, amused at Alcmaeon’s clever efforts to find portage methods, felt that he could afford to let Alcmaeon keep double what he had managed to pick up.³⁷

Pericles is not the only famous Athenian leader who owes such a debt to Croesus. Miltiades’ family, too, ultimately derived its power in the Chersonese from Croesus, and it may not be mere accident that Herodotus directly follows the mention of Pericles with an account of Miltiades’ unseemly end in the Parian expedition. This is quite an important story, as it illustrates one of the fundamental lessons that Herodotus encourages his audience to learn from historical example. As the imperial nation is defeated, the victorious enemy is tempted to adopt its policy. So the Lydian counsellor Sandanis wisely predicted when Croesus contemplated attacking Persia,³⁸ and it was Croesus himself who gave the victorious Cyrus a first-hand lesson in imperialism. If he wanted to maintain his position, the Great King would have to break his initial promise of wealth to all those Persians who would follow him in overthrowing Astyages the Mede—and thereby break the Persian *nomos* of honesty—and keep all the booty of Sardis for himself, using another lie in the process.³⁹

Here, Miltiades, fresh from keeping Athens free from Persian imperialism at Marathon, uses the opportunity to establish the habit for which Pericles’ imperial Athens would be infamous: bullying the islanders. In fact, Herodotus seems to have crafted his account of the attack on Paros so as to recall the careers of Cyrus and Cambyses. Like the former, Miltiades vaguely promises riches to all the soldiers who follow him in

³⁶ *Agamemnon* 742.

³⁷ Hdt. 6. 125.

³⁸ Hdt. 1. 71, especially section 6: “Once the Persians get a taste of our *agatha*, they will latch onto them, and it will be impossible to push them away.” The language could easily suggest a lion taking hold of a piece of meat.

³⁹ Hdt. 1. 89. For Cyrus’ promise of *agatha* to the Persians who would join him against Astyages, see 1. 126. 5.

what turns out to be an expedition for personal gain; like the latter, Miltiades dies from an accidentally self-inflicted thigh wound suffered in the wake of violating *nomos*.⁴⁰

What, then, might all this imply about Herodotus' views on Periclean policy? Surely, our thoughts here must admittedly be somewhat speculative, but with these strong symbolic ties and the suggestive ordering of the narrative, it is possible to conclude that Herodotus also identifies Pericles as one who trusted too much in his situation, and who started to destroy his nation from within. Herodotus writes after the Peloponnesian War has started taking its toll, with increasing losses and misfortunes for Athens; Pericles himself had strongly advocated the war in the first place. Is Herodotus likening Pericles' war with Sparta to Croesus' with Persia? Does the historian seek, ever so subtly, to remind the audience of Pericles' confidence that Athens' power base would last in the face of Peloponnesian troop superiority, not to mention against Athens' own "allies," whose "loyalty" had to be secured by expeditions such as Miltiades'?

In this connection we are naturally inclined to remember how Pericles defended his policy to the disheartened Athenian citizenry, in the words of Thucydides: The *polis* is now virtually a tyranny, perhaps unjustly taken, but dangerous to let go.⁴¹ As with Herodotus' *Histories*, the historical context of Thucydides' writing must not be forgotten, either. Pericles wound up being fined despite his attempts to rally his countrymen, and died shortly thereafter from the great plague that his war had facilitated. Perhaps it is more than coincidence that Herodotus similarly remembers Miltiades' end: Lingering from the wound caused by his imperialism, Miltiades is fined for his policy, but his death prevents him from paying; that responsibility falls to his son, Cimon.

Although Thucydides himself clearly blames the ultimate failure of Pericles' strategy on his demagogic successors, Herodotus may have regarded the situation in precisely these terms. For Pericles himself, imperial policy proved not only to be self-perpetuating, as Thucydides reports him putting it, but, in practical terms, suicidal; his death, however, prevented him from paying the full price that Athens was bound to pay. The Alcmaeonids started out as "tyrant haters," but just as Alcmaeon in fact owed his influence to Croesus, Pericles ultimately fell into the disastrous behavior by which Croesus trapped himself.⁴²

Agariste's dream is Herodotus' final instance of lion cubs. The lion in general, though, makes one more appropriate appearance. As Xerxes' army marches through Thrace toward a supposedly easy conquest of Greece, lions

⁴⁰ Miltiades' promise, 6. 132; wounding and death, 6. 134. 2 and 6. 136. 3.

⁴¹ Thucydides 2. 63. Cf. Cleon's similar characterization of Athens as a tyranny in 3. 37.

⁴² For Herodotus' description of the Alcmaeonids as μισοτύραννοι, see 6. 121, part of the historian's infamous defense of the clan against charges of Medism stemming from the supposed shield-signal at Marathon.

emerge from the countryside and speed towards the long column, but attack only the Persian camels.⁴³ Herodotus' apparent wonder at this phenomenon may in fact be gentle encouragement for the audience to do some thinking about patterns in history. The astute listener will remember that camels allowed Persia to become an imperial power in the first place: Their unusual odor frightened off the horses of the army defending Sardis.⁴⁴ Otherwise, the crack Lydian cavalry surely would have turned back Cyrus' invading forces. Also, as mentioned previously, it was none other than a lion cub, the very symbol of Lydian royalty, that was supposedly supplying the ultimate power to protect Sardis from harm; the miscalculations of those symbolized, however, proved most responsible in neutralizing this power.

Herodotus may have had grand designs in choosing to relate this episode, showing how the patterns of history have come full circle, but with new players faced with the old situations and choices that caused others to stumble.⁴⁵ On the one hand, doom is portended for Persian imperial intentions, as now it is the camels who are chased off. On the other, the attacking lions would naturally represent the Greek defenders, and, if Herodotus' previous leonine symbology holds constant, would suggest that the Greeks, soon confronted with the many possibilities of victory, will experience frustration and failure themselves.

In this regard, perhaps we might think of a mighty sailor from Troezen, the finest of his crew, whose opportunity to demonstrate his prowess for battle was stolen by the flight and ensuing surrender of his ship. The Persian captors sacrificed him as the fruit of their victory, and Herodotus muses how much this fate was connected with his name: Leon.⁴⁶ We ourselves might similarly wonder about a more recognizable casualty of the war: Leonidas. But how might his famous stand with the three hundred at Thermopylae, mentioned at the start of this article in connection with frequently cited examples of positive leonine symbolism, be considered a failure?

Thermopylae was chiefly remembered not so much as the defense of territory, but as the defense of a way of life. Herodotus impresses this on the audience by prefacing the battle with a forceful scene, in which the Spartan defector Demaratus praises his countrymen's obedience to *nomos* to an incredulous Xerxes, and by concluding with the similar sentiments of the epitaph at the battle site. Clearly, the determination of Leonidas' men at

⁴³ Hdt. 7. 125–26.

⁴⁴ Hdt. 1. 80, 3–6.

⁴⁵ Here, we might see some elements of Anaximandrian *tisis* discussed by Gould (above, note 11) 85, but Herodotus subordinates simple "tit-for-tat" to a larger system. Once again, we should make reference to Herodotus' opening principle that "happiness never stays in the same place" advanced in refuting the "cherchez la femme" theory (1. 5. 4): Herodotus rejects a strictly bilateral model of "punch, counterpunch" between "east" and "west" in favor of a progressive chain of similar behavior patterns spread by contact.

⁴⁶ Hdt. 7. 180.

Thermopylae showed the potential, if not the very virtue, of the Greek cause. But although the Greeks were later able to achieve victory in the military sense, did they follow up this promising beginning in moral terms?

We have seen how Miltiades' actions after Marathon turned Athens on the wrong path in the wake of its great national victory; Herodotus also makes sure to report how the other Athenian military hero, Themistocles, used his triumph at Salamis in exactly the same manner, with self-serving attacks on Andros and other islands.⁴⁷ These expeditions were launched in the wake of an even more hypocritical speech: The Athenians would have otherwise continued to pursue the fleeing Persians, but counted Themistocles wise for warning them *not* to repeat the imperial mistakes of the Persian foe! Themistocles cleverly said virtuous words for a villainous reason: He wished not to save the Athenians, but to do Xerxes a favor, in case he ever needed one in return; Herodotus reminds the audience that Themistocles would indeed defect to Persia.⁴⁸

As for Sparta, Leonidas' example in the opening battle of the campaign must be viewed in comparison with that of the Spartan commander who led the Greeks to victory in the final battle: Pausanias. On the surface of it, the end seems to be quite fitting. In his moment of victory, Pausanias is shown steadfastly refusing exhortations to violate *nomos*, and exhibiting his devotion to it: For the amusement of the Greek army, he had the captured Persian chefs prepare a Persian-style banquet alongside an offering of typical Spartan fare. With a laugh, he asked why the Persians, whose baggage train alone had amazed the Greeks, would go to so much trouble to conquer such penurious folk.⁴⁹

To leave the analysis at that, though, would ignore the narrative context in which Pausanias is situated. The Spartan's two preceding appearances have already shown the audience how Pausanias would act after Plataea. In the first instance, Herodotus quite simply says that Pausanias wanted nothing other than to be a tyrant ruling Greece, although he doubts whether the Spartan secured betrothal to a cousin of Darius for that end.⁵⁰ In the

⁴⁷ Hdt. 8. 111–12. Themistocles is described as suffering from *pleonexia*, a word commonly applied to Athenian imperial behavior in the fifth century; significantly, Cyrus is also so characterized as he fatally overreaches himself in the Massagetae expedition (1. 206). See K. Raafalaub, "Herodotus, Political Thought, and the Meaning of History," *Aretusa* 20 (1987) 221–48, especially 227–29.

⁴⁸ Hdt. 8. 109. 5; Fornara (above, note 6) 70–71 argues that Themistocles was not deceiving the Athenians, but simply trying to fool Xerxes as he had done before Salamis (8. 75. 2–3).

⁴⁹ Hdt. 9. 82. The sentiment reminds the audience of Sandanis' assessment of the discrepancy between Lydian and Persian wealth in 1. 71: Lydia had everything to lose and nothing to gain in attacking the backward Persians. As mentioned above, Cyrus wound up adopting Croesus' behavior despite earlier intentions (1. 89, 1. 126. 5); this in itself is enough to suggest the aftermath for Pausanias, in addition to the more directed textual cues to which our discussion now turns.

⁵⁰ Hdt. 5. 32. Even in arguing that Herodotus attempted to exculpate Pausanias from allegations of treason, J. A. S. Evans, "The Medism of Pausanias: Two Versions," *Antichthon* 22 (1988) 1–11, agrees that Herodotus' language technically indicates skepticism only about

second, Herodotus cites no less than Pausanias' *hubris* as an Athenian pretext for stripping him of his command and finally embarking on the awaited imperial campaign against Persia.⁵¹

Moreover, Herodotus shrewdly closes the *Histories* shortly thereafter with an anecdote that turns out to be a parallel to Pausanias' situation. Fresh from his victory over Astyages, Cyrus adamantly refuses to yield to a suggestion that he use his newly won power to abandon the poor, mountainous Persian homeland and pursue an imperial policy in the rich, fertile plain.⁵² From the course of history as Herodotus has related it, the audience knows that Cyrus failed miserably to adhere to this stance. From its own experience, the audience would likely know Pausanias—regardless of his actual guilt of "Medizing"—as Thucydides (and later Plutarch) portrayed him: a man who, like Cyrus, fell prey to the temptations that Sandanis had so correctly foretold. Once exposed to Persian imperial riches, he went over to Persia, coveting tyrannical power and enjoying the very finery which he had mocked.⁵³ In other words, Herodotus' account of Pausanias in the aftermath of Plataea was calculated to affect the Greek audience in much the same way as a tale recounting the heroic exploits of Benedict Arnold at Saratoga would affect an American one. In the end, then, Leonidas' stand for Greek *nomos* was nullified by Pausanias' ultimate rejection of it.

Herodotus' lion cub is indeed an ambiguous symbol that readily lent itself to the historian's purposes. It cleverly ties apparently disparate episodes together and, more importantly, suggests how historical data can be interrelated to draw conclusions for the future. The analogous portraits of the great majesty, but excessive ferocity of the lion cub preceding Agariste's dream, and the examples of frustrated promise following the scene infuse the brief mention of Pericles as lion cub with greater significance.

Herodotus thus expects his information about the relatively unfamiliar to direct his audience to use its own knowledge in reflecting upon the familiar.⁵⁴ Domestic propaganda is turned back on itself, as the audience is

the betrothal, and not about Pausanias' "lust for tyranny"; however, Evans does add that Herodotus "was probably equally skeptical of the allegation of tyranny." On the connection between lust and tyranny in the *Histories*, see D. Lateiner, "No Laughing Matter: A Literary Tactic in Herodotus," *TAPA* 107 (1977) 173–82, 181 n. 15.

⁵¹ Hdt. 8. 3.

⁵² Hdt. 9. 122.

⁵³ Thucydides 1. 128–30; Plutarch, *Aristides* 23 and *Cimon* 6. Compare the accounts of Themistocles' behavior in Persia, Thucydides 1. 138 and Plutarch, *Themistocles* 27–29.

⁵⁴ J. Schwartz, "Hérodote et Périclès," *Historia* 18 (1969) 367–70 and J. A. S. Evans, *Herodotus, Explorer of the Past* (Princeton 1991) 93–94, suggest that Herodotus' report of Lycian *nomoi* concerning legitimate births (1. 173. 5) may also have been so directed against Pericles. The historian emphasizes that not even the leading Carian male citizen could have his offspring by a foreign wife or concubine considered legitimate; Pericles had gone to great lengths to enroll his son by Aspasia, contrary to Athenian *nomos*. On Herodotus' use of

encouraged to re-evaluate the great Pericles and his policy. As with tyranny itself, bad ends can and do come from good beginnings. Perhaps it is not too late for Herodotus' audience, citizens of the "tyranny of Athens," to heed Solon's advice to "look to the end."

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eastern despots and Greek tyrants in patterning a model of interpretation for the audience, see D. Lateiner, *The Historical Method of Herodotus* (Toronto 1989) 166–79.

Notes on Euripides, *Iphigenia in Tauris*

MARTIN CROPP

I cite the readings of ms. L (= Laurentianus plut. 32.2) except where noted, and except for routine adjustments in orthography, punctuation and colometry.¹

130–36

(Xor.)	όσίας ὄσιον πόδα παρθένιον κληιδούχου δούλα πέμπω, 'Ελλάδος εὐίπου πύργους καὶ τείχη χόρτων τ' εὐδένδρων έξαλλάξασ' Εὐρώπαν, πατρώιων οἴκων ἔδρας.	130 135
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130 ὄσίας ὄσιον πόδα παρθένιον Seidler: πόδα παρθένιον ὄσιον ὄσίας L
|| 132 εὐίπου p: τᾶς εὐίπου L || 135 Εὐρώταν Barnes

I walk in our holy maiden-procession, servant of your (i.e. Artemis') holy keyholder, having left the ramparts and towers of horse-rich Hellas and Europe with its lushly wooded pastures, site of my ancestral home.

Barnes's Εὐρώταν replaces "Europe" with the Laconian river Eurotas. Edith Hall has argued vigorously in favour of this change, and it is now accepted by James Diggle.² Hall was concerned, reasonably enough, to show that Euripides had a clear idea of the geographical location of the Taurians' land, the Tauric Chersonese or modern Crimea. The problem she saw in Εὐρώπαν is that it makes the Chorus imply that they have left Europe when in fact Greek geography placed the Taurians' land *in* Europe.

Εὐρώταν, however, has its own difficulties. First, lines 132–35 together make a pair of (a) Greece with its fortified cities and fine horses and (b) Europe with its meadows and their fine trees. The two elements together seem to make up a generic picture of Greece as a well-protected area within the fertile natural environment of Europe. While the fertility of

¹ I thank James Diggle and David Sansone for their comments on a draft of these notes.

² E. Hall, *AJP* 107 (1987) 430–33; J. Diggle, *Euripidea* (Oxford 1994) 418. Earlier editors accepting Εὐρώταν include Schoene and Paley.

Europe (134) is stressed for the sake of contrast with the barrenness of the Taurians' land (218–19), the characterization of Europe as finely treed is not in itself unexpected. It is in fact shared with Herodotus, who tells of Mardonius's using it to entice Xerxes into invading Europe: . . . ἡ Εὐρώπη περικαλλής χώρη καὶ δένδρεα παντοῖα φέρει τὰ ἥμερα (Hdt. 7. 5. 3).³

Further, we might expect an identification of Sparta (or Laconia) as the Chorus's home to have some resonances later in the play, but it does not. On the contrary, in lines 399–401 the Chorus guess that Orestes and Pylades may have come "from Eurotas' beautiful waters and fresh green reeds, or Dirce's holy streams" (*tὸν εὔνδρον δονακόχλοον λιπόντες Εὐρώταν ἡ ρεύματα σεμνὰ Δίρκας*), i.e. from Sparta or Thebes, but they do not give Sparta any special attention. These are just two leading Greek cities, chosen here so as not to associate the unrecognised strangers with Orestes' real home, Argos, or with Iphigenia's future home near Athens. Again, we learn in a later ode that the Chorus have reached the Taurians through the slave trade after the sack of their own, unspecified city (1106–12). It would be surprising if this were Sparta or a neighbouring town. In short, there is no apparent relevance in the precise origin of the Chorus, and the naming of a precise origin would be a distraction.

Euripides may have made his Chorus sing of "leaving Europe," not through carelessness or geographical ignorance, but so as to assimilate the barbaric Taurians to Asia and oppose them to the "European" Greeks. This opposition is schematic and ideological, and need not depend on geographical niceties.

159–61

(Ιφ.) . . . (my brother) . . . ὦι τάσδε χοὰς
μέλλω κρατῆρά τε τὸν φθιμένων
ὑδραίνειν γαίας ἐν νώτοις

161 ὑγραίνειν Blaydes

. . . for whom I am going to water these libations, this mixture that belongs to the dead, upon the earth's surface . . .

The conjecture ὑγραίνειν went unnoticed when Blaydes proposed it in 1901. Diggle proposed it independently in 1976 and printed it in his 1981 edition. His choice was disputed by Sansone.⁴ On both sides the arguments were largely concerned with the question of content. Diggle argued that ὑδραίνειν could only refer to the pouring of water, and noted that the other

³ Wecklein and Platnauer cite this passage. Contrast Hall (previous note) 432–33: "Strohm comments . . . that Europe was thought to be more fertile than Asia; but this goes against the ancient consensus (cf. *Aér.* 12)." In *IT* 132–36 the contrast has to do with the Taurians' land rather than Asia as a whole.

⁴ Diggle (above, note 2) 148–49, 216–18 = *PCPS* 22 (1976) 42 and *QUCC* 8 (1981) 161–63; D. Sansone, *QUCC* 1 (1979) 157–58.

instances of this rare verb seem to connote cleansing.⁵ Sansone suggested that Euripides could have used ὑδραίνειν loosely for libations of which water was only one part (even though water is not specified in the list of ingredients which follows in 163–65) just as χέρνιψ refers to a mixed libation for the dead in Aeschylus, *Choephoroi* 129, or that ὑδρ- might be understood loosely as “liquid,” as ὕδωρ sometimes is in scientific contexts.

The content of the libations does not seem to me to be the decisive issue here. Ὅδραίνειν clearly means “to water,” and it can easily enough be used with an external object, as in *Iphigenia in Tauris* 54 (αὐτόν), or with an internal object, as in *Electra* 157 (λουτρά), and, according to L’s reading, in *Iphigenia in Tauris* 159–61 (χοάς). Since Iphigenia’s libations do not consist of water, the usage here should be understood as metaphorical. In Aeschylus, *Choephoroi* 129 (κάγῳ χέουσα τάσδε χέρνιβας νεκροῖς), χέρνιβας is similarly a metaphor, and in Sophocles, *Electra* 84 and 434 libations for Agamemnon are metaphorically called λουτρά, another term that normally suggests water.⁶ *Iphigenia in Tauris* 159–61 seems to repeat this pattern, perhaps intentionally, since Iphigenia’s libation-ceremony for Orestes is modelled on Electra’s for Agamemnon.

With ὑδραίνειν the construction would be rather harsh (“to moisten these libations on the ground” = “to pour these moist libations on the ground”) and not to my knowledge paralleled so far as this verb is concerned. The poetic expressions cited by Wecklein and Platnauer (as illustrating the use of ὑδραίνειν!)—Sophocles, *Ajax* 376 ἐρεμνὸν αἷμ’ ἔδευσα, “I drenched dark blood,” *Trachiniae* 847–48 ὀδινῶν χλωρὰν τέγγει δακρύων ἄχνων, “she soaks a fresh dew of dense tears,” Pindar, *Nemean* 10. 75 θερμὰ . . . τέγγων δάκρυα, “soaking hot tears”—seem to me more natural and effective than this.

336–39

(Βου.) εὔχου δὲ τοιάδ', ὡς νεᾶνι, σοὶ ξένων
σφάγια παρεῖναι· κανὸν ἀναλίσκης ξένους
τοιούσδε, τὸν σὸν Ἑλλὰς ἀποτείσει φόνον,
δίκας τίνουσα τῆς ἐν Αὐλίδι σφαγῆς.

336 ηὗχου Mekler

⁵ *El.* 157 λουτρὰ πανύσταθ' ὑδρανάμενον χροί, *IT* 54 (ἔδοξα) ὑδραίνειν αὐτὸν . . . , *Hom. Od.* 4. 750 (= 4. 759, 17. 48, 17. 58) ή δ' ὑδρηναμένη . . . ; cf. *Eur. Ion* 97 καθαραῖς δὲ δρόσοις ἀφυδρανάμενοι . . . I have found no others than these through the *TLG* CD-ROM #D.

⁶ Cf. Garvie on *Cho.* 129: “Electra perhaps sprinkles drops of the χοάι over the tomb, as a preliminary to the pouring of the offering as a whole at 149 . . . But χέουσα suggests more than sprinkling, and probably χέρνιβας is used, exceptionally, here as a synonym for χοάς, as λουτρά is at *S. El.* 84, 434 (cf. Hesych. s.v. χθόνια λουτρά). It means a water-libation at E. *Hyps.* fr. 1.iv.30 (see Bond).”

Young lady, pray to have strangers like these for victims. If you can execute such strangers as these, Hellas will be making amends for your murder and paying the price for your sacrifice at Aulis.

Mekler's conjecture, changing "pray" to "you have been praying," is adopted by most twentieth-century editors (including Murray, Sansone, Diggle, and—rather equivocally—Strohm and Platnauer; not, however, Grégoire). The contextual problem it creates has been discussed before, and I need only repeat the essentials.⁷ The implication that Iphigenia has been eager to sacrifice Greeks in the past so as to avenge her own sacrifice by Greeks at Aulis contradicts her characterisation elsewhere in the play, and especially in her speech just eight lines later, when she says that in the past she has always been full of pity for her fellow-Greeks when they were brought to her for sacrifice but will harden her heart now that she believes Orestes dead. The idea that she has nursed a longing for Greek victims is in no way supported by 354–58 or 439–46 (which express the thought that *Helen* and *Menelaus* would be her proper victims). Her distaste for her sacrificial duties has been displayed at 225–28, where the suppression of pity for her victims in favour of grief for her brother is also prepared (229–35). The status of 258–59 is too uncertain to carry weight in this argument.

It may be worth adding several further reasons why Mekler's conjecture is neither needed nor wanted:

(1) A report-speech that ends with a summary recommendation and reflection, as this one does if εύχου is retained, is entirely normal. For the particular pattern found here compare *Hecuba* 579–82, *Bacchae* 769–74, and especially *Supplices* 726–30 τοιόνδε δὴ στρατηγὸν αἱρεῖσθαι χρεών, / ὃς ἐν τε τοῖς δεινοῖσιν ἔστιν ἄλκιμος, etc. On the other hand, a report-speech which ends with a comment on its recipient's past prayers, made by a character who has no occasion to know them, is abnormal.

(2) Εύχου with infinitive-phrase is an idiom often used in recommending a choice of fortunes, whether in general or in a particular situation. (So of course is εύχομαι.) Compare, for example, *Hippolytus* 1455 τοιῶνδε παίδων γνησίων εύχου τυχεῖν, *Electra* 563–65, *Ion* 423–24, Aeschylus, *Septem contra Thebas* 266, *Choephoroi* 212–13, Sophocles, *Ajax* 392–93, 686, Theognis 129, Menander, *Samia* 609, *Sententiae* 247 Jäkel εύχου δ' ἔχειν τι, καὶ ἔχητις ἔξεις φίλους, 773, Philemon fr. 178. 14–15 Kassel–Austin εύχου μὴ λαβεῖν πειράν φίλων· εἰ δὲ μή, γνώσει σεαυτὸν ἄλλο μηδὲν ἢ σκιάν. The passages of Menander and Philemon which I have cited even parallel our passage's conditional follow-up, "And if you get (or don't get) your wish . . ." On the other hand, "You have been praying . . . , and if your prayer is granted . . ." is less coherent.

(3) Comparison with some of the examples cited above (*Suppl.* 726–30, *Hipp.* 1455) shows that the Herdsman's remark is not just a general

⁷ See J. C. G. Strachan, *CP* 71 (1976) 134–36, supported by M. Cropp, *Hermes* 107 (1979) 249 n. 2a, against D. Sansone, *RhM* 121 (1978) 36 n. 4.

exhortation (like e.g. Menand. *Sentent.* 247, Philemon fr. 178. 14–15) but amounts to a comment on the prisoners he has described: in effect, “These are just the kind of victims you should be praying for.” So there is no cause to object that he ought logically to say, “Pray for *other* such victims,”⁸ nor to preclude this by insisting that what the Herdsman means is, “Pray for a *constant supply* of such victims . . .”⁹

To return to the dramatic context: The Herdsman’s remark has three particular effects if he is encouraging Iphigenia to vengefulness against her normal instinct. First, this encouragement prepares for Iphigenia’s announcement that she has (now) hardened her heart. Secondly, the Herdsman’s officiousness and lack of sympathy with her are advertised, somewhat comically. As a barbaric Taurian he sees human sacrifice as a *nomos* (cf. 38, 463–66) and is looking forward with enthusiasm to seeing Orestes and Pylades killed (cf. 243–45), whereas Iphigenia cannot believe that human sacrifices are called for by the gods (385–91). This characterisation of the Herdsman anticipates the characterisation of Thoas, who also is eager to get on with the sacrifices of Orestes and Pylades (1153–54, 1190) and does not see through Iphigenia’s trick because he takes it for granted that she is loyal to her duties and his community and cannot imagine she will want to spare her Greek captives or escape herself (cf. especially 1180–89, 1212–14). At that point, of course, Iphigenia encourages Thoas’s belief because it suits her escape-plan. Thirdly, the Herdsman speaks more than he knows, since Orestes and Pylades are precisely the kind of “strangers” for whose arrival Iphigenia should be praying.

340–41

Χορ. Θαυμάστ’ ἔλεξας τὸν φανένθ’, ὅστις ποτὲ
“Ελληνος ἐκ γῆς πόντον ἥλθεν ἄξενον.

340 μανένθ’ Kaehler, Lakon

It’s a marvellous story you’ve told of this man who has appeared, whoever he may be who has come from Hellene land to Unfriendly sea.

The conjecture μανένθ’ turns “this man who has appeared” into “this man who has suffered a fit of madness” (which the Herdsman has just described impressively in his report-speech). It has been adopted even more widely than εὔχου in 336 (see Bruhn, Wecklein’s school edition, Murray, Grégoire, Platnauer, Strohm, Sansone, Diggle). Yet there is no compelling reason for

⁸ This objection underlies the feeling that the sentence as it stands is somehow unsatisfactory. For example, Platnauer ad loc.: “Keeping the MSS. εὔχου (imperative) we must understand ἄλλο with τοιάδε or even emend to σοι θαυμὰ [ξένων] (Stadtmüller) or πολλά σοι [ξένων] (Paley and Barthold), regarding ξένων as a gloss”; Paley: “With παρεῖναι it seems necessary to supply αὐθις or ἐς τὸ λοιπὸν . . .”

⁹ Strachan (above, note 7) 136.

rejecting φανένθ', and a compelling reason not to. Ellendt's *Lexicon Sophocleum* describes the relevant usage of the passive (and intransitive active) forms of φαίνω: "apparere, de rebus visui patentibus, unde de hominibus dictum aliquando venire aut venisse interpretari licet." In fact tragedy often uses these forms to denote a somehow unexpected or long-awaited appearance, arrival or "turning up," both in ordinary human situations, e.g. Euripides, *Electra* 578 (Electra greeting Orestes), *Heraclidae* 663, Sophocles, *Ajax* 462, *Trachiniae* 186, 228, *Oedipus Tyrannus* 838, *Electra* 172 (Electra complaining of Orestes' non-return), *Oedipus Coloneus* 77, 328, 1120,¹⁰ and with reference to divine epiphanies or appearances which are represented as having some supernatural motivation, e.g. Euripides, *Alcestis* 92, *Hippolytus* 677, *Hercules* 494, *Bacchae* 42, 182, 1017, *Iphigenia Aulidensis* 973, Aeschylus, *Persae* 354, *Choephoroi* 143 (Electra referring to Orestes), Sophocles, *Philoctetes* 1445–46. The Messenger's narrative has indicated a supernatural element in the strangers' arrival, both in the religious peasant's guess that they are *daimones* (270 ff.; he is wrong, but not wholly off the mark), and in their miraculous invulnerability (328–29). The Chorus are interested in the origin and identity of these strangers who have appeared in such remarkable circumstances. Their comment says just this (i.e., ὅστις ποτὲ etc. elaborates on τὸν φανένθ'), and it prepares for their ode following this scene (393 ff.), which explores the topic at length. In speaking of Orestes "appearing" they (or their leader) unconsciously use a word which is also appropriate to his actual role as a divinely sponsored rescuer for themselves and Iphigenia. This sufficiently explains why the participle is singular when we might expect Pylades to be included in their comment.

569–75

Iφ.	ψευδεῖς ὄνειροι, χαίρετ', οὐδὲν ἦτ' ἄρα.	
Ορ.	οὐδ' οἱ σοφοί γε δαίμονες κεκλημένοι	570
	πτηνῶν ὄνείρων εἰσὶν ἀψευδέστεροι.	
	πολὺς ταραγμὸς ἔν τε τοῖς θείοις ἔνι	
	κάν τοῖς βροτείοις· ἐν δὲ λυπεῖται μόνον,	
	ὅτ' οὐκ ἄφρων ὁν, μάντεων πεισθεὶς λόγοις,	
	ὅλωλεν ὡς ὅλωλε τοῖσιν εἰδόσιν.	575

570–75 assigned to Orestes by Heath, to Iphigenia with 569 by L (572–75 to Orestes probably by Triclinius rather than L) || 570 οὐδ' Hermann: οὐθ' L || 572 θείοις Scaliger: θεοῖς L || 573 λείπεται Triclinius

—False dreams, farewell! You prove to be nothing, then.

—Nor indeed are the gods, though reputed to be wise, any more infallible than flighty dreams. There is much turmoil in divine affairs and human ones;

¹⁰ In ordinary conversation note the beginning of Plato's *Protagoras*, πόθεν, ὃ Σώκρατες, φαίνη; and Xen. *Mem.* 2. 8. 1, πόθεν . . . , Εὔθηρε, φαίνη;

but he feels pain over one thing only—when not through being foolish, but persuaded by seers' pronouncements, he is ruined as those who know of it know he is ruined.

Lines 572–75 have caused a great deal of difficulty, as can be seen most clearly from Wecklein's apparatus and appendix and the commentary of Platnauer. Diggle expresses suspicion of all six of Orestes' lines in his apparatus, and obelizes ἐν δὲ λυπεῖται μόνον. Wilamowitz proposed to add δ' after ταραγμός so as to remove the asyndeton there. This same incoherence caused Mekler to propose a lacuna between 571 and 572. Incoherence of sense caused Monk to propose a lacuna between 573 and 574, and ὅς for ὅτι in 574.

A better course is to delete 572–75. Lines 570–71 stand very well on their own, given the dramatic situation. In commenting on Iphigenia's declaration about false dreams, Orestes does not know that the dream she has dismissed concerned his own death. His comment refers to the poor guidance he has received, or thinks he has received, from Apollo (cf. 77 ff., 93–94, 711–23), but this is so far as he knows none of Iphigenia's business, and at this point she must get no inkling of who he is. He criticises Apollo briefly and obliquely, just as he complains about his own plight in 500, 548, 560, 568.

Lines 572–75 give tolerable sense in themselves: Life is all confusion, but the real pain which has arisen (in the situation to which these lines refer) has arisen because a well-meaning man has consulted seers and their advice has proved ruinous to him. This does not fit Orestes' situation, for Orestes was advised not by seers but by Apollo himself through the Pythia (85, 976). Apollo is called a seer in 711–13, 720, 1128 (cf. *Or.* 1666–67), but in 574 it is impossible to take μάντεων λόγοις as alluding to Apollo's advice, and unreasonable to suppose that Orestes is for the time being talking as if his advice came from seers and not from the god. Lines 572–75, then, look very much like a quite separate comment, probably cited as a marginal "parallel" and then mistakenly introduced into the text. Without them, the Chorus's enquiry about their own parents (576–77) follows rather more naturally on the conclusion of the discussion of Iphigenia's family at 569.

578–81

Iφ. ἀκούσατ'· ἐξ γὰρ δή τιν' ἥκομεν λόγον,
 ὑμῖν τ' ὄνησιν, ὡς ξένοι, σπεύδουσ' ἄμα
 κάμοι· τὸ δ' εὖ μάλιστά τγ' οὔτωτι γίγνεται 580
 εἰ πᾶσι ταῦτὸν πρᾶγμ' ἀρεσκόντως ἔχει.

579 σπεύδουσ' Musgrave: σπουδῆς L || 580 τὸ δ' Markland: τόδ' L | γ'
 ὥδε Porson: τῇδε Heimsoeth

Listen: I have just arrived at a plan, pursuing your advantage, strangers, and mine—and this is the best basis for good results, when the same transaction is pleasing for all.

The difficulty in 580 is minor, and Iphigenia's point is clear enough: The best results are achieved by planning which aims for the advantage of both (or all) the parties concerned. She makes the point in order to make her plan look attractive. It is made much more crisply without the laboriously phrased 581, which I think is an editorial interpolation of the kind intended to explain the sense to inexperienced readers.¹¹ As often happens, it explains rather badly since *πρᾶγμα* is not quite the right word for “planning” or “project,” and “advantageous” would be apter sense than ἀρεσκόντως, “pleasing.” The adverb is rare but available to an interpolator from 463 (it is otherwise attested in classical literature only in Pl. *Rep.* 504b6, Xen. *Oec.* 11. 19, Menand. *Dysc.* 69).

617–22

Op.	θύσει δὲ τίς με καὶ τὰ δεινὰ τλήσεται;	
Iφ.	ἐγώ· θεᾶς γὰρ τήνδε προστροπὴν ἔχω.	
Op.	ἄζηλον, ὃ νεᾶνι, κούκ εὐδαιμόνα.	
Iφ.	ἀλλ' εἰς ἀνάγκην κείμεθ', ἦν φυλακτέον.	620
Op.	αὐτῇ ξίφει θύουσα θῆλυς ἄρσενας;	
Iφ.	οὔκ, ἀλλὰ χαίτην ἀμφὶ σὴν χερνίψομαι.	

618 τήνδε P. Hibeh 24 (and Bothe); τῆσδε L | συμ[.]ραν ε[χ]ω P. Hibeh ||

619 ἄζηλον Bothe: ἄζηλά γ' L || **621** κτείνουσα P. Hibeh: θείνουσα Maehly || **622** οὔκ Triclinius: οὐκουν L

- But who will sacrifice me and bear the terrible deed?
- I shall; this is the duty I have from the goddess.
- An unenviable duty, maiden, not a happy one.
- But I am under compulsion, and must heed it.
- And will you sacrifice me with the sword yourself, female killing male?
- No; but I'll sprinkle holy water around your head.

In 621 L's θύουσα has been the reading of choice both before and after the publication of P. Hibeh 24 in 1906, although the editors of the papyrus remarked that “κτείνουσα is preferable to the traditional θύουσα . . . Maehly's acute conjecture θείνουσα, though not actually confirmed, is thus seen to have been on the right track.” I think they were right to recommend κτείνουσα; this is not simply a banalising substitute in the papyrus like συμ[φο]ράν for προστροπήν in 618. The verb θύειν often refers generally to the process of sacrificing. It can easily include the striking of the death-blow, but it is surprising that it should be used to specify the striking of the

¹¹ Such interpolations in the text of *IT* include 294 (del. Wilamowitz), 299 (del. West, *BICS* 28 [1981] 62), 317 (del. Bothe), 349 (del. Nauck), and quite possibly 278 (del. Herwerden).

death-blow in contrast with the rest of the process, and the more so when it has just been used to denote the role of Iphigenia who will *not* strike the death-blow (617).¹² Platnauer's reference to the sense of θυομένοισιν in Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 137 (the eagles killing the hare) does nothing to alleviate this difficulty. On the other hand, *Agamemnon* 1231 θῆλυς ἄρσενος φονεύς does seem to be recalled in our passage, so that the horror of wife killing husband is evoked with respect to the possibility that their daughter will kill their son; and κτείνουσα perhaps sharpens this allusion.

827–33

Iφ.	ὦ φίλτατ'—οὐδὲν ἄλλο, φίλτατος γὰρ εἰ— ἔχω σ', Ὁρέστα, τηλύγετον χθονὸς ἀπὸ πατρίδος Ἀργόθεν, ὡς φῦλος.	830
Ὀρ.	κάγὼ σὲ τὴν θανοῦσαν, ὡς δοξάζεται. κατὰ δὲ δάκρυν κατὰ δὲ γύος ἄμα χαρᾶν τὸ σὸν νοτίζει βλέφαρον, ὥσπερ τοι δέ τοι.	

—O dearest one—nothing else, for you are my dearest—I hold you, Orestes, long lost from your homeland of Argos, O dear one!

—And I hold you, who are supposed to have died! A tear, a sob along with joy bedews your face, and mine as well!

I do not concern myself here with lines 829–30, which have been thoroughly discussed by others,¹³ but with 831–33. L's assignment of all three of these lines to Orestes is unsatisfactory because 832 with its three resolved cretices will be his only line in the recognition duet which is not a non-lyric iambic trimeter—and sandwiched between two spoken trimeters. This seems too irregular (the fact that Menelaus breaks into song in the recognition duet of *Helen* is a different matter), although until recently most editors have been prepared to tolerate it.¹⁴

Three alternatives have been proposed. Lohmann in 1905 assigned 832 to Iphigenia, leaving Orestes with 833;¹⁵ but the division of the sentence in

¹² Κτείνουσα is briefly defended by C. Prato, *SIFC* 36 (1964) 72, comparing *IT* 27 ἐκαινόμην ξίφει, 1173 κατηργάσαντο κοινωνῶι ξίφει, *Hel.* 1044–45 τί δ' εἰ . . . κτάνομ' ἄνακτα . . . ξίφει, and noting that Euripides never uses θύω with such a qualification. J. Casabona, *Recherches sur le vocabulaire des sacrifices en Grec* (Aix-en-Provence 1966) 76–80, discusses the use of θύειν to include the death-blow and accepts θύουσα in *IT* 621, commenting that the addition of a word such as ξίφει gives θύω the same value as σφάζω; but he provides no parallels. That θύειν and κτείνειν can refer to the same act looked at from different points of view as legitimate or illegitimate (Casabona 78–80) is a separate matter—although it speaks if anything in favour of κτείνουσα here.

¹³ See especially J. Jackson, *Marginalia Scaenica* (Oxford 1955) 34–35, with discussion of earlier conjectures; T. C. W. Stinton, *Collected Papers on Greek Tragedy* (Oxford 1990) 15–16 = *CR* 15 (1965) 145–46; Diggle (above, note 2) 184 n. 18 = *Dionysiac* (Cambridge 1978) 175 n. 18.

¹⁴ See also C. Willink, *CQ* 39 (1989) 46.

¹⁵ As did P. Maas, *Hermes* 61 (1926) 240.

this way is very awkward, not least because, as Sansone has noted, it splits the tmesis κατὰ . . . votίζει between the two speakers. Sansone himself deletes 832–33, partly in order to assist Bergk’s change in the next line of τὸ δέ τι to τὸν (better ὅν) ἔτι;¹⁶ but this cutting of the Gordian knot should only be a last resort. The best of the three previous proposals was made by Bauer in 1872 and again by Diggle,¹⁷ assigning 832–33 together to Iphigenia, which at least presents no major difficulties.

Better still, however, is the solution suggested to me by Professor K. H. Lee: Assign κατὰ . . . βλέφαρον to Iphigenia, and ώσαύτως δ’ ἐμόν to Orestes. This also requires changing τὸ σόν to τούμόν, but it is not surprising that τούμόν should have been altered so as to provide sense when the mid-line speaker-change was lost.¹⁸ The advantages of this arrangement over Bauer’s are several: (1) It allows Orestes to comment on his own tears of joy rather than leaving Iphigenia to do it for him; (2) the pattern, “I weep for joy,” “And so do I,” matches the pattern of the previous exchange (829–31), “I hold you, Orestes,” “And I you . . .”; this pattern is more natural in a recognition duet than, “You weep for joy, and so do I,” and it gives full value to the emphatic ώσαύτως δ’; (3) we get a clear sequence of topics in the exchanges between Iphigenia and Orestes: embrace (827–31), tears of joy (832–33), miraculous reunion after long separation (834–41), and so on.

A single half-trimeter for Orestes (who in this recognition-duet otherwise has five whole trimeters and one couplet) is unusual but not implausible. The recognition duet of *Ion* has seven iambic interjections for Ion (1453, 1472, 1478, 1481, 1483, 1497, and probably 1500) along with trimeters and couplets. In the recognition-duet of Sophocles’ *Electra*, Orestes has whole trimeters and couplets in the strophe and antistrophe, then in the epode a half-trimeter interjection (1276), a whole trimeter (1279), and a bacchiac echoing Electra’s (1280).

837–40

(Ιφ.) Ὡς κρεῖσσον ἢ λόγοισιν τεύτυχῶν ἐμοῦ·
ψυχᾶ† τί φῶ; θαυμάτων πέρα
καὶ λόγου πρόσω τάδ’ ἀπέβα.

837 εύτυχῶν p || 839 ψυχᾶ P || 840 ἀπέβα Reiske: ἐπέβα L

O . . . more strongly than for (my?) words, what can I say? Beyond marvels, beyond account have these things turned out!

With εύτυχῶν (p), ψυχᾶ (P), and a comma following ψυχᾶ, it is (just) possible to understand the beginning as, “O soul (sc. Orestes), more

¹⁶ D. Sansone, *Maia* 31 (1979) 240.

¹⁷ J. Diggle, *Studies on the Text of Euripides* (Oxford 1981) 20.

¹⁸ Alternations and repetitions of “my” and “your” can easily cause confusion. Compare for example *IT* 744–45, where L has “my” (*τοῖς ἐμοῖς*) in place of the first “your” (*τοῖσι σοῖς*).

fortunate than my words can express,” or, with another comma before ἐμοῦ, “O one more fortunate than words can express, my soul (sc. Orestes),” and to explain the masculine εὐτυχῶν with feminine ψυχά as suiting the reference to Orestes. This is printed by e.g. Wecklein in his large edition and (with two commas) Sansone. More popular in recent times has been Wecklein’s conjecture εὐτυχοῦσά μου / ψυχά (following Markland’s εὐτυχοῦσ’ ἐμὰ / ψυχά), which allows Iphigenia to be addressing her own soul (which in itself is not implausible: cf. 882, *Ion* 859). Wecklein’s appendix lists many negligible conjectures on this passage and a few which plausibly substitute a form of τύχα for ψυχᾶ, though none of these is finally convincing.¹⁹ The best solution, I suggest, is:

ῳ κρεῖσσον ἢ λόγοισιν εὐτυχοῦσά μου
τύχα,

O stroke of fortune more fortunate than my words can express,

so that there is no question of anyone’s soul being addressed or experiencing good fortune, and μου is seen to depend clearly on λόγοισιν (which is what the phrasing suggests in any case).²⁰ The rhetoric of 837–40 as a whole becomes coherent: “O inexpressibly great good fortune, what can I say? This outcome is more than a miracle, beyond description.” The point is taken up in Orestes’ response (“May our good fortune continue”), and the theme of their dependence on unpredictable strokes of fortune (τύχαι) recurs in Iphigenia’s later reflections (865–67, 875). The phrasing is artful (compare *Tro.* 471 δυστυχῆ . . . τύχην,²¹ *Hipp.* 818 ὡς τύχα, ὡς μοι βαρεῖα καὶ δόμοις ἐπεστάθης), and sufficiently contrived to cause confusion and corruption. Confusion of τύχη with ψυχή is known elsewhere, including *Supplices* 622.²²

876–79

(Ιφ.) τίνα σοι πόρον εύρομένα
πάλιν ἀπὸ πόλεως, ἀπὸ φόνου πέμψω
πατρίδ' ἐξ Ἀργείαν . . . ;

¹⁹ Bothe: ὡς κρείσσον’ ἢ λόγοισιν εὐτυχῶν ὄμοιν / τύχαν, “O (Orestes) enjoying together (with me) a fortune more fortunate than words can express,” from which Hermann subtracted ὄμοιν. Elmsley, *Mus. Crit.* 2 (1826) 297: ὡς κρείσσον ἢ λόγοισιν εὐτυχῶν (gen. pl.) [ἐμοῦ] τύχαι (nom. pl.), apparently intending “O fortunes of those (i.e. us) more fortunate than words can express.”

²⁰ Postponement of a dependent genitive is common in Euripidean lyrics, especially with a verb intervening; see W. Breitenbach, *Untersuchungen zur Sprache der euripideischen Lyrik* (Stuttgart 1934) 249–51. The neat interlacing of κρείσσον . . . εὐτυχοῦσα . . . τύχα with ἢ λόγοισιν . . . μου is also characteristic of Euripides; cf. e.g. *Suppl.* 377, *El.* 714–15, *Or.* 164–65, 341–42, *IA* 1330–31 (all amongst Breitenbach’s examples, *ibid.*), and Breitenbach 260–61 on other kinds of interlacing. On the other hand μου (or ἐμοῦ) / τύχα (or ψυχά) across the colon-break is unwelcome.

²¹ Also *Alc.* 926 εὐτυχῆ . . . πότμον, *Tro.* 244 πότμος εὐτυχής, 631 εὐτυχεστέρωι πότμωι.

²² See the notes of Elmsley (above, note 19) and Paley.

876 τίνα σοι <τίνα σοι> Diggle

What path shall I find for you, to bring you back from this *polis*, from a bloody death to our Argive homeland . . . ?

There are two problems: (1) the metre of 876, three anapaests where four might be expected; (2) the sense of ἀπὸ πόλεως. The second has sometimes been attacked separately (e.g. Reiske's πελέκεως or Koechly's ξένας replacing πόλεως), sometimes together with the first (e.g. Bruhn's τίνα σοι πόρον εύρομένα πάλιν <αὐ / ξένας σ'> ἀπὸ πόλεως . . .). Diggle treats the first simply and plausibly by duplicating τίνα σοι, and adds his opinion that πόλεως is sound in view of the use of πόλις with reference to the Taurian community in 464, 595, 1209, 1214 (to which one may add 1212).²³ But in the passages compared (and also 38, though that verse may be inauthentic), "the community" is relevant as authorising human sacrifices, being served by Iphigenia, and being ruled by Thoas. In 877 there is no contextual basis for the word πόλις, and awkward sense (" . . . back from this *polis*, from a bloody death . . . ") is hardly justified by parallel phrasing (ἀπὸ πόλεως ~ ἀπὸ φόνου).

Better than this, I think, is to read ἀποπόλεως as a single word, so that the phrase means, "back from a city-absent slaughter," i.e. "back from a violent death in exile." All other instances of ἀπόπ(τ)ολις refer to people (Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 1410, Sophocles, *Trachiniae* 647, *Oedipus Tyrannus* 1000, *Oedipus Coloneus* 208; in Euripides, *Hypsipyle* fr. 70 the context is unclear), and the impersonal uses of ἀπολις are not exactly similar to what I propose here, but a bold extension of the word's usage is not unexpected in Iphigenia's overwrought monody. And there is a nice balance between ἀποπόλεως ἀπὸ φόνου and πατρίδ' ἐς Ἀργείαν.²⁴

1017–19

Iφ. πῶς οὖν γένοιτ' ἂν ὕστε μήθ' ἡμᾶς θανεῖν
λαβεῖν θ' ἢ βουλόμεσθα; τῆιδε γὰρ νοσεῖ
νόστος πρὸς οἴκους, ή δὲ βούλησις πάρα.

1018 νοσεῖ Markland: νόει L || **1019** ἥδε βούλευσις Markland (ἥδε M. Crusius: see J. A. Spranger, *SIFC* 11 [1934] 252)

So how can it come about that we escape death and get what we want as well? This is where our return home languishes, although we have the will for it.

²³ Diggle (above, note 2) 150–51 with n. 17 = *PCPS* 22 (1976) 44–45 with n. 17. The list of other recent editors who have printed L's text as it stands includes Weil ("ἀπὸ πόλεως équivaut à ἀπὸ χθονός"), Grégoire ("échapper à ce peuple") and Sansone.

²⁴ David Sansone suggests another way of supplying the epithet which πόλεως seems to need: For ἀπὸ φόνου read e.g. ἀνδροφόνου. In his 1940 edition of the play J. D. Meerwaldt proposed reading ἀποφόνου, which barely makes sense.

Markland's reading in 1019, "This is the deliberation before us," has been widely adopted (although Bruhn, Grégoire and Murray for example retain L's text). Sansone objected that βούλευσις is a prosaic word first found in Aristotle (which the *TLG* CD-ROM #D confirms), and prints ἥδε βούλησις πάρα, "This is the wish we have." The change to ἥδε is superficially attractive because it creates the anaphora τῇδε . . . ἥδε, but it destroys the more pointed rhetoric of the original; ή δὲ βούλησις πάρα is far from "intolerably weak" (as Platnauer claims). Iphigenia's first sentence (1017–18) indicates that they need to find a way of getting what they want, which is to escape safely while also carrying off the image of Artemis. Her second sentence stresses that wanting is not enough: "We know what we want, but how to do it is the problem." This is well explained by E.-R. Schwinge, *Die Verwendung der Stichomythie in den Dramen des Euripides* (Heidelberg 1968) 119, with note 12.²⁵

1024–27

Op.	τί δ' εἴ̄ με ναῷ τῷδε κρύψειας λάθραι;	
Iφ.	ώς δὴ σκότον λαβόντες ἐκσωθεῖμεν ἂν;	1025
Op.	κλεπτῶν γάρ ή νύξ, τῆς δ' ἀληθείας τὸ φῶς.	
Iφ.	εἴσ' ἔνδον ἱεροῦ φύλακες, οὓς οὐ λήσομεν.	

1025–26 deleted by Markland || 1025 σκότον Dindorf: σκότος L | ἐκσωθεῖμεν Brodaeus: ἔξω θεῖμεν L || 1027 ἱεροῦ Dobree: -οὶ L

- Then suppose you hid me secretly here in the temple?
- As though we could get out safely by clothing ourselves in darkness?
- Well, night belongs to thieves, daylight to openness.
- There are guards in the sanctuary; we won't evade them.

The plan in question here is of course the same as the plan mooted in 110–12, that the theft of Artemis' image should be attempted *at night*. One weakness of Markland's deletion (adopted among more recent editors by Paley, England, Weil, Bruhn, Wecklein, Platnauer, Diggle, though not by Murray, Grégoire, Strohm, Sansone) is that it eliminates all reference to night.²⁶ There is also a compositional reason why it should be retained, which once again is well explained by Schwinge (cited above) 119–20, with note 14. The pattern of 1021–24 is the same as the pattern of 1020–23: Orestes makes a suggestion, Iphigenia raises an objection, Orestes tries to counter the objection, and Iphigenia completes her rebuttal. Nor is there anything wrong with the language. 'Ως δὴ . . . ἐκσωθεῖμεν ἂν is not a

²⁵ For the phrasing, David Sansone now aptly compares Hdt. 1. 42. 1 οὐτε τὸ βούλεσθαι πάρα.

²⁶ Cf. D. L. Page, *Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy* (Oxford 1934) 78: "1025–6. Another very doubtful case. 1027 follows 1024 very well; ἐκσωθεῖμεν ἂν is suspiciously like σωθεῖμεν ἂν 1029; the lines have the appearance of a slightly irrelevant interruption. But we can hardly afford to lose 1026."

purpose clause (in which the optative with ᾧ would be out of place) but a potential clause responding to Orestes' conditional in the previous line and introduced by a sceptical "as if."²⁷ For σκότον λαβόντες, cf. *Orestes* 467 τίνα σκότον λάβω προσώπωι; Orestes' gnomic-sounding remark about thieves' affinity with the night²⁸ is almost a debating point, and is countered in Iphigenia's reply; he has claimed that "non-evasion" (ἀ-λήθεια) is confined to daylight hours, and she replies that in any case they cannot "evade" (οὐ λήσομεν) the temple-guards.²⁹

1042–43

Ὀρ. ποῖ δῆτα πόντου νοτερὸν εἰ παρ' ἔκβολον;
Ιφ. οὖν ναῦς χαλινοῖς λινοδέτοις ὄρμεῖ σέθεν.

1042 εἰ παρ' Reiske: εἰπας L

—So where will you go to along the sea's damp shore?

—To where your ship is moored with flax-woven hawsers.

"Ἐκβολὸν has usually been understood as "inlet" or "promontory" (cf. LSJ s.vv. ἐκβολός II.3, ἐκβολή VII, and commentators such as England or Platnauer). What this ἐκβολὸν is that Iphigenia has in mind is then obscure, and the treatment of the line by editors has been correspondingly bizarre. Almost all place a question-mark after ποῖ δῆτα, and many retain L's εἰπας: hence, e.g., "Whither then? Do you allude to the watery creek of the sea?" (Paley). But the question Iphigenia answers is, "Where will you go to?" not, "Do you mean the inlet?" or "Will you go to the inlet?" All of this, not to mention the wilder conjectures printed e.g. by Weil and by Wecklein in his school edition, is I think entirely off the mark.

"Ἐκβολὸν means literally "cast-off." Euripides applies it to babies abandoned (*Ion* 555) or "cast" from a mother's womb (*Bacchae* 91), and to ship's wreckage (*Helen* 422, 1214). In *Iphigenia in Tauris* 1196 the sea "falls out" (ἐκπίπτει) close to the temple, and in 1424 the expected wreckage of the Greek ship is "cast-offs from the ship" (ἐκβολὰς νεώς). Here, I suggest, πόντου . . . ἐκβολὸν is either simply the breakers breaking on the shore, or what is left by the breakers after they recede, a surf-dampened strand. The phrase thus emulates epic phrases like παρὰ θῖν' ἀλός. Apart from its other advantages, this understanding gives a descriptive function to νοτερόν, which refers either to the spray from the breakers or to their damp residue.

²⁷ For this use of ὡς δή, see J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1954) 229—although Denniston himself surprisingly classifies our passage as a final clause like *IT* 1184 and 1233.

²⁸ David Sansone notes that this remark has a precedent in Hom. *Il.* 3. 11.

²⁹ Strohm observes, "κλέπτειν ist [Orestes'] Ziel von Anfang an (vgl. 1400), und dazu gehört λανθάνειν, das in ἀλήθεια noch herausgehört wird."

1068–71

(Ιφ.) ἀλλὰ πρός σε δεξιᾶς
 σὲ καὶ σ' ίκνοῦμαι, σὲ δὲ φύλης παρηίδος
 γονάτων τε καὶ τῶν ἐν δόμοισι φιλτάτων 1070
 [μητρὸς πατρός τε καὶ τέκνων ὅτι κυρεῖ].

1071 deleted by Dindorf | πατρός τε TrP: πατρὸς L

Come, by your right hand I beseech you, and you, and you by your dear cheek, and your knees and those who are dearest to you at home, [your mother and father, and your children, those of you that have them].

1071 is certainly inauthentic, since the Chorus are unmarried women like Iphigenia (cf. 130, 1143 ff.). I suspect that 1070 is part of the same melodramatic interpolation. In lines 1068–69 Iphigenia enacts her supplication, or at least speaks as if she is enacting it, by approaching first one, then another, then a third chorus-member and grasping the hands of the first two and the cheek of the third. Line 1069 is an ascending tricolon, its rhetorical effect somewhat spoiled by the continuation. If we accept the pairing of “knees” with “cheek,” we also have to accept the awkward addition to these of “your dearest ones at home.” And we might expect Iphigenia to remember that these women all come from a city which has been destroyed and its population enslaved (1106–10), which makes “those who are dearest to you at home” rather inappropriate. Line 363 of this play, also expanding a description of supplication for emotional effect, is probably a similar interpolation (deleted by M. L. West in Diggle’s apparatus).

1117–22

(Χορ.) ... ζηλοῦσα τὸν διὰ παν-
 τὸς δυσδαιμον'· ἐν γὰρ ἀνάγ-
 καις οὐ κάμνει, σύντροφος ὄν.
 μεταβάλλει δυσδαιμονία· 1120
 τὸ δὲ μετ' εὐτυχίαν κακοῦ-
 σθαι θνατοῖς βαρὺς αἰών.

1117 ζηλοῦσα τὸν Greverus (-σαν τὸν Bothe 1803, -σα τὸν Bothe 1824): ζηλοῦσ' ἄταν L || **1119** κάμνει Milton: -εις L || **1120** δ' εὐδαιμονία Markland | μεταβάλλειν δυσδαιμονία Bergk (μεταβάλλειν δ' εὐδαιμονία Musgrave) || **1121** εὐτυχίαν Scaliger: -ας L

I envy one who is constantly ill-starred; he languishes less in hardships, being their fellow. Ill fortune changes, and affliction after prosperity makes a heavy life for mortals.

The slightly paradoxical claim that ill-fortune is only painful if you are not used to it is familiar in Euripides; cf. *Hecuba* 375–76, *Hercules* 1291–93,

Troades 639–40, *Helen* 417–19, *Bellerophon* fr. 285. 15–18, fr. 821 N², fr. 964 N².

In 1120, “Ill fortune changes” does not fit the argument. The variety of attempts to improve on it has been extreme and highly confusing (as can be seen, for example, if one tries to read Platnauer’s note). Only two alternatives are really worth considering: Markland’s μεταβάλλει δ’ εὐδαιμονία (“But good fortune changes”), and Bergk’s μεταβάλλειν δυσδαιμονία (“To change is ill-fortune”).³⁰ Markland’s conjecture, which I think is clearly right, was accepted by some nineteenth-century editors (e.g. Hermann, Paley) but has received very little attention in recent times, whereas Bergk’s is printed by Bruhn, Grégoire, Strohm and Diggle.

With μεταβάλλειν δυσδαιμονία the argument runs: “Constant ill-fortune is enviable. Change (of fortune) is (real) ill-fortune, and suffering ill-fortune after enjoying good fortune is painful.” This is rather difficult, because it requires understanding the single word μεταβάλλειν (= “changing”) as “experiencing a change from good to ill fortune,” and the single word δυσδαιμονία as “real ill-fortune.” And the Chorus has not in fact claimed that the ill-fortune of the constantly unfortunate man is not *real*, but merely that it is (comparatively) enviable because he is used to bearing it. Nor is it allowable to adjust the sense so that a change from good to ill fortune is understood to be the *greatest* ill-fortune (as in Bergk’s own paraphrase, “und so wird . . . der Wechsel des Geschickes für das grösste Unglück erklärt”).

On the other hand, the sense of μεταβάλλει δ’ εὐδαιμονία is entirely clear, and the argument becomes: “Constant ill-fortune is enviable. Good fortune, by contrast, changes, and suffering ill fortune after enjoying good fortune is painful.”³¹ That good fortune changes is of course a truism, but it is important to this train of gnomic thought. In the background lies the assumption that constant good fortune is impossible for mortals, as is famously explained, for example, in Achilles’ description of Zeus’s jars of good and bad fortune, Homer, *Iliad* 24. 527–33. Good fortune is *sure* to change, and the change is sure to be painful. The only man who can avoid this is the constantly unfortunate one, and that is why he has to be envied.

1321

Θο. ὁ θαῦμα· πῶς σε μεῖζον ὄνομάσας τύχω;

σφε Diggle: μείον Markland

O marvel—how can I call you by a greater name?

³⁰ T. Bergk, *RhMus* 18 (1863) 216.

³¹ One reason for Bergk’s dissatisfaction with μεταβάλλει δ’ εὐδαιμονία is that he understood τὸ γάρ μετ’ εύτυχίας to be the transmitted reading (γάρ is in fact a conjecture of Triclinius)—which does indeed make it unattractive.

Everything needed for understanding this line is contained in Diggle's discussion.³² I do not see great difficulty in taking σε as addressed to the θαῦμα on which Thoas has just exclaimed (which leads to Diggle's conjecture σφε and his suggestion that both θαῦμα and the pronoun refer to Iphigenia), but I do not discuss that here. (Compare, however, *Hipp.* 818, cited above on 836–38.) Concerning the logic of the πῶς-clause, Diggle quite rightly explains that it expresses "the speaker's inability to find any name more suitable than the one he has already found . . ." But he continues, "The only obstacle to so taking the sentence is μεῖζον," citing Markland's opinion ("potius putarem μεῖον. quo enim minore nomine recte te possim appellare?"), and referring to Platnauer's comment (" . . . we should expect not so much 'what *more* can I call it . . .' as 'what *less* . . .?'").

In fact (as Weil for example explains), the sense of the πῶς-question is not, "How can I *hit the mark if I call you* by a greater name?" (which would indeed call for the change to "lesser"), but, "How can I *succeed in calling you* by a greater name (when there is no greater name available)." The rhetorical point is similar to that of 837–40 (discussed above), *Hecuba* 714, *Bacchae* 667, *Helen* 601, *Phoenissae* 389, 407, all of which Diggle cites on p. 89. Cf. also *Hippolytus* 826–27, *Hecuba* 667 (cited by Weil).

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³² Diggle (above, note 17) 89–91. It should be noted that Diggle prints L's text unchanged in his edition.

In Xenophontis *Symposium* Observatiunculae
Criticae¹

BERNHARD HUSS

Hellmut Flashar
*praeceptoris clarissimo praeclarissimoque qui
 cor meum inflammaverit amore Xenophontis*

2. Ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἐπιδεικνὺς ως ἐν θαύματι ἀργύριον ἐλάμβανεν.

'Ως ἐν θαύματι is difficult to understand. (a) Todd translates, "as a spectacle"; Finckh (apud Herbst) takes it as, "als etwas Ausserordentliches," which Herbst tries to explain by supplying ὅντα: "quasi in miraculo posita essent." However, Herbst is forced to add, "Quanquam scio ἐν θαύματι εἶναι plerumque esse *mirari, obstupescere*." This is true. 'Ἐν θαύματι (sing.) is generally used only in connection with verbs like εἶναι, γίγνεσθαι, (ἐν)έχεσθαι, meaning, "to wonder, to be astonished," vel sim. (cf. Dutton 194, LSJ s.v. θαῦμα II): Hdt. 1. 68. 1 ἐν θώματι ἦν ὄρῶν τὸ ποιεόμενον, 3. 3. 3 τὰς γυναῖκας ἐν θώματι γενέσθαι, 7. 128. 2 ἐν θώματι μεγάλῳ ἐνέσχετο, 7. 218. 2 ἐν θώματι ἐγένοντο, 8. 135. 3 ἐν θώματι ἔχεσθαι, 9. 11. 3 ἐν θώματι γενόμενοι, 9. 37. 3 ἐν θώματι μεγάλῳ ἐνέχεσθαι τῆς τόλμης, Th. 8. 14. 2 ἐν θαύματι ἥσαν καὶ ἐκπλήξει. A similar usage occurs in Plut. *Pomp.* 14. 5, ὄρῶν δὲ τοὺς ἀκούσαντας ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου καὶ τοῦ σχήματος ἐν θαύματι ποιουμένους (they were astonished because they had heard Pompey say something bold and outrageous). From these passages we can conclude that ἐν θαύματι (sing.) is an idiomatic expression which does not fit our context.

(b) Woldinga 235 f. paraphrases our passage, "als in een kermiskraam," and LSJ (s.v. θαῦμα I.2) interpret θαῦμα in our passage as "mountebank-gambols." Certainly this is much closer to the true meaning of the expression than the parallels listed under (a). Θαύματα in the plural is a *terminus technicus* denoting anything that serves to amuse and entertain the audience at a fair (Hsch. s.v. θαύματα, θ 147 Latte: ἡ οἱ θαυματοποιοὶ

¹ I am very much indebted to Professor William M. Calder III, who encouraged me to write this paper (a πάρεργον of my forthcoming commentary on Xenophon's *Symposium*), read carefully two drafts of it and gave helpful suggestions.

ἐπιδείκνυνται). It can be said of menageries (*Isoc.* 15. 213 θεωροῦντες ἐν τοῖς θαύμασιν τοὺς μὲν λέοντας . . .) and of mechanical devices (*Arist. Mech.* 848a11) as well as of jugglers' booths (*Ath.* 10. 452f ἐν τοῖς θαύμασιν ὑπεκρίνετο μίμους), of performances on stage (*Thphr. Char.* 27. 7 ἐν τοῖς θαύμασι τρία ἡ τέταρα πληρώματα ὑπομένειν) and of the whole event of a fair (*Thphr. Char.* 6. 4 ἐν θαύμασι). I suggest changing one letter and reading in our passage the plural θαύματα in precisely this technical sense: ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἐπιδεικνύς ως ἐν θαύμασι(v) ἀργύριον ἐλάζειν, meaning, "he showed them (scil. at symposia for which he is hired; cf. 2. 2, 4. 55) as in performances at a fair and earned money from that." (For ως introducing a prepositional phrase as a comparison, see Kühner–Gerth I 472 Anmerk. 1.) The emendation ἐν θαύμασι is supported by two passages in Plato which connect the *terminus technicus* θαύματα with the verb δεικνύναι or its compound ἐπιδεικνύναι²: *Pl. R.* 7. 514b τοῖς θαύματοποιοῖς πρὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρόκειται τὰ παραφράγματα, ὑπὲρ ὧν τὰ θαύματα δεικνύασιν (θαύματα being a kind of puppet-show or toy theater), and *Pl. Lg.* 2. 658b–c θαύματα ἐπιδεικνύς, "presenting a puppet-show" (cf. England ad loc.), contrasted with ἐπιδεικνύναι ῥαψῳδίαν, κιθαρῳδίαν, τραγῳδίαν, κωμῳδίαν. Based on these two parallels one might even interpret our passage as an allusion to the performance of a puppet-show. Although this might not necessarily be cogent, it is interesting that the Syracusean impresario in 4. 55 makes a similar statement, comparing his acrobats to νευρόσπαστα, "puppets." The origin of the corruption θαύμασι(v) > θαύματι is easy to explain, especially since the manuscript from which the error originated possibly lacked v *ephelkustikon* added to θαύμασι (see, in general, Kühner–Blass I 295).

6. 9 Καὶ νῦν σύ γε λοιδορούμενῷ ἔοικας, εἰ πάντ' αὐτοῦ βελτίωντ φήσειναι

So all manuscripts. The sense of this would be an absurd phrase like, "if you say that in all things you are better than he is" (αὐτοῦ being a gen. *compar.* dependent on βελτίων). Since the passage is clearly corrupt, many attempts have been made to heal it. These attempts can be divided into three groups, according to their understanding of πάντ' :

(a) Πάντ' is accusative neuter plural, the accusative being the subject of an *acc. cum inf.*-construction that depends on φήσει. Therefore the correct reading is either πάντ' αὐτοῦ βελτίονα (Leuncl. 1569, 1594 and 1595) or πάντ' αὐτοῦ βελτίω (see Zeune, Bornemann, Lange, Schenkl), which should be interpreted as "si omnia, quae in eo sunt, meliora esse dicis, quam revera sunt" (Sauppe ad loc.), or even πάντ' αὐτοῦ βέλτιστα (Weiske). In

² Cf. the definition from Hesychios quoted above.

all these interpretations the genitive must be considered as dependent on πάντ', and not as a *genitivus comparationis* with the comparative βελτίω.³

(b) Πάντ' αὐτοῦ βελτίω is the correct reading, but πάντ' is accusative masculine singular, and the passage therefore should be rendered, "si unumquemque hic meliorem iudices, quam Syracusanum" (Bornemann). This, however, is improbable in the context, and Bornemann himself expresses doubts regarding this solution.⁴

(c) Πάντ' is an *acc. limitationis*; αὐτοῦ must be changed to αὐτόν (this form is noted by Leuncl. 1594 *in margine*), so that the correct reading is πάντ' αὐτὸν βελτίω (βελτίονα is given by Leuncl.),⁵ "if you say that he is better in all things," scil. better than the καλοί and βέλτιστοι, with whom Philippos is going to compare the Syracusan (for this would be so incredible that Philippos' comparison would be slander rather than praise). I think that this emendation⁶ is better than most modern critics have assumed and that Cirignano is probably right in preferring it for his *Symposium* text. The explanation of πάντ' as an *acc. limitationis* is strengthened by a close parallel in the *Cyropaedia*: 5. 5. 34 οὐ γάρ τοι ἐγώ Μήδων ἥρχον διὰ τὸ κρείττων αὐτῶν πάντων εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ αὐτοὺς τούτους ἀξιοῦν ἡμᾶς αὐτῶν (αὐτῶν, ἔστων νν. ll.) πάντα βελτίονας εἶναι. Such a parallel is particularly welcome in an author like Xenophon, who largely tends to express the same concepts in the same words.⁷

8. 1 Ὁποί... εἰκός ήμᾶς... μὴ [ἄν] ἀμνημονῆσαι;

This passage has caused much confusion. Scholars have assumed that the meaning of the sentence as given by Marchant would be, "Is it right for us not to forget Eros?" that is, "We ought to forget him," whereas the context demands precisely the opposite: "We must not forget him"; "I hope we shall remember him." For this reason various alterations of the text have been proposed: (a) a change of Ὁποί to Ἀλλά in order to make the sentence a statement, not a question (Richards 1902: 294); (b) an addition, Ὁποί <οὐκ> εἰκός (Richards 1896: 294, withdrawn in Richards 1907: 22); (c) the elimination of μὴ (Hartman 244 f.).⁸

Since Ὁποί provides a neutral introduction for a question, per se suggesting neither a positive nor a negative answer (see Kühner-Gerth II

³ Cf. also Marchant's proposal, πάντα τὰ αὐτοῦ βελτίω.

⁴ Bornemann also proposes εἰ μὴ πάντ' αὐτοῦ βελτίω φῆς εἶναι, "nisi quemque conviviarum eo meliorem esse dicas," which is as improbable as Marchant's second proposal, πάντων αὐτὸν βελτίω.

⁵ The modern apparatus critici do not present accurately the readings of Leunclavius.

⁶ If it really is an emendation and not rather a *varia lectio*.

⁷ Cf. for the *acc. limitationis* with βελτίων *Symp.* 4. 6 ἂν ἔσεσθε βελτίονες, *Cyr.* 2. 1. 13 ὅ τι ἄν οὗτοι βελτίονες γένωνται.

⁸ Cf., however, Richards 1902: 294: "It may be thought that the obvious remedy is to strike out μὴ, but the position of ἄν or any such particle, if right, then becomes very questionable, and in any case I think the remedy is to be found elsewhere."

527), and since Richards 1907: 22 is therefore right in pointing out that one should not alter the beginning of our phrase, we are still faced with this question: "Is it (neutral) right for us not to forget Eros?" I think there are two ways to avoid this dilemma: (a) We could assume that Ἄρα κτλ. must be interpreted silently as demanding an answer, "Yes, it is right; for we should 'not forget him,' i.e. we should remember him." This interpretation makes the construction of the question seem strange and at the same time demands a rather pointless litotes, μὴ ἀμνημονῆσαι, "not to forget" = "to remember." Furthermore, it does not explain the intrusion of ἄν, which is in all our manuscripts, but is cancelled by Steph. 1561^{adn.}, Steph. 1581^{marg.}. (b) Possibly Stephanus was wrong in eliminating ἄν here. I suggest reading μὴ ἀναμνησθῆναι or, even more plausibly, μὴ ἀναμνημονεῦσαι. "An is the result of erroneous word division and αμνησθῆναι or αμνημονεῦσαι has been subsequently "corrected" into ἀμνημονῆσαι.⁹ Both readings would convey the meaning, "Is it right (neutral) for us not to remember/to mention Eros?" and this question would easily suggest the answer, "No, of course it is not right; we must remember him."

9. 6 καὶ γὰρ ἥκουν τοῦ Διονύσου μὲν ἐπερωτῶντος αὐτὴν εἰ φιλεῖ αὐτόν, τῆς δὲ οὕτως ἐπομνυούστης <ώστε> μὴ μόνον τὸν Διόνυσον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς παρόντας ἅπαντας συνομόσαι (ἐπομόσαι DF) ἄν ἢ μὴν τὸν παῖδα καὶ τὴν παῖδα ὑπ' ἀλλήλων φιλεῖσθαι.

(a) In general modern editors have accepted the reading in the majority of our manuscripts, συνομόσαι. Presumably they explain ἐπομόσαι¹⁰ as a corruption, created under the influence of the preceding ἐπομνυούστης. But this argument has a weak point: There is a certain difference between the present ἐπομνυούστης and the aorist συνομόσαι that renders this kind of corruption more improbable than it may seem at first sight. I propose reading συνεπομόσαι, a rare verb for whose active LSJ give only two references, one in Aristophanes, *Lys.* 237 Συνεπόμνυθ' ὑμεῖς ταῦτα πᾶσαι; (the answer of the πᾶσαι is Νὴ Δία), the other in Xenophon, *An.* 7. 6. 19 (with an infinitive construction following, exactly as in our passage). If my

⁹ For ἀναμνημονεύειν, "remember," cf. *Souda* s.v. "Εσδρας" (II 422. 8 f. Adler) τῶν μὴ εὑρθέντων βιβλίων τὰς γραφὰς ἀναμνημονεύσας, Steph. *Schol.* in *Hp. Prog.* 1. 10, line 121 Duffy ἀναμνημονεύει τῶν οἰκείων ἔργων ἡ ψυχή (cf. *ibid.* line 128), Anon. in *Rh.* 116. 30 οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἀναμνημονεύειν πολλά, Gal. *De diebus decr.* IX 867. 15 f. Kühn εἰ δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς πείρας ἐφεξῆς ἀναμνημονεύσαμι, *Excerpta Polyaeni* 1. 1, line 31 (ed. Woelflin/Melber) ἵνα χρείας καλούσης ἀναμνημονεύων ταῦτα πάντας ἐκπλήσσῃ ὡς πολυμνήμων, Origenes, *Cels.* 5. 46 ἀναμνημονεύειν ἐν καρδίᾳ. The fact that all these references are later than Xenophon is not necessarily a cogent argument against my proposal, since Xenophon's language in many aspects is very "modern" (and often anticipates the koine). Furthermore, he might well have used an unusual word in a particularly important passage (8. 1 is the transition from the "normal" part of the *Symposium* to Sokrates' great speech on Eros).

¹⁰ Ἐπομόσαι is also the reading of all *editiones veteres* (s. XVI) as well as of Bach, Zeune and Lange. Steph. 1561 and 1581 and Leuncl. 1569, 1594 and 1595 note συνομόσαι *in margine*.

assumption is correct, there is a corruption which must have originated in the following way: A *sciolus* was struck by the word συνεπομόσαι, unfamiliar to him because of its rarity. He cancelled this word, adding a marginal note like, “aut συνομόσαι aut ἐπομόσαι legendum,” and destroying what Xenophon had conceived as an elegant climax. As a result, the majority of the manuscripts, depending on our *sciolus*, chose his first solution, while a minority favored the second one.¹¹ Xenophon's text means: Not only would “Dionysos” swear, but all guests would be ready to swear the same oath together with him (συνεπομνύναι has precisely this meaning in Ar. loc. cit.), because the girl's (“Ariadne's”) performance was so natural that it convinced them all.

(b) “Ωστε is an addition made by Steph. 1581¹² that has been accepted by all modern editors except for Cirignano, who excludes it from his *Symposium* text. I think ώστε, or ως in the sense of ώστε (see below), is indispensable. If it were deleted, the girl would swear μὴ μόνον τὸν Διόνυσον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν παρόντας ἀπαντας συνεπομόσαι ἂν ἦ μὴν τὸν παῖδα καὶ τὴν παῖδα ὑπ' ἀλλήλων φιλεῖσθαι. In my opinion it is obvious that this would be absurd. The girl (“Ariadne”) swears (a) “Yes, I do love you” (the narration, of course, does not make this as explicit as I put it here), and she does this so convincingly that not only would “Dionysos” swear, “Oh yes, we are in love,” but all guests, if they were asked to do this, would swear together with him (b) “Oh yes, they both really love each other.”¹³ The narrator presents (b) as a consequence of (a); therefore he needs to say ώστε. Μὴ μόνον . . . ὑπ' ἀλλήλων φιλεῖσθαι is clearly a statement of the narrator, not the content of ἐπομνυούσης. By making this statement the narrator shows how fascinated the audience is by the lively and skilful performance they are watching. Furthermore, accepting Cirignano's solution one would be forced to take οὔτως as preparing the following utterance in the infinitive, which in our passage seems odd.¹⁴

Some forty years before Stephanus had made his supplement, Castalio had added ώς, which is independently advanced by Castiglioni 82. Unfortunately, modern editors in our century ignore it, although it was noted in 1830 by Herbst. Castalio's variant would at least be worth mentioning in the apparatus criticus of a new edition of the *Symposium*. I

¹¹ NB: All manuscripts of the *Symposium* which are known to us have the same *archetypus*.

¹² It is not in Steph. 1561. In his preface Stephanus says that his readings are partly based on variants in manuscripts he checked. Unfortunately, he does not specify which manuscripts he used to prepare his second edition.

¹³ Xenophon's narration proceeds somewhat rapidly at this point, and the reader has to supply some things that are not made explicit. However, the sentence in the form given by Marchant's OCT is perfectly comprehensible and becomes, I think, even more comprehensible if συνεπομόσαι is accepted, so that one should not (with Schenkl, Ollier, Thalheim) assume a lacuna after Διόνυσον. See Castiglioni 82 f., who argues convincingly against Thalheim's Διόνυσον <ἀπερησθῆναι>.

¹⁴ Passages in direct speech like *An.* 4. 6. 10 ἐγὼ δ' οὔτω γιγνώσκω· εἰ μὲν ἀνάγκη κτλ. have a different character.

think it is better than ὥστε—its omission from the text is easier to explain, not only because of its brevity, but because it could have been omitted under the influence of οὔτως, οὔτως ἐπομνυούσης ὡς creating the confusion. Xenophon uses both constructions (cf. for οὔτως . . . ὡς *Symp.* 4. 21, 4. 37, 4. 39, 8. 35 and Castiglioni 82). ‘Ως + inf. instead of ὥστε + inf. is particularly “Xenophontean”; see Kühner–Gerth II 501 Anmerk. and Stahl 492, Nr. 1.

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Hermippus, Fragment 22 Wehrli

DAVID SANSONE

Josephus (*Contra Apionem* 1. 164) quotes Hermippus as saying that Pythagoras claimed that the soul of one of his deceased followers, Calliphon of Croton, used to remain at his side night and day, and that he—the text is not explicit as to whether the subject is Pythagoras or the soul of Calliphon—used to utter the following precepts: “Do not pass through a place where an ass has collapsed; keep away from the thirsty waters; avoid all blasphemy” (μὴ διέρχεσθαι τόπον ἐφ' ὃν <ἄν> ὄνος ὀκλάσῃ καὶ τῶν διψίων ὑδάτων ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ πάσης ἀπέχειν βλασφημίας). Hermippus goes on to say that these precepts have been taken over from the Jews and the Thracians. My colleague Howard Jacobson¹ has argued that there are indeed Jewish elements in all three precepts, and that the injunction to avoid the thirsty waters is a reflection of the verse Exodus 23. 7: “Avoid all falsehood.” The attractiveness of this suggestion lies in the fact that, as Jacobson has shown, there are parallels to the two other precepts in the immediate biblical vicinity, namely at Exodus 22. 27 and 23. 5. But there is a difficulty with this view: Water does not appear in Exodus 23. 7, nor is falsehood mentioned by Hermippus. Jacobson addresses this issue by pointing out a number of passages from ancient Jewish commentators that illustrate the association between, on the one hand, good waters and truth and, on the other, bad waters and falsehood. But there is no evidence that this association was made in connection with this particular passage from Exodus, and Jacobson is forced to hypothesize a source (otherwise unattested) for Hermippus that took as its point of departure Exodus 23. 7 and then “proceeded in routine exegetical fashion to make an analogy . . . between falsehood and water that does not satisfy one’s thirst.” This explanation of the passage from Hermippus seems to have satisfied Louis

¹ H. Jacobson, “Hermippus, Pythagoras and the Jews,” *Revue des études juives* 135 (1976) 145–49. I should like to thank Professor Jacobson for his characteristically incisive comments on a draft of the present piece, comments that have caused me to reconsider or rephrase in a number of instances. I am also indebted to my colleague Miroslav Marcovich, who kindly read and commented on a draft and who provided several useful comments and suggestions.

Feldman, who, however, registers some uneasiness over the absence of any verbal connection between Hermippus and the supposed biblical source.²

There are, I think, further difficulties with this explanation. In the first place, Jacobson and other commentators have ignored the definite article: τῶν διψίων ὑδάτων means “*the* thirsty waters”; i.e. the well-known, or the previously specified, thirsty waters, rather than thirsty waters in general.³ In the second place, the evidence that δίψιος can mean “causing thirst” (so LSJ) is not unambiguous.⁴ For this meaning LSJ cite only this passage and Nicander, *Theriaca* 147. But “thirst-provoking”⁵ is not the only meaning possible in the latter passage. Nicander uses the word to describe the σῆψ, a kind of reptile. The scholiast comments: δίψιος δὲ ὁ ξηρὸς διὰ τὸ μὴ παρ’ ὑδατώδεστι τόποις φαίνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐν ὄρεινοις· ἡ ὁ ποιῶν δίψαν τοῖς δακνομένοις. The latter explanation is clearly a guess. The former is surely correct: Nicander provides a gloss on the epithet when he writes (155–56) πολέες δ’ ἀμάθοισι μιγέντες / σπείρῃ λεπρύνονται ἀλινδόμενοι ψαμάθοισι. It is not, I think, until the time of Nonnus that we find fairly good evidence for δίψιος = “causing thirst.”⁶ Finally, even if τὰ δίψα ὕδατα could mean “waters that cause thirst” in Hellenistic Greek, there is surely no need for an injunction instructing anyone to avoid them.

For these reasons I am convinced that διψίων is corrupt. Jacobson’s introduction of the notion of falsehood is attractive and, while I recognize that the absence of a reference to water in Exodus 23. 7 remains a problem, I should like to suggest that Hermippus wrote τῶν μαψιδίων ὑδάτων ἀπέχεσθαι. Whether this is what Josephus wrote is, however, another matter. We are dependent for the text of *Contra Apionem* on a single, mediocre eleventh-century manuscript (and its apographa) as well as on a Latin version, written in the sixth century at the instigation of Cassiodorus.⁷

² L. H. Feldman, *Josephus and Modern Scholarship (1937–1980)* (Berlin 1984) 395–96: “Admittedly, the interpretation of the last passage is rather remote from the literal meaning, but we may comment that the fact that all three passages are in such close proximity to one another makes it more likely that this particular portion of Exodus is Pythagoras’ source.”

³ This seems to have made Walter Burkert uncomfortable; when he refers to this passage and translates the precept (“one . . . should avoid ‘thirst-causing water’”), he conveniently omits the definite article from his Greek quotation: W. Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism*, Engl. transl. (Cambridge, MA 1972) 173 with n. 59.

⁴ I take it that the entries in Hesychius δίψιον· βλαπτικόν and δίψαι· βλάψαι are no more reliable, and no more based in reality, than the entry ἴψαι· φθείρατ, βλάψαι; cf. H. Erbse, *Beiträge zur Überlieferung der Iliasscholien*, Zetemata 24 (Munich 1960) 242.

⁵ This is the rendering in A. S. F. Gow and A. F. Scholfield, *Nicander. The Poems and Poetical Fragments* (Cambridge 1953) 37.

⁶ See the *Paraphr. Ioann.* 4. 24 (John 4. 6) δίψιος ὥρη, cited in Stephanus’ *Thesaurus*. In the *Dionysiaca*, Nonnus twice uses the expression δίψιον ὕδωρ (15. 13 and 27. 186). W. Peek, *Lexikon zu den Dionysiaka des Nonnus I* (Berlin 1968) 411 translates “spärlich” in both instances. F. Vian disagrees, and notes (on *Dion.* 27. 186), “l’eau est ‘assoiffée’ puisqu’elle a fait place à la poussière; en 15,13, au contraire, elle est ‘assoiffante’, parce qu’elle a été changée en vin.” Thus, even the evidence of Nonnus is not entirely clear, and it is in any case dangerous to use it to support the usage of Hermippus, who lived in the third century B.C.

⁷ For the text of the Latin version, see the edition by C. Boysen, in volume 37 (Vienna 1898) of the *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*.

It is difficult to say whether the author of the Latin version read διψίων in his Vorlage, as he translates *ab aqua fetulenta* (i.e. *faeculenta*). It is just possible, however, that he was translating μαψιδίων: Two of the passages cited in the *TLL* to illustrate *faeculentus*—both of them, as it happens, from the sixth century—feature a contrast between *faeculentia* and “truth.”⁸ In any case, it is, if anything, even less likely that he was translating διψίων. The suggested corruption, from μαψιδίων to διψίων, is readily accounted for. The word μαψιδίος is a poeticism which might well be unfamiliar to, and was certainly not expected by, a scribe copying the text of Josephus. It was easily replaced, through a process that combined psychological factors with lipography and anagrammatism,⁹ by the common word δίψιος, which is often encountered in contexts containing the word ὕδωρ.

Now, the question remains: What are τὰ μαψίδια ὕδατα? They are, I suggest, the waters of falsehood that the souls of the dead are encouraged to avoid. The words τῶν μαψιδίων ὕδάτων ἀπέχεσθαι form the end of a hexameter line, and there are several hexameter texts, some of which have only recently been published, that give a series of directions for the souls of the deceased to follow.¹⁰ Specifically, the souls are instructed to avoid the water of a spring next to which stands a white cypress.¹¹ They are instructed to go instead to the pool of Mnemosyne, and it is from this pool that they are to drink the cold waters. But the waters have guards stationed over them, and the souls are required to tell the guards the whole truth (πᾶσαν ἀληθείην on the gold plaque from Petelia) before they are allowed to drink.

We have, therefore, two sources of water. One is the pool of Mnemosyne, associated with truth, from which the souls are to drink. The other is to be avoided. It is, clearly, Lethe.¹² Whether rightly or not, the

⁸ Cassiodorus, *Expositio Psalmorum* 3. 22 (= CCSL 97.271.436–37) *purissimam veritatem nemo faeculenta voluntate conturbat*; Fulgentius, *Ad Trasamundum* 1. 5. 2 (= CCSL 91.102.215–18) *faeculentae quippe carnis inquinamenta non sensit, qui ad suscipiendam veram substantiam carnis et eandem mundandam carnis faeculentiam venit*.

⁹ Compare the comments of A. Dain, *Les manuscrits*, 3rd ed. (Paris 1975) 40–52.

¹⁰ The texts are most conveniently collected by R. Janko, “Forgetfulness in the Golden Tablets of Memory,” *CQ* 34 (1984) 89–100. Janko’s article should be consulted for full references to the authoritative publications.

¹¹ See lines 4–7 of the “long archetype” as reconstructed by Janko (previous note) 99. The significance of the cypress (as well as its description as white) is unclear; see G. Zuntz, *Persephone: Three Essays on Religion and Thought in Magna Graecia* (Oxford 1971) 373, 385. But it is interesting in this connection that, according to Diogenes Laertius, Hermippus reported in his book about Pythagoras that the followers of Pythagoras avoided using coffins made of cypress wood: Hermippus, fr. 23 Wehrli = D.L. 8. 10 (this is the same work on Pythagoras as the one from which Josephus quotes).

¹² So H. R. Willoughby, *Pagan Regeneration: A Study of Mystery Initiations in the Graeco-Roman World* (Chicago 1929) 106. Cf. Kaibel, *Epigrammata Graeca* 204. 11 οὐκ ἔπιον Λήθης Ἀιδωνίδος ἔσχατον ὕδωρ, 414. 10 καὶ Λήθης οὐκ ἔπιον λιβάδα, *AP* 7. 346. 4 τοῦ Λήθης ἐτέμοι μή τι πίης πόματος.

ancient Greeks regarded ἀλήθεια as derived from $\alpha + \lambda\eta\theta\cdot$,¹³ so that the two sources represented an opposition, not only between memory and forgetfulness, but between truth and falsehood as well.¹⁴ This latter opposition is reflected, and is expressed in characteristically Platonic terms, in the eschatological myth in Plato's *Phaedrus* (247c–48b). There a distinction is made between the souls of the gods, which are capable of contemplating Truth, and other souls, which are able to follow the souls of the gods with only varying degrees of success. These latter, though they strive mightily to see the Plain of Truth ($\tauὸ\; ἀληθείας\; πεδίον$), are disappointed of their hope to behold reality ($\grave{\alpha}\tauελεῖς\; τῆς\; τοῦ\; ὄντος\; θέας\; ἀπέρχονται$) and must satisfy themselves instead with the deceptive food of conjecture ($\tauροφὴ\; δοξαστή$). The Plain of Truth is clearly intended as the counterpart to the Plain of Forgetfulness ($\Lambda\acute{\eta}\thetaης$ or $\Lambda\eta\theta\acute{a}ion$ $\piεδίον$: Ar. *Ran.* 186, Pl. *Resp.* 621a, Thgn. 1216). It is obvious why Plato, with his doctrine of *anamnesis*, would wish to condemn forgetfulness and to view it as the opposite of truth. But the same view would be congenial to all those who, like the Pythagoreans, held to the doctrine of metempsychosis.¹⁵ Pythagorean (as well as "Orphic") elements have been detected in the hexameter texts that supply directions to the souls of the dead, and it would not be out of character for one of these texts to instruct the souls to avoid the waters of Lethe by instructing them $\tauῶν\; μαψιδίων\; ὑδάτων\; ἀπέχεσθαι$.

In addition, these hexameter texts contain references to the mysteries, and Plato's myth also is conveyed in terminology drawn from the mysteries (cf. $\grave{\alpha}\tauελεῖς$). It is interesting to note that at least one of the other precepts that Hermippus preserves also has a connection with the mysteries, although it must be admitted that the nature of that connection is quite obscure. The instruction not to pass through a place where an ass has collapsed reminds

¹³ M. Detienne, "La notion mythique d'ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ," *REG* 73 (1960) 27–35; E. Heitsch, "Die nicht-philosophische ἀλήθεια," *Hermes* 90 (1962) 24–33 and "Wahrheit als Erinnerung," *Hermes* 91 (1963) 36–52; H. D. Rankin, "Α-ΛΗΘΕΙΑ in Plato," *Glotta* 41 (1963) 51–54; T. Cole, "Archaic Truth," *QUCC* 13 (1983) 7–28.

¹⁴ The expression $\muαψίδια\; ὕδατα$ should be regarded as the poetic equivalent of $\ddot{\nu}\deltaωρ\; ψευδές$, which we find at LXX *Jer.* 15. 18 ($\ddot{\omega}\zeta\; \ddot{\nu}\deltaωρ\; ψευδές\; οὐκ\; ἔχον\; πίστιν$). That passage apparently refers to water that is "deceptive" or "untrustworthy" in the sense that the source is liable to failure; cf. W. L. Holladay, *Jeremiah I: A Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Jeremiah Chapters 1–25* (Philadelphia 1986) 462. In this connection it is particularly interesting to note that the water from the pool of Mnemosyne is regularly referred to as "ever-flowing": $\kappa\rho\acute{a}νας\; αἰειρόω$ on the gold leaf in Malibu, $\kappa\rho\acute{a}νας\; αἰειρόω$ or $\kappa\rho\acute{a}νας\; αἰείνω$ on the gold leaves from Eleutherna; cf. further E. Rohde, *Psyche: The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality among the Greeks*, Engl. transl. (London 1925) 575 n. 151. (Cf. also, perhaps, Aristeas *Judeus* 279 $\ddot{\alpha}\acute{e}νναον\; μνήμην$.) I am inclined to agree with T. G. Tucker's note on Ar. *Ran.* 146 ($\sigma\kappa\grave{\omega}\; \grave{\alpha}\acute{e}ινων$): "an obvious burlesque of something more dignified, e.g. $\ddot{\nu}\deltaωρ\; \grave{\alpha}\acute{e}ινων$."

¹⁵ For the positive evaluation of memory among the Pythagoreans and the desire to avoid the waters of Lethe, see Burkert (above, note 3) 213. Cf. also J.-P. Vernant, "Aspects mythiques de la mémoire en Grèce," *Journal de Psychologie* 56 (1959) 1–29 and "Le fleuve 'Amélès' et la 'Mélétiè Thanatou'," *Revue Philosophique* 150 (1960) 163–79; these two articles appear in English translation in J.-P. Vernant, *Myth and Thought Among the Greeks* (London 1983) 75–105 and 106–23.

us that the ass has connections not only with the mysteries, but with the underworld as well.¹⁶ The ass of Ocnus was depicted in Polygnotus' painting of the underworld¹⁷ and one of the infernal place-names mentioned by Charon in the *Frogs* is the mysterious Ass-Fleece.¹⁸ Aristophanes' comedy also provides evidence that asses were somehow connected with the mysteries. When Heracles begins to talk about the initiates, the slave Xanthias says (*Ran.* 159), *vñ τὸν Δί’ ἐγὼ γοῦν ὄνος ἄγω μυστῆρια*. Michael Tierney has convincingly shown that ὄνος is the title of one of the levels of initiation into the mysteries.¹⁹ And this is surely relevant to the fact that the asinine hero of Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* is initiated into the mysteries of Isis. But Aristophanes also introduces a literal ass into the opening scene of *Frogs*. The slave Xanthias complains about the burden he is carrying, but Dionysus tells him that, so far from bearing a burden, Xanthias is himself being borne by the ass. Xanthias protests, saying that his shoulder is oppressed by the weight of the baggage. Dionysus responds by saying, "Well, since you claim that the ass is of no use to you, lift up the ass and take your turn carrying it."²⁰ This is not merely, as W. B. Stanford puts it in his note ad loc., "a pleasant *reductio ad absurdum* of Xanthias's argument." It is a complete non sequitur. For, if the ass is of no use to Xanthias, he should leave it behind, and not carry it. The absurdity of the reversal—this is one of many such in this play—may have been adequate for Aristophanes' humorous purposes. But the passage gains additional point if Aristophanes and his audience were familiar with an injunction to give assistance (*ut ita dicam*) to a suffering ass. And this is precisely how Jacobson explains Hermippus' Pythagorean precept, saying, "the dictum enjoins not to pass a place where an ass has collapsed, i.e. one should stop and give help." Jacobson refers to Exodus 23. 5 in this connection, the Septuagint text of which reads as follows: *ἐὰν δὲ ἵδης τὸ ὑποζύγιον τοῦ ἔχθροῦ σου πεπτωκὸς ὑπὸ τὸν γόμον αὐτοῦ, οὐ παρελεύσῃ αὐτό, ἀλλὰ*

¹⁶ See the exhaustive treatment of the evidence, both literary and archaeological, by E. Keuls, "The Ass in the Cult of Dionysus as a Symbol of Toil and Suffering," *Anthropological Journal of Canada* 8.1 (1970) 26–46; cf. also F. Olck, "Esel," *RE* VI.1 (1907) 626–76, esp. 651–53, and I. Opelt, "Esel," *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* VI (1966) 564–95.

¹⁷ Pausanias 10. 29. 1. See the Appendix, below.

¹⁸ Ar. *Ran.* 186 *τίς εἰς τὸ Λήθης πεδίον, ἢ ὃς Ὀνουπόκας;* The manuscripts have ὄνου πόκας, of which 'Ονουπόκας is Radermacher's interpretation. Even if we were to follow Bergk, as Sommerstein does in his recent edition (Warminster 1996), and read "Οκνου πλοκάς, the reference to the ass would still be felt.

¹⁹ M. Tierney, "ΟΝΟΣ ΑΓΩΝ ΜΥΣΤΗΡΙΑ," in *Mélanges offerts à M. Octave Navarre* (Toulouse 1935) 395–403; cf. also O. Schütz, "Zwei orphische Liturgien," *RhM* 87 (1938) 252–54.

²⁰ Ar. *Ran.* 31–32 *σὺ δ’ οὖν ἐπειδὴ τὸν ὄνον οὐ φῆς σ’ ὠφελεῖν, / ἐν τῷ μέρει σὺ τὸν ὄνον ἀράμενος φέρε.* It is possible that Aristophanes is here hinting at the supposed etymological connection between ὄνος and ὄνινμι, which is explicitly attested later in Artemidorus, *Onir.* 5. 12 (= 121.3 Pack) and Aelian, *Nat. Animal.* 11. 35. Compare also, perhaps, Paus. 10. 29. 2 ὄνησιν and Nic. *Ther.* 348 ἀπόνητο. (For these last two texts, see the Appendix, below.)

συνεγερεῖς (the original reading of the Codex Vaticanus is συναρεῖς) αὐτὸς μετ' αὐτοῦ.

But there is clearer and more unambiguous evidence that confirms our supposition that the injunction concerning the collapsing ass is connected with the underworld and, most likely, with the mysteries. In the Museo Nazionale di Palermo is a black-figure lekythos from the end of the sixth, or the beginning of the fifth, century B.C.²¹ The vase was found at Monte Saraceno, near Ravanusa in Sicily. The ivy-leaf motif on the vase's shoulder indicates a Dionysiac, and possibly initiatory, connection.²² The scene on the body of the vase shows the underworld, with men and women carrying vessels of water, one of which is being emptied into a huge pithos. In front of the pithos is an ass with a bearded old man seated next to it. The ass has collapsed, fallen forward on its front knees, and some lines on the vase are taken to represent the ass' burden, which has fallen to the ground.²³ One of the water-carriers is pulling on the tail of the ass, apparently in an effort to help it to get back on its feet.²⁴ A scene apparently related to the one on the lekythos is mentioned in the Cupid and Psyche story in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*. Venus has sent Psyche on an errand to Proserpina, and Psyche, in despair, decides to end her life by throwing herself from a high tower (a motif taken from Ar. *Ran.* 127–33). But the tower remarkably begins to speak, and gives Psyche directions for her journey to the underworld. Among the instructions, she is told: "You will meet a lame ass carrying wood, with a driver lame as well, who will ask you to hand him some twigs that have fallen off his load. But you must not utter a single word and must pass by him in silence."²⁵ Unlike the souls of the dead, Psyche is not to give assistance to the driver and his animal, because she is merely on an errand for Venus and she will in fact return from the underworld.

We see, then, that there is ample evidence connecting asses, and collapsing asses in particular, with the underworld and with initiates (whose initiation into the mysteries is intended as a preparation for and anticipation

²¹ Palermo 996. See E. Keuls, *The Water Carriers in Hades* (Amsterdam 1974) Plate II and pages 35–37, with further references.

²² See S. G. Cole, "Voices from Beyond the Grave: Dionysus and the Dead," in T. H. Carpenter and C. A. Faraone (eds.), *Masks of Dionysus* (Ithaca 1993) 279. For "Efeu als feststehenden Attribut des Dionysos und seines Thiasos," see A. F. H. Bierl, *Dionysos und die griechische Tragödie*, Classica Monacensia 1 (Tübingen 1991) 255.

²³ So A. Furtwängler, *ArchAnz* (1890) 5 and many others. (The lines are, however, interpreted as representing water by R. Helm, *NJA* 33 [1914] 204 n. 4, and as a river of the underworld by Keuls [above, note 21].) Furtwängler was also the first to associate the scene on this vase with the passage from Apuleius to be mentioned shortly.

²⁴ Compare the episode narrated in Lucian, *Asin.* 19: An ass sank down under the weight of its load and the drivers "beat the poor creature with a stick and told it to get up, but, when it paid no heed to their blows, some of them seized it by the ears and others by the tail and tried to get it on its feet" (in M. D. Macleod's Loeb translation).

²⁵ Apul. *Met.* 6. 18 (in J. A. Hanson's Loeb translation).

of their blessed afterlife).²⁶ The precepts of Hermippus are explicitly Pythagorean, and the Pythagoreans, no less than the devotees of the various mystery cults, were very much concerned with the proper behavior of the soul at death. The injunction to avoid the waters of falsehood evidently refers to the soul's journey to the underworld, and the precept concerning the ass apparently does so as well. The third precept, regarding blasphemy, is less easy to connect with the mysteries or with the underworld or, indeed, with Greek ideas in general.²⁷ But we may be justified in finding a hint of this connection in Plato, whose writings show traces of Pythagorean influence, and who frequently expresses himself in terms appropriate to the mysteries.²⁸ In the *Phaedo*, just before Socrates is to die, he reproaches his companions for their noisy lamentations and says, ἀκήκοα ὅτι ἐν εὐφρημίῳ χρὴ τελευτῶν (117e). Franz Cumont has plausibly suggested that this is to be connected with the Pythagorean prescription, preserved by Iamblichus (VP 257), regarding blasphemy at the time of death: κατὰ τὸν ὑστάτον καιρὸν παρήγγελλε μὴ βλασφημεῖν.²⁹ Further, in the *Republic*, in the myth of Er, which is itself unusually rich in Pythagorean elements,³⁰ we are told that the priest of Lachesis says to the assembled souls that have come to choose their lots and model lives, "The person making the choice is responsible; god takes no responsibility."³¹ It is, as Halliwell says in his note on this passage, "a Platonic conviction, contradictory of traditional beliefs, that gods cannot be responsible for evil." And he, like other commentators, refers to the related passage in Book 2, where Socrates argues that, contrary to what most people say, the gods, being good, can only be responsible for what is good (379b–c). He continues by saying that, therefore, the blame for evils must be sought elsewhere, and not among the gods. Although the actual word is not used, this sounds very much like an injunction against blasphemy. In fact, the word is used a little later in the same context. After castigating the poets for falsely claiming that the gods repeatedly transform themselves into (necessarily inferior) forms, Socrates says that mothers should not terrify their children by telling them stories about some divinities going about by night in the likeness of all manner of

²⁶ See F. Graf, *Eleusis und die orphische Dichtung Athens*, Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten 33 (Berlin 1974) 79.

²⁷ See the (necessarily) limited treatment by H. Merkel, s.v. "Gotteslästerung," in *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* XI (1981) 1187–88.

²⁸ For Pythagorean influence, see Burkert (above, note 3) 83–96 and passim; for the terminology of the mysteries, see C. Riedweg, *Mysterienterminologie bei Platon, Philon und Clemens von Alexandrien*, Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte 26 (Berlin 1987) 1–69. In addition to the passages noted below, *Phdr.* 242b–43a gives a good illustration of Plato's sensitivity to blasphemy. There Socrates expresses the need for him to compose a "palinode," so that he will not be guilty of ascribing evil qualities to the divinity Eros.

²⁹ F. Cumont, "A propos des dernières paroles de Socrate," *CRAI* (1943) 115. Professor Marcovich has kindly pointed out to me the more general Pythagorean pronouncements regarding blasphemy at D.L. 8. 21 and 24, Iamb. VP 218 and Porph. VP 38.

³⁰ S. Halliwell (ed.), *Plato. Republic 10* (Warminster 1988) 169, with further references.

³¹ *Resp.* 617e αἰτίᾳ ἐλομένου· θεός ἀναίτιος

strangers, "so that they will not blaspheme against the gods."³² The stories that Socrates is referring to are, as Adam points out in his commentary, those concerning "the bugbears of the nursery—Lamia, Mormo, and Empusa." As it happens, Empusa is one of the denizens of the underworld that Dionysus encounters in Aristophanes' *Frogs* (285–96). And, in an interesting recent article, Christopher Brown has shown that this scene in the *Frogs* is part of the pattern of Eleusinian elements that is so prevalent in the early part of the play.³³ According to the evidence collected by Brown, some kind of apparition of Empusa seems to have materialized for those who were undergoing initiation into the mysteries.

And so we see that all three of Hermippus' Pythagorean precepts are related in one way or another to notions of the soul's progress in the underworld and of initiation into the mysteries. This is perhaps not surprising, considering the fact that they are associated in Josephus' account with the notice about the soul of the deceased Calliphon haunting Pythagoras. To be sure, Fritz Wehrli has denied this association, saying in his commentary to this fragment,³⁴ "der Bericht über die Erscheinungen Kalliphons ist von demjenigen über pythagoreische Sakralschriften zu trennen." But this can be maintained only by someone who has ignored (as Wehrli appears to have done) the context from which this fragment is extracted. Here is the text of the passage (*Ap.* 1. 164–65) as it appears in Henry St. John Thackeray's Loeb edition:

λέγει τοίνυν [sc. "Ερμιππος"] ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν περὶ Πυθαγόρου βιβλίῳ
ὅτι Πυθαγόρας, ἐνὸς αὐτοῦ τῶν συνουσιαστῶν τελευτήσαντος,
τούνομα Καλλιφῶντος τὸ γένος Κροτωνιάτου, τὴν ἔκεινου ψυχὴν ἔλεγε
συνδιατρίβειν αὐτῷ καὶ νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν, καὶ ὅτι παρεκελεύετο
μὴ διέρχεσθαι τόπον ἐφ' ὃν ὁνος ὀκλάσῃ, καὶ τῶν διψίων ὑδάτων
ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ πάσης [ἀπέχειν] βλασφημίας. εἴτα προστίθησι μετὰ.
ταῦτα καὶ τάδε· "ταῦτα δὲ ἔπραττε καὶ ἔλεγε τὰς Ιουδαίων καὶ
Θρακῶν δόξας μιμούμενος καὶ μεταφέρων εἰς ἑαυτόν."

Josephus is here concerned to cite Hermippus as one of several Greek sources documenting the Greeks' familiarity with the Jews. His evidence, which includes citations from Theophrastus, Herodotus, Choerilus of Samos and others, confines itself—appropriately, for a carefully argued work of apologetics—to what is strictly relevant. The introduction of Calliphon is utterly superfluous to Josephus' purpose, unless there is some connection, according to Hermippus, between the story about Calliphon and the

³² *Resp.* 381e ἵνα μὴ . . . εἰς θεοὺς βλασφημῶσιν. This is the only occurrence in Plato of a word from the root βλασφημ- outside of the *Laws* and (if that work is genuine) the second *Alcibiades*.

³³ C. G. Brown, "Empousa, Dionysus and the Mysteries: Aristophanes, *Frogs* 285ff.," *CQ* 41 (1991) 41–50. For a detailed examination of the Eleusinian features of *Frogs*, see now A. M. Bowie, *Aristophanes: Myth, Ritual and Comedy* (Cambridge 1993) 228–53.

³⁴ F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles*, Suppl. I: *Hermippus der Kallimacheer* (Basel 1974) 57–58.

precepts. If Josephus had seen no such connection in Hermippus' account, there is no possible reason for him to have bothered to include what Hermippus had to say about Calliphon. Rather, it is clear that Josephus reports Hermippus' having said that, after Calliphon's death, Pythagoras and Calliphon's ghost had some communications with one another, that these precepts were among those communications and that these precepts are, ultimately, Jewish and Thracian.

What is not entirely clear, however, is whether Pythagoras conveyed these precepts to Calliphon or, rather, Calliphon to Pythagoras. On the whole, translators and commentators have opted for either Pythagoras or Calliphon as subject of *παρεκελεύετο* without giving reasons for their choice. An exception is Maria Timpanaro Cardini,³⁵ who says that the subject of *παρεκελεύετο* is Pythagoras, "come appare chiaro dal seguito." But I can see nothing in what follows that makes Pythagoras a more likely subject than Calliphon. Others who take Pythagoras to be the subject include Fritz Wehrli and Théodore Reinach.³⁶ On the other hand, Calliphon is taken as the subject by Kathleen Freeman and, if I am construing his English correctly, by Thackeray in his Loeb translation.³⁷ For our purposes, it makes little difference in which way the communication went. In any event, the precepts were communicated either by or to the soul of someone recently dead. For a variety of reasons, none of which is perhaps decisive, I am inclined to believe that the former is the case. To begin with, if Calliphon was a *συνουσιαστής* of Pythagoras, one wonders why the philosopher waited until after his disciple had died to impart these^{*} vital instructions to him. Indeed, why are we told that Pythagoras conveyed these precepts specifically to Calliphon, and not to his disciples generally? If Calliphon were, rather, the *source* of these precepts, the account would be perfectly intelligible. And, in fact, the account would conform to a very common narrative pattern, namely the pattern whereby a person receives a visit from a supernatural being, and the supernatural being "reveals without symbolism what will or will not happen, or should or should not be done."³⁸

³⁵ M. Timpanaro Cardini, *Pitagorici. Testimonianze e frammenti I* (Florence 1958) 110.

³⁶ Wehrli (above, note 34); T. Reinach, *Textes d'auteurs grecs et romains relatifs au Judaïsme* (Paris 1895) 39. In Reinach's Budé edition (1930) of the work, however, the translation, which is the work of Léon Blum, makes the soul of Calliphon the subject of *παρεκελεύετο* ("qu'il avait commerce nuit et jour avec l'âme de celui-ci, et qu'elle lui donnait le conseil . . .").

³⁷ K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1949) 87. Thackeray's translation runs: "Hermippus . . . states that the philosopher . . . remarked that his pupil's soul was with him night and day, and admonished him . . ." I take the absence of a pronoun before "admonished" as an indication that Thackeray considers "his pupil's soul" to continue as subject. I am unable to determine from Troiani's translation whether he takes Calliphon or Pythagoras as subject: L. Troiani, *Commento storico al "Contro Apione" di Giuseppe* (Pisa 1977) 236.

³⁸ Macrobius (*Somn. Scip.* 1. 3. 8), as quoted by E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley 1951) 107. For further examples of this pattern in dream-narratives, see Dodds 104 ff., esp. 107–08.

Most commonly, the supernatural visitor is spoken of as appearing in a dream but, in fact, the distinction between seeing a dream and seeing the soul (*ψυχή* or *εἴδωλον*) of someone deceased or the manifestation of a god is insignificant or even non-existent.³⁹ The pattern is particularly clear in the case of *repeated* visits, which I take to be the case here, given the imperfects (*συνδιατρίβειν* and *παρεκελεύετο*) and the expression *καὶ νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν*. In the fifth-century tragedy *Prometheus Bound*, Io tells us that she was constantly being visited by dreams that urged her to give in to Zeus' amorous advances.⁴⁰ And Herodotus reports that "the same vision" occurred on three consecutive nights, twice to Xerxes and once to Artabanus, insisting that the Persians embrace that which is fated and attack Greece.⁴¹ In Euripides' *Hecuba*, the ghost of Polydorus has been haunting his mother for three days, and he tells her indistinctly and the audience explicitly what is to happen in the near future.⁴² And, according to Plato, Socrates was often visited by "the same dream," which repeatedly advised him to make music.⁴³ Even the ghost of Darius in Aeschylus' *Persae*, who enters the stage (681 ff.) asking for information concerning the reason for the lamentation that he has heard, ends up by giving predictions and advice at great length. Indeed, that is the reason the chorus of elders had summoned him to appear. And, in general, that is the function of visitors from the other realm, namely to convey to the living what the living are themselves in no position to know. Granted, the living Pythagoras was no ordinary living being. But still, the uniformity of this narrative pattern suggests that the soul of Calliphon is more likely to have been the conveyor than the recipient of these precepts.

And this inference is supported further by a consideration of one remaining question, namely whether we can tell if these precepts, of apparently Jewish origin, reached the Greeks in the time of Pythagoras, or not until the time of Hermippus.⁴⁴ Unfortunately, it appears that we know nothing at all about Calliphon apart from what we read in this fragment of

³⁹ See G. Björck, "ONAP ΙΔΕΙΝ. De la perception de rêve chez les anciens," *Eranos* 44 (1946) 313 for the identity of dreams and *εἴδωλα*. According to A. H. M. Kessels, *Studies on the Dream in Greek Literature* (Utrecht 1978) 153, all the dreams that are narrated in detail in the Homeric poems "are supposed to come either from the gods . . . or from the dead."

⁴⁰ Αἰεὶ γὰρ ὄψεις ἔννυχοι πολεύμεναι . . . παρηγόρουν 645–46. The words of the dream-figure are quoted in 647–54.

⁴¹ Hdt. 7. 12–17. Note τώντο ὅνειρον 7. 14, 15. 3 and 17. 1. The words of the dream-figure, different in each case, are quoted in 12. 2, 14 and 17. 2.

⁴² Eur. *Hec.* 1 ff. Note τριταῖον ἥδη φέγγος 32. Polydorus foretells the future in lines 42 ff. Hecuba indicates that she has had troubling visions (68–72) and requires a Helenus or a Cassandra (87–89) to interpret them. According to J. Bremmer, *The Early Greek Concept of the Soul* (Princeton 1983) 84–85, the souls of the dead "are unable to speak properly," and he cites as evidence *Il.* 23. 101, where the soul of Patroclus disappears squeaking. But he neglects to mention lines 69–92, where the words that Patroclus speaks to Achilles are given in full.

⁴³ Plato, *Phaedo* 60e πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸν ἐνύπνιον ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ ὅψει φαινόμενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, "Ω Σώκρατες," ἔφη, "μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζουν."

⁴⁴ So E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, 5th ed. (Leipzig 1892) 1.1 302 n. 1.

Hermippus. But there seems to be no reason not to identify this man with the Calliphon named by Herodotus (3. 125. 1) as the father of the famous physician Democedes. If this is the case, as scholars generally assume,⁴⁵ then we know from the *Suda* the additional fact (if it is indeed a fact) that Calliphon was a priest of Asclepius in Cnidos, and from Herodotus that he had a nasty temper.⁴⁶ And we know a good deal about Democedes.⁴⁷ Democedes was born in Croton, which is the obvious location of the story connecting his father with Pythagoras, but he travelled widely. According to Herodotus, he practiced medicine in both Aegina and Athens before joining the court of Polycrates of Samos. He accompanied Polycrates to Magnesia, where the tyrant was murdered by the Persian governor Oroetes and where Democedes was himself taken prisoner. Later, Democedes became associated with the court of Darius and lived at Susa. He eventually persuaded Darius to allow him to return home to Croton by way of Sidon, on a Phoenician ship. When Darius sent Democedes back to Greece he sent with him presents for Democedes' father and brothers (Hdt. 3. 135. 2), so that, if Herodotus' narrative preserves anything resembling the truth, Calliphon was still alive when Democedes returned from his travels and settled down in Croton to marry the daughter of the wrestler Milo (3. 137. 5). Thus Calliphon had every opportunity available to a Greek citizen of the sixth century to learn about the practices of his contemporaries in the Near East. Cnidos had connections in that century with Egypt, being one of the cities that joined in the construction of the Hellenion near Naucratis (Hdt. 2. 178. 2). And Democedes' various experiences in Persia, Lydia and Phoenicia will have enabled him to come into contact with the Jews' closest neighbors and, most likely, with Jews themselves. And he could well have communicated some of what he learned to his father Calliphon, who in turn transmitted that knowledge to his associate Pythagoras, either before or after his soul was separated from his body.

One final question remains, namely the matter of the Thracians and their connection with these precepts. For, according to Hermippus,

⁴⁵ See, e.g., H. Gossen, "Kalliphon 7," *RE* X (1917) 1656; Timpanaro Cardini (above, note 35) 108; Burkert (above, note 3) 293 n. 82; B. Centrone, "Calliphon de Crotone," in *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques* II (Paris 1994) 177. Our Calliphon (1) was from Croton and (2) associated with Pythagoras. Calliphon's son Democedes (1) was from Croton and (2) both he (Iamb. VP 257) and his father-in-law Milo (Str. 6. 1. 12 C263; Iamb. VP 104, 249, 267) associated with Pythagoras. How many Crotoniates named Calliphon can have belonged to Pythagoras' circle?

⁴⁶ *Suda* Δ 442 Adler; Hdt. 3. 131. 1.

⁴⁷ Hdt. 3. 125, 129–37; M. Michler, "Demokedes von Kroton: Der älteste Vertreter westgriechischen Heilkunde," *Gesnerus* 23 (1966) 213–29; J. Hofstetter, *Die Griechen in Persien: Prosopographie der Griechen im persischen Reich vor Alexander*, Archäologische Mitteilungen aus Iran, Ergänzungsband 5 (Berlin 1978) no. 79; A. Griffiths, "Democedes of Croton: A Greek Doctor at the Court of Darius," *Achaemenid History* 2 (1987) 37–51.

Pythagoras⁴⁸ observed and taught these precepts "in imitation of the beliefs of the Jews and Thracians." Jacobson has shown that all three of these precepts have Jewish elements. What, then, is left for the Thracians? As we have seen, the three precepts, at least in their Pythagorean garb, have associations with the underworld, with the mysteries and with the soul's journey after death. These associations are obviously not Jewish. But it is, of course, quite natural for a Greek writer to attribute them to a Thracian origin. For Thrace is the home of Orpheus and it is the Thracian Getae whom Herodotus characterizes as "those who believe in immortality."⁴⁹ The story that Hermippus tells about Pythagoras and his subterranean chamber has clear connections with Herodotus' account of the Thracian Zalmoxis.⁵⁰ And, finally, we have evidence at least as early as the fifth century B.C. for a belief in the existence of a Thracian background to the Eleusinian Mysteries and to the priestly family of the Eumolpidae.⁵¹ So that, although we cannot be confident about the reconstruction of the details of transmission, it looks as though these Jewish precepts were adopted by some Greeks who had contact with the Near East in the sixth century B.C., were combined with the "Thracian" belief in the immortality of the individual soul, and were taken over into the body of doctrine professed by the Pythagoreans.

Appendix: The Ass of Ocnus

Pausanias describes in detail Polygnotus' painting of the underworld in the Cnidian Lesche at Delphi. Among the figures depicted and described (10. 29. 1-2) is Ocnus, who perpetually plaits a rope, which in turn is perpetually eaten by an ass that stands next to him. For this figure, see W. Felten, s.v. "Oknos," in *LIMC* VII.1 (1994) 33-35, with further bibliography, to which should be added W. G. Arnott, "Ocnus, With Reference to a Passage of Apuleius and to a Black-Figure Lekythos in Palermo," *C&M* 23 (1962) 233-47 and Graf (above, note 26) 188-94.

⁴⁸ If, that is, Pythagoras is the subject of ἔπραττε καὶ ἔλεγε, as Reinach, *Textes* (above, note 36) assumes. But if, as I have argued, Calliphon is the subject of παρεκέλευτο, he could just as well be the subject of ἔπραττε καὶ ἔλεγε also.

⁴⁹ Hdt. 4. 93 Γέτας τοὺς ἀθανατίζοντας. Cf. Pl. *Chrm.* 156d τῶν Θρακῶν τῶν Ζαλμόδιδος ιατρῶν, οἵ λέγονται καὶ ἀπαθανατίζειν.

⁵⁰ D.L. 8. 41 = Hermippus, fr. 20 Wehrli; cf. Hdt. 4. 95. 4-5. See Burkert (above, note 3) 155-59; Dodds (above, note 38) 144, 165-66; W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* I (Cambridge 1962) 158-60; D. Asheri, "Herodotus on Thracian Society and History," in *Hérodote et les peuples non grecs*, Entretiens Hardt 35 (Vandoeuvres-Geneva 1988) 148-49 and (the discussion between Asheri and Burkert) 166-67. The fundamental study is K. Meuli, "Scythica," *Hermes* 70 (1935) 121-76 = *Gesammelte Schriften* II (Basel 1975) 817-79.

⁵¹ The evidence is to be found in the fragments of Euripides' *Erechtheus*. See R. Parker, "Myths of Early Athens," in J. Bremmer (ed.), *Interpretations of Greek Mythology* (London 1987) 202-04.

("Exkurs II: Oknos"). There are two unexplained features of this account. In the first place, "we are never told what Oknos did to merit this punishment" (H. A. Shapiro, *Personifications in Greek Art* [Zurich 1993] 178). In the second place, the man's name is surprising, inasmuch as his punishment "exemplifies futility rather than hesitation or timidity" (D. A. Russell and N. G. Wilson [eds.], *Menander Rhetor* [Oxford 1981] 231). Both these features can, I think, be accounted for by reference to a story told by Nicander and Aelian, and examined by Malcolm Davies in "The Ancient Greeks on Why Mankind Does not Live Forever," *MH* 44 (1987) 65–75. (I should like to thank Dr. Helma Dik for bringing this article to my attention and for initiating the skein of thought that resulted in this Appendix.) Nicander, *Theriaca* 343–58 and Aelian, *De Natura Animalium* 6. 51 recount the story of the ass and the dipsas. According to the tale, Zeus wished to reward those mortals who had denounced Prometheus' theft of fire by giving them a remedy against aging. But they, out of laziness (*νωθεῖς . . . κάμυοντες*, Nic. *Ther.* 349; N. Hopkinson, *A Hellenistic Anthology* [Cambridge 1988] 145 prefers to follow the *deteriores* and read *νωθεῖ*, in agreement with the ass, for reasons which I do not find compelling), handed over the remedy to an ass to carry. As it was summer, the ass was very thirsty. It came to a spring guarded by a snake. (Compare the underworld pool that has guards posted over it, in the hexameter texts giving instructions to the souls of the deceased.) The ass is only too happy to trade its burden, the value of which it does not know, for a drink from the spring. As a result, the snake receives from the ass the remedy against old age, so that it is able to slough off its skin and be periodically rejuvenated. In addition, the snake takes on the ass' burning thirst (an aition for the name "dipsas").

There is no explicit connection between this story and that of Ocnus and his ass. But the two stories complement each other perfectly. As Davies (70) notes, the story of the ass and the dipsas seems truncated, as it does not specify a punishment of the ass to balance that of the snake. But that punishment may be supplied from the story of Ocnus, which places the ass in the underworld. As we saw above, there is no explicit explanation for the presence of Ocnus and his ass in the underworld. (We may also imagine that the story of the ass and the dipsas supplies the original explanation for the proverb concerning the ass and the mysteries: As punishment for having squandered the gift of immortality, the ass must serve the mysteries in some menial capacity.) And the story of the ass and the dipsas suggests an explanation for the name of Ocnus: Instead of speedily conveying the gift of perpetual youth to the rest of mankind, Ocnus lazily (*piger* is Pliny's gloss on Ocnus' name: *NH* 35. 137) and carelessly entrusts it to an ass. And yet, the punishment fits the crime. Ocnus spends eternity braiding a rope, presumably the one with which he intends to secure the burden on his ass. And so the punishment exemplifies not only futility, but also endless delay.

It may be objected that there are too many loose ends, that there is nothing that ties one story explicitly to the other, that the plural "denouncers" in Nicander and Aelian do not mesh with the singular sinner Ocnus. And, further, we are bound to wonder how (if at all) this is all connected with the Jewish and Pythagorean precept regarding the collapsing ass. But we must remember that this whole nexus of accounts is associated with the mysteries. (See especially Graf, who suggests a possible connection—although not the one proposed here—between Ocnus and the mysteries.) And it is entirely possible, perhaps even likely, that only odds and ends of the account known fully to the initiates ever surfaced in the texts that have survived to us, and that those odds and ends were subject to the kinds of alterations and embroideries that even coherent narratives have been known to suffer.

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Suspense in the Phaeacian Episode of Apollonius' *Argonautica*

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The suspenseful Phaeacian episode of Apollonius' *Argonautica* (4. 982–1222) is one of the most important and dramatic in the action of the second half of the poem, tying into a tight knot its central conflicts and finally (apparently) resolving them.¹ The love affair between Jason and Medea, which made possible the former's acquisition of the Golden Fleece but which has seemed precarious and dubious, is consummated. Their marriage, which is celebrated with glorious festivity, means that King Alcinous recognizes that Medea has thereby passed from the power of her father into the power and protection of Jason and declares that Medea shall not be given up to the Colchian force which is demanding her back. The latter give up further pursuit of the Argonauts.

And yet this ending to the Colchian portion of the Argonautic story is curiously ambiguous, ambivalent, and inconclusive. Scholars and critics have read the episode in quite different ways. Many follow Wilamowitz² in seeing the episode as the unhappy beginning of the end of the story of Jason and Medea: They are alienated and estranged from one another, and they marry perforce in order to keep Medea from falling into the hands of the Colchians. Others, however, see it rather as the happy end of the romantic story that is the subject of the second half of the poem.³

This ambiguity and inconclusiveness, I will argue here, is part of a deliberate rhetorical strategy on the part of the poet. In this episode, Apollonius creates a complex interplay and tension between the “suspense of uncertainty” that we are made to feel about the outcome of the action *within* the episode (the development of the relationship between Jason and Medea and the handling of the threat posed by the Colchians) and the

¹ On the Phaeacian episode as a “substitute” for the Argonauts’ return to Pagasae, which the poet handles summarily at the end of the poem, see V. Knight, *The Renewal of Epic: Responses to Homer in the “Argonautica” of Apollonius* (Leiden 1995) 248–49.

² U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Hellenistische Dichtung in der Zeit des Kallimachos II* (Berlin 1924) 199–203.

³ See especially Edward Phinney, Jr., “Narrative Unity in the *Argonautica*, the Medea–Jason Romance,” *TAPA* 98 (1967) 336–38; cf. G. O. Hutchinson, *Hellenistic Poetry* (Oxford 1988) 132–34.

"suspense of anticipation" that we feel about the ultimate outcome of the Argonautic expedition and of Jason and Medea's marriage.⁴ From our knowledge of the mythological tradition and from foreshadowings within the poem itself (e.g., 1. 440–41, 3. 85–89, 3. 241–43), we know that the Argonautic enterprise will be successful, and that both Jason and Medea will reach Greece safely; however, we also know that the trip will involve "innumerable trials" (1. 441–42). We know, too, that the relationship of Jason and Medea is doomed to fatal estrangement that will have tragic consequences; through vague but ominous hints and allusions to Euripides' *Medea*, Apollonius reinforces this knowledge and keeps the ultimate fate of Jason and Medea continually in view.⁵

The poet intensifies and complicates the suspense by exploiting the dynamics of the reading process described by Menakhem Perry, whereby the audience continuously constructs hypotheses about what is going on in the fictional world on the basis of the information and knowledge available during the reading of the linear text, and confirms, modifies, or rejects these hypotheses as further information becomes available.⁶ By withholding crucial information about events and about his characters' thoughts and feelings, and by emphasizing the bellicose implacability of the Colchians and recalling words or events in Euripides' play, Apollonius leads us to believe that the Colchians will resort to anything in order to get possession of Medea and that the tragic estrangement of Jason and Medea may already be in progress.⁷ Finally, when the suspense of uncertainty dissipates as narrative gaps are filled in and ambiguities are resolved, we are left with a "happy" ending whose happiness is tempered by our knowledge that it is

⁴ On the distinction between "suspense of uncertainty" and "suspense of anticipation" and between suspense concerning individual episodes and suspense concerning the "main events of the story" whose outcome is known to the audience, see G. E. Duckworth, *Foreshadowing and Suspense in the Epics of Homer, Apollonius, and Vergil* (Princeton 1933) 37.

⁵ On the foreshadowing of events that await Jason and Medea in Greece, see Duckworth (previous note) 33–34; M. Fusillo, *Il tempo delle "Argonautiche": Un'analisi del racconto in Apollonio Rodio* (Rome 1985) 307–11, 338. On audience expectations based on knowledge of the tradition and on internal foreshadowings in the *Iliad*, see J. V. Morrison, *Homeric Misdirection: False Predictions in the "Iliad"* (Ann Arbor 1992) 13. On "aftermaths," or "endings beyond the ending" in literature, see D. H. Roberts, "Afterword: Ending and Aftermath, Ancient and Modern," in *Classical Closure: Reading the End in Greek and Latin Literature*, ed. by D. H. Roberts, F. M. Dunn, and D. Fowler (Princeton 1997) 251–73.

⁶ M. Perry, "Literary Dynamics: How the Order of a Text Creates Its Meanings," *Poetics Today* 1 (1979) 35–64, 311–61. Cf. S. Rimmon-Kenan, *Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics* (London 1983) 117–29.

⁷ R. L. Hunter (ed.), *Apollonius of Rhodes. "Argonautica" Book III* (Cambridge 1989) 19, says that Apollonius "models his Jason and his Medea with an eye to their 'subsequent' history in Euripides' tragedy. The two texts become mutually explicative: *Arg.* shows us how the origins of the tragedy lay far back, and the tragedy lends deep resonance and 'tragic' irony to the events of the epic." I would argue, however, that Apollonius does not really "show" us that the tragedy originated in the initial stages of Jason and Medea's love affair; rather, he encourages our hypothesis that it did so. In his now giving support to this hypothesis, now taking it away, lies much of the power and interest of the fourth book of the poem.

not the end at all, and that the disaster that we were led to fear has only been deferred.

Apollonius has already employed similar techniques in the earlier Apsyrtus episode (4. 338–521), which closely parallels the Phaeacian episode in situation and in structure.⁸ In that episode, the Colchian contingent led by Medea's brother Apsyrtus caught up with the Argonauts and demanded that Medea be given up to them; but Jason made an agreement with them to submit her fate to third-party arbitration. After accusations of betrayal on her part, and self-defensiveness on his, Jason and Medea concerted the killing of Apsyrtus in order to escape. Medea's towering rage and bitter recriminations and Jason's smooth reassurances vividly recall their portrayal in the *Medea*, and indeed many scholars have seen here the germination of the seeds of their ultimate tragedy, as told by Euripides. But Apollonius is in fact deliberately ambiguous about whether their relationship has already become the "Euripidean" one: Though Medea shows herself capable of implacable wrath against Jason, she nevertheless seems to be placated by his arguments; and though Jason shows that he is capable of deceit and treachery, it is not clear that it is Medea whom he wishes to deceive and betray.⁹ The "Euripidean hypothesis," therefore, remains in abeyance, to be reactivated in the Phaeacian episode.

The excursus with which the Phaeacian episode begins, giving alternative derivations of the name of the Phaeacians' island, on which the Argonauts land, suggests a thematic opposition between violence and betrayal, on the one hand, and peace and civilization, on the other: Drepene gets its name either from the sickle with which Kronos castrated his father or from the sickle of Demeter, who out of love for Macris taught the Titans to reap grain there (984–91).¹⁰ This thematic opposition is carried over onto the level of the plot when the narrative proper begins: The Argonauts are welcomed with joy and homecoming-like festivity by the friendly Phaeacians (994b–1000a), but immediately have to face the prospect of battle (1000b). That part of the Colchian fleet that is still pursuing the Argonauts has arrived.¹¹

Events immediately following the arrival of the Colchians are narrated rapidly in a dense and elliptical summary (1004–10) similar to that reporting the forging of the compact between the Colchians and the Argonauts in the

⁸ On the parallelism, see F. Vian (ed.), *Apollonios de Rhodes. "Argonautiques"* III (Paris 1981) 14–15; cf. A. R. Dyck, "On the Way from Colchis to Corinth: Medea in Book 4 of the *Argonautica*," *Hermes* 117 (1989) 466.

⁹ On this episode, see C. S. Byre, "The Killing of Apsyrtus in Apollonius Rhodius' *Argonautica*," *Phoenix* 50 (1996) 3–16 and the bibliographic references there.

¹⁰ Cf. Dyck (above, note 8) 465; A. Hurst, *Apollonios de Rhodes, manière et cohérence: Contribution à l'étude de l'esthétique alexandrine* (Rome 1967) 121.

¹¹ They have arrived, the poet adds (1002b–03), by a different route than the Argonauts. This fact tells us that the Colchians are unaware of Apsyrtus' murder, and introduces a further source of suspense into the episode: Will they find out about it? (They do not, and in fact no allusion is made to it in the episode by either the poet or his characters.)

Apsyrtus episode (4. 340–49). We learn only that the Colchians are implacably set upon (ἴεντ' ἀπροφάτως, 1005¹²) bringing Medea back to her father, threatening great violence if they do not get her; but that Alcinous restrains them, for he is eager to resolve the dispute for both sides without warfare (λελίητο γὰρ ἀμφοτέροισι / δηιοτῆτος ἄνευθεν ὑπέρβια νείκεα λῦσαι, 1009–10). The poet withholds from us the details of Alcinous' intervention, and tells us nothing about how he intends to resolve the issue. We are thus left with the impression that the Colchians are a powerful force who will not be deflected from their object and will stop at nothing to obtain it.¹³

Nor does the poet tell us anything about Jason's own actions and reactions. This narrative gap seems to become ominously significant when we are told that Medea's appeals to the Argonauts for support are addressed to Jason's *companions* (πολλὰ μὲν αὐτοὺς / Αἰσονίδεω ἐτάρους μειλίσσετο, 1011b–12a), each in turn (τοῖα δ' ὀριστήσων ἐναμοιβαδίς ἄνδρα ἔκαστον, 1030). Nothing is said about where Jason is or what he is doing in the meantime. This, together with the fact that Medea's scornful appeals to the Argonauts echo many of her arguments to Jason in the Apsyrtus episode¹⁴ (which in turn echo Medea's speech to Jason, *Med.* 465–519), including her adjuration to respect the compact made with her, the oaths sworn, and her rights as a suppliant (δείσατε συνθεσίας τε καὶ ὅρκια, δείσατ' Ἐρινύν / Ἰκεσίην νέμεσίν τε θεῶν, 1042–43a), suggests that, once again, she suspects that treachery may be afoot. Moreover, neither her appeals to Queen Arete (1014–28) nor her appeals to the Argonauts (1031–52) make any mention of Jason; she even treats the trials in Colchis and the acquisition of the fleece—which, as she notes, are due entirely to her own agency—as exploits of the entire group (1031–35). All of this encourages us to assimilate the information that is given in the narrative to the tragic pattern of the *Medea*; in other words, to reactivate the hypothesis, first suggested by the Apsyrtus episode, that the relationship between Jason and Medea has become the “Euripidean” one, that Jason has gotten what he wants from Medea and is ready to throw her over if she

¹² On the meaning of ἀπροφάτως here, see E. Livrea (ed.), *Apollonii Rhodii Argonauticon liber quartus* (Florence 1973) ad loc. R. Hunter translates, “their unconditional demand was the handing over of Medea to be returned to her father” (*Apollonius of Rhodes: Jason and the Golden Fleece [The ‘Argonautica’]* [Oxford 1993] 122). The text of the poem that is cited in this paper is that of Vian (above, note 8).

¹³ Fusillo (above, note 5) 272, 274, argues that the poet uses narrative compression here in order to downplay what is least important in the episode, the development of the action itself, and to highlight what is most important, the psychology of Medea. And H. Fränkel (*Noten zu den ‘Argonautika’ des Apollonios* [Munich 1968] 553–55), pointing out that the reader can fill in the details of what is going on at this point in the story only on the basis of what he or she learns later in the episode, attributes the gaps to the author's lack of consideration for the reader. Both scholars fail to recognize the function of these narrative gaps in creating ambiguity and suspense. On the function of similar gaps in the Apsyrtus episode, see Byre (above, note 9) 5–6.

¹⁴ See Vian (above, note 8) 114 n. 3.

jeopardizes the success of the expedition and that Medea, with good reason, no longer loves or trusts him.¹⁵

The fact that the Argonauts answer her pleas with a show of arms and promises of aid in the case of an unjust verdict (*δίκης ἀλιτήμονος*, 1057) suggests that Medea need fear no treachery from them, at any rate.¹⁶ But their saber-rattling only reinforces our fear that the situation may erupt into warfare—the Colchians have threatened violence if they do not get Medea, now the Argonauts promise it if they do. Meanwhile, our suspicions about Jason's motives remain.

Night finds Medea sleepless and tortured by apprehension. Our own suspense about what is going to happen on Drepene seems to mirror hers, and we are made to feel deep sympathy with her in what we take to be her desolate situation. The poet tells us that her anguish is like that of a poor spinstress who works by night while her orphan children (*όρφανὰ τέκνα*, 1063) whimper; the woman, desolate through the loss of her husband (*χηροσύνη πόσιος*, 1064), weeps at her sad lot. The details of the simile, besides reminding us of the terrible events to come in Corinth, her abandonment by Jason and perhaps even her killing of her children,¹⁷ reinforce the hypothesis that something is seriously amiss between her and Jason, suggesting that Medea has already “lost” her lover.

Meanwhile, in the palace, the bedtime conversation between Arete and Alcinous (1068–1109), whose marital harmony poignantly contrasts with Medea's situation,¹⁸ only deepens the suspense. Arete pleads that her husband save Medea from the Colchians (1073–74); but her request that he not make Jason false in the great oaths that he has sworn to Medea¹⁹ ironically reminds us both of the possibility of Jason's faithlessness now, and of the perfidy that he will certainly be guilty of some years hence. And Alcinous' decision, made (or revealed) only now, to give Medea back to her father if she is a virgin, makes it seem inevitable that the episode must have an unhappy issue; for both Medea in her pleas to Arete, and Arete in her pleas to Alcinous, have emphasized that her virginity is intact (1024–25 and

¹⁵ Cf. Wilamowitz (above, note 2) 202–03; P. A. Hübscher, *Die Charakteristik der Personen in Apollonios' “Argonautika”* (diss. Freiburg 1940) 16; S. A. Natzel, *Κλέα γυναικῶν: Frauen in den “Argonautika” des Apollonios Rhodios* (Trier 1992) 115–16.

¹⁶ Fränkel compares Medea's appeals to the Argonauts to Agamemnon's *epipoleisis* in the *Iliad*, designed to spur to action men whose loyalty was never in doubt ([above, note 13] 559–60).

¹⁷ Cf. Hurst (above, note 10) 122–23; C. R. Beye, *Epic and Romance in the “Argonautica” of Apollonius* (Carbondale, IL 1982) 154; Fusillo (above, note 5) 338; Natzel (above, note 15) 117.

¹⁸ Cf. Knight (above, note 1) 251.

¹⁹ How she has heard of this (*ώς οἴω*, 1084), is unclear, since no mention is made of it in Medea's speech to Arete. According to R. Ibscher (*Gestalt der Szene und Form der Rede in den “Argonautika” des Apollonios Rhodios* [diss. Berlin 1939] 91), *ώς οἴω* “nimmt Bezug auf das, was sie durch Medea erfuhr”; but this inference is not justified by the text. See R. Hunter, *The “Argonautica” of Apollonius: Literary Studies* (Cambridge 1993) 72.

1074, respectively).²⁰ Alcinous emphasizes his resolve to render a verdict that all mankind will regard as the best one (1104–05). But will the Argonauts see it that way if he awards Medea to the Colchians? Or will they see it as the “unjust verdict” in the case of which they have promised their aid to Medea? And what, in any case, will Jason do?

As the narrative continues, what the poet tells us gradually lessens the strength of the “Euripidean hypothesis” while suspense about the Colchian threat continues to build. Arete secretly sends a herald to the Argonauts to tell them what Alcinous’ decree will be and to urge Jason to consummate his marriage with Medea. From this it is evident that Arete, at any rate, trusts Jason with Medea’s welfare. The herald finds the Argonauts in armed watch by the ship (1124–25). Although his reception by them is presented in another swift and elliptical summary, and Jason’s individual reaction is not shown, the fact that the herald has come to give his message to Jason (ὅς κεν Ἰήσονι μῦθον ἐναίσιμον ἀγγείλειν, 1122) makes it clear that Jason shares in the general joy of the Argonauts when they hear the welcome news (γῆθησε δὲ θυμὸς ἐκάστου / ἡρώων, μάλα γάρ σφιν ἔαδότα μῦθον ἔειπεν, 1126b–27).

Our fears that the couple are estranged, however, are not allayed until the narrative of the wedding itself. In a rare “inside view” of the couple in this episode, we are finally given direct insight into the motivations of Jason and into the attitudes of Medea. The poet notes (1161–64) that this wedding on Drepene is not as either of them desires (they had wanted to wed in his father’s house in Iolcus), but that they are led to make love by necessity (τότ’ αὐτὸν χρεὼς ἥγε μιγῆναι, 1164). And he adds the deeply pessimistic gnomic generalization that we much-suffering humans never get a firm footing on the path of Delight, that bitter care always attends human joy (1165–67):

ἀλλὰ γάρ οὐ ποτε φῦλα δυηπαθέων ἀνθρώπων
τερπωλῆς ἐπέβημεν ὅλῳ ποδὶ· σὺν δέ τις αἰεὶ²¹
πικρὴ παρμέμβλωκεν ἐυφροσύνησιν ἀνί.

In the universalizing generality of the comment we have once again, of course, a foreshadowing of the ultimate unhappy outcome of the marriage.²¹ But there is nothing in the text to suggest, as some scholars seem to think, that Jason and Medea are unwilling to marry each other, or that they have mixed feelings about their marriage itself.²² The comment is syntactically and semantically closely tied to its context, to the poet’s attempt to explain

²⁰ Cf. Duckworth (above, note 4) 110, who sees in this “an element of false foreshadowing.”

²¹ I believe that G. Zanker, however (“The Love Theme in Apollonius Rhodius’ *Argonautica*,” *WS* n.s. 13 [1979] 67–68), goes too far when he says that here the poet “clearly states his view of love in the *Argonautica*: the passion may be all-powerful and grand, but it can provoke men and women to action which can have the direst consequences” (i.e. the events of Euripides’ *Medea*). The statement, rather, is about life in general.

²² See Natzel (above, note 15) 119; cf. Dyck (above, note 8) 467.

the state of mind of the couple at this moment of the story:²³ their feelings of joy in their love-making mixed with disappointment at the hasty irregularity of the marriage and with awareness that they are not yet home and mixed above all, as the poet indicates in his resumption of the narrative, with anxiety about Alcinous' future verdict and its consequences (*τῶ καὶ τούς, γλυκερῆ περ ιαινομένους φιλότητι, / δεῖμ' ἔχεν, εἰ τελέοιτο διάκρισις Ἀλκινόοι*, 1168–69). It is the *circumstances* of the marriage that occasion their mixed feelings. They do want to marry; and the fact that they "take delight in sweet love-making" (1168b) at the consummation of their marriage means that, by this point in the narrative, textual support for the "Euripidean hypothesis" is severely eroded, if not swept away altogether.²⁴

As the imminence of tragedy diminishes, intimations of tragedy deferred continue. In the poet's excursus on the sacred cave in which the marriage is consummated (1131–40), we are told how, on Euboea, Macris fed the infant Dionysus with honey after Hermes had taken him from the flames; Hera in anger drove her from the island, and she went to dwell in the sacred cave of the Phaeacians, where she gave the inhabitants unlimited prosperity (*ὅλβον ἀθέσφατον*, 1140). The content and tone of the digression suggests salvation and safe refuge; but Natzel hears sinister overtones in the story, reminders that Medea is, like Macris, an exile who is a victim of the designs of Hera.²⁵

In keeping with Apollonius' technique of spinning out the threads of the suspense of uncertainty as long as possible, Hera's role in this episode is revealed in a tardy and piecemeal fashion. It is only after describing the nymphs who have come with flowers for the bridal chamber that he mentions that they were moved to come by Hera, who was doing honor to Jason ('*Ιήσονα κυδαίνουσα*, 1152); only after describing the arrival the next morning of men and women bringing gifts for the couple that he mentions that Hera had sent out word about the wedding (1184b–85a). And only at the end of his description of these festivities does he reveal that it

²³ As Vian (above, note 8) 120 n. 3 points out, "'Αλλὰ γὰρ implique comme d'habitude une ellipse: 'Mais (ils ne jouirent pas plainement de leur union: cf. 1164 μιγῆναι, et 1168), car . . .'"

²⁴ Cf. Phinney (above, note 3) 336–38. There still remains the disturbing fact that Medea addressed her appeals for support to the other Argonauts and not to Jason. H. Herter ("Bericht über die Literatur zur hellenistischen Dichtung seit dem Jahre 1921, II. Teil: Apollonios von Rhodos," *Bursian's Jahresb.* 285 [1955] 396) attributes it to the poet's wish for *variatio*: She had addressed Jason, and not the other Argonauts, in the Apsyrtus episode. But the poet's making Jason so conspicuous by his absence seems to demand motivation on the level of the story as well. Did Medea in fact have no confidence in Jason? Or are we to understand in the light of what we have now learned that Medea, convinced perhaps of his fealty by his complicity in the murder of Apsyrtus, did not find it necessary to test his loyalty or spur his courage (cf. Phinney [above, note 3] 336)? Apollonius does not give us enough information finally to decide between the two possibilities, and thus leaves the door slightly ajar on the "Euripidean hypothesis."

²⁵ Natzel (above, note 15) 118.

was Hera who gave Arete the idea of disclosing Alcinous' intended decree (1199–1200).²⁶ Had the latter incident been revealed to us at the time when it occurred in the story, much of the suspense of the episode would have been lost, for we would have known from almost the beginning that Hera was safeguarding Jason and Medea here,²⁷ just as she ensured their safe passage of the Planctae not long before (4. 753–963).

This information about Hera's support of the couple further reduces our suspense of uncertainty; it increases our suspense of anticipation, however, for it brings with it recollection of the self-interested designs that lie behind her support. We learned earlier in the poem, when Hera secured Aphrodite's aid in making Medea fall in love with Jason and later when she secured Thetis' aid in assisting the Argonauts past the Planctae, that Hera intends that the Argonauts return safely to Greece, partly because she feels affection for Jason (3. 61–75, 4. 784–85) but partly, and indeed chiefly, because Jason and Medea are the instruments of her revenge upon Pelias (3. 61–65). And we have heard her reveal the curious and disturbing fact that it is Achilles to whom Medea will be married in the afterlife (4. 810–15).²⁸ Clearly, then, this is not a "happily ever after" marriage.

Despite the marriage and the splendor with which it is celebrated, the Colchians still remain a threat (the Argonauts sing the wedding song with weapons in hand, against a possible surprise attack, 1155b–60). Suspense about them and their seemingly non-negotiable demands is not fully and finally dissipated until the very end of the episode. Once again, Apollonius has heightened the suspense of uncertainty by withholding until later information that "naturally" belongs earlier in the narrative. When Alcinous sets out for the meeting-place to deliver his verdict about Medea, we are told that he does so "in accordance with the agreement" (*συνθεσίησιν*, 1176). This is the first clear indication that what occurred in the confrontation of the Argonauts with the Colchians at the beginning of the episode was the agreement by both parties to have Alcinous arbitrate the dispute.²⁹ Now, in the similarly dense and elliptical narrative of how Alcinous delivers his verdict in favor of the Argonauts, we are told that he is not influenced by fear of the wrath of Aeetes (1203b–05a), which the

²⁶ Knight (above, note 1) 287 says that "it is characteristic of Apollonius casually to mention a divine intervention after describing its effect"; but three of her six examples are these references to Hera's role in the wedding.

²⁷ Cf. L. Klein, "Die Göttertechnik in den *Argonautika* des Apollonios Rhodios," *Philologus* 86 (1931) 237–39.

²⁸ See C. S. Byre, "On the Departure from Pagasae and the Passage of the Planctae in Apollonius' *Argonautica*," *MH* 54 (1997) 112–14. See also D. C. Feeney, *The Gods in Epic: Poets and Critics of the Classical Tradition* (Oxford 1991) 62–63, who notes that "once her instrument of vengeance is safely married to the transport [Hera] disappears from the story, now fully assimilated to her standard pattern of malevolence, with the anomaly of her initial beneficence removed."

²⁹ Cf. Fränkel (above, note 13) 554.

Colchians had threatened him with in 1006,³⁰ because “he had bound them with unbreakable oaths” (*ἀρρήκτοισι δὲ ἐνίζεντας ἔχεν ὅρκοις*, 1205). As Fränkel points out, this must mean that Alcinous has, in this part of the story or earlier, made both parties swear to abide by his decision and that he now holds them to their oaths.³¹ Vian takes the phrase to mean that they took the oaths just before Alcinous gives his verdict.³² It makes more sense, however, to take it as referring to the time when Alcinous was chosen (or imposed himself) as the arbitrator of the dispute at the beginning of the episode.³³ So we can now see that the Colchian threat has been something of a red herring: The Colchians are not as truculent and intransigent and lawless as the poet initially led us to believe. Indeed, when they see that their suit is in vain, their fear of Aeetes’ anger, far from impelling them to renege on their agreement, prompts them to ask to become allies of Alcinous (1206–10).³⁴

By the end of the episode, then, the issues involved in the intra-episodic suspense are resolved and a happy closure is made to the Colchian portion of the Argonautic adventure. The to-and-fro swing from tragedy-in-progress to tragedy deferred, which began in the Apsyrtus episode, has now halted at the latter. But this very deferral means that the episode does not bring closure to the story of Jason and Medea.

As we read through the narrative of the Phaeacian episode to its end, our suspense of uncertainty gradually gives place to suspense of anticipation, anticipation of what is in sight beyond the borders of the poem. And at the end of the episode, in retrospect, we are able to see the poignant, double-edged ironies of the situation on Drepene. Medea was not in fact like the woman in the simile, for she would gain a husband, not lose one.³⁵ And yet she will be like the woman in the simile, for she will lose the husband that she has gained. She suffered agonies of uncertainty, expecting the worst, not knowing that the adventure would end happily for her; and she has reached that happy end not knowing what horrors lie in store.

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³⁰ On the interpretation of 1203b–05a, see Fränkel (above, note 13) 576; Vian, on the other hand, interprets the lines as referring to threats made by the Colchians at the present moment of the story ([above, note 8] 53).

³¹ Fränkel (above, note 13) 577; cf. Livrea (above, note 12) 340, on line 1205.

³² Vian (above, note 8) 53.

³³ Cf. the terms of the compact (*ἐτάμοντο*) agreed upon (*συνθεσίη*) by the Argonauts and the other contingent of Colchians at the beginning of the Apsyrtus episode, whereby Medea’s case would be settled by arbitration (4. 340–49). On agreements to arbitration in ancient Greece, see M. N. Tod, *International Arbitration amongst the Greeks* (Oxford 1913) 70–77.

³⁴ As Knight points out, this is one of several instances in the *Argonautica* where armed conflict seems imminent but does not take place; such “frustrated battles” “tease the reader” and highlight alternatives to warfare in dealing with conflicts ([above, note 1] 114–17).

³⁵ Hutchinson (above, note 3) 133.

*Glaucumam ob Oculos Obiciemus:
Forbidden Sight in Miles Gloriosus*¹

RADD K. EHRMAN

Plautus' comedies are full of direct references to myths utilized for various comic ends, such as to make hyperbolic comparison of characters to well-known mythical figures.² In the *Miles Gloriosus*, for example, the soldier Pyrgoplynices is told that he is regarded as Achilles or his brother (60 f., 1054a); he thinks of himself as more handsome than Paris (777) and is mockingly heralded as the grandson of Venus (1413, 1421). At the hands of the slave Palaestrio and his fellow conspirators, however, he becomes "a Troy to be taken" (1025), while one of the conspirators casts his deceivers as maenads (1016).³ But in structuring the framework of deception in the *Miles Gloriosus*, Plautus also uses myth and mythological motifs in a far more subtle way, moving beyond simple direct references to utilization of mythic patterns without using the names traditionally associated with them.

The first ploy undertaken in the comedy is motivated by an inadvertent action of the slave Sceledrus who, while pursuing an ape over the rooftops of Ephesus, has accidentally seen Philocomasium kissing her lover in the neighbor's house without the knowledge of her abductor, the soldier Pyrgoplynices. Ironically, Pyrgoplynices had appointed this same Sceledrus to guard Philocomasium against any amorous advances, save his own. Up to this point she has been able to carry on her secret affair next door without arousing suspicion, for she has been successfully protected by other characters privileged to the circumstances. The lengths to which her friends are willing to go to safeguard her dalliance are indicated by the elaborate deception, used to wonderful comic effect, of a breach between

¹ It is my pleasure to thank the many individuals who saw various versions of this paper and offered salutary criticism: Oliver Phillips, Anne Grotot, J. K. Newman, David Sansone, and the anonymous referees.

² Good basic studies on Plautus' use of direct allusions to mythology include E. Fraenkel, *Elementi plautini in Plauto* (Florence 1960) and N. Zagagi, *Tradition and Originality in Plautus: Studies of the Amatory Motifs in Plautine Comedy* (Göttingen 1980). On the use of mythological characters in reference to the soldier, see E. W. Leach, "The Soldier and Society: Plautus' *Miles Gloriosus* as Popular Drama," *RSC* 27 (1979) 203–04.

³ Compare the lofty mythological heights reached by the slave Chrysalus at *Bacchides* 925 ff., where he pictures himself as Ulysses at the sack of Troy.

Pyrgopolynices' house and that of the neighbor, Periplectomenus. When they learn that Philocomasium has been spotted by someone not in on her secret, they are anxious to identify the culprit quickly and then eliminate the threat to Philocomasium that his action poses. After Sceledrus is so discovered, the clever slave Palaestrio develops a plan that relies on Philocomasium's ability to think quickly and act convincingly (as well as on his own ability) in order to persuade Sceledrus that he has not seen what in fact he really has seen (147–49):

ei nos facetis fabricis et doctis dolis
glaucumam ob oculos obiciemus eumque ita
faciemus ut quod viderit non viderit.

The plan contrived works so well that, hopelessly flustered, Sceledrus leaves the stage never to be seen, or see, for the remainder of the comedy.

The intrigue in several ways resembles patterns found in the tales of those individuals, such as Actaeon, Tiresias, and Pentheus, who see what is forbidden and are punished by loss of vision, metamorphosis or dismemberment, even though such sight is unintentional.⁴ The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that through indirect references Plautus comically employs the motif of the unwitting sinner deliberately punished for accidentally seeing, and hence gaining knowledge of, the forbidden.⁵

The theme of the consequences that ensue when a mortal witnesses a god or something sacred contrary to a divine will is not uncommon.⁶ As with many Greek mythical narratives, those of the Thebans noted above are known in several versions and serve as good illustrations of the type of the

⁴ The argument here will not be whether such punishment is deserved or just (cf. Diod. Sic. 4. 81. 4–5) outside the world of the comedy. On the subject of blindness as a divine punishment, see E. A. Bernidaki-Aldous, *Blindness in a Culture of Light* (New York 1990) 57–93; on blindness as a punishment for sexual crimes, see G. Devereux, "The Self-Blinding of Oidipous in Sophokles: *Oidipous Tyrannos*," *JHS* 93 (1973) 36–49.

⁵ By "indirect references" I mean allusions to the myth or motif without utilization of the names (i.e. Actaeon, Tiresias, Pentheus) traditionally associated with them. See W. T. MacCary, "Patterns of Myth, Ritual and Comedy in Plautus' *Casina*," *Texas Studies in Literature and Language* 15.5 (1974) 881–89; cf. N. Frye, "The Argument of Comedy," *English Institute Studies* (1948) 58–73. Taking his cue from Frye, MacCary demonstrated mythic patterns and themes in the *Casina* which had survived "the dropping of names," that is, themes in the comedy derived from the myth but not employing the traditional names. In addition, parallels to the rescue scene in Euripides' *Helen* have been found in *Miles Gloriosus*; see K. Gaiser, "Zum 'Miles Gloriosus' des Plautus: eine neu erschlossene Menander-Komödie und ihre literaturgeschichtliche Stellung," in E. Lefèvre (ed.), *Die Römische Komödie* (Darmstadt 1973) 228–29, reprinted from *Poetica* 1 (1967) 452–54. For other folktale motifs see also J. P. Small, "Plautus and the Three Princes of Serendip," *Renaissance Quarterly* 29 (1976) 183–94.

⁶ In the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* 90 ff., for example, Hermes, while driving away Apollo's cattle, advises an old man not to see what he has seen (*καὶ τε ιδὸν μὴ ιδὼν εἴναι*, 92) and then he will have an abundant crop. At 201 ff., however, the farmer tells Apollo what he has witnessed (cf. 354 f.) but suffers no punishment, although there had been an implied threat in Hermes' *ὅτε μὴ τι καταβλάπτῃ τὸ σὸν αὐτοῦ* (93). Contrast the myth of Battus in Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 2. 676 ff.

unwitting transgressor. The cause of Actaeon's demise is variously given,⁷ but in the account found in Callimachus, *Hymn* 5. 107 ff., his fault was overstepping the bounds set by the gods, for he invaded Artemis' domain and inadvertently saw her bathing (111–15):⁸

ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ αὐτὸν ὁ τε δρόμος αἴ τ' ἐν ὅρεσσι
ρήσευνται ξυναὶ τάμος ἐκαβολίαι,
ὅππόταν οὐκ ἐθέλων περ ἵδη χαρίεντα λοετρὰ
δαιμόνος· ἀλλ᾽ αὐταὶ τὸν πρὶν ἄνακτα κύνες
τουτάκι δειπνησεῦντι.

Here Athena uses the myth to illustrate the Κρόνιοι νόμοι which state that to behold a divinity uninvited exacts a heavy penalty (100–02):

Κρόνιοι δ' ὅδε λέγοντι νόμοι·
ὅς κε τιν' ἀθανάτων, οἶκα μὴ θεός αὐτὸς ἔληται,
ἀθρήσῃ, μισθῷ τοῦτον ἰδεῖν μεγάλω.

In the *Hymn*, Artemis brings about the offending Actaeon's punishment by turning the hunter into the hunted, pursued to his death. This brief account of his demise is designed to mollify Chariclo's feelings on the fate of her son Tiresias who, also while hunting, intrudes upon sacred space (*ἱερὸν χῶρον*, 76) and unwittingly views something that he is not privileged to see, Athena bathing (*οὐκ ἐθέλων δ' εἶδε τὰ μὴ θεμιτά*, 78). In this case the offender is punished not by destruction but by instant deprivation of his sight.⁹

The other representative of the motif, Pentheus, is presented in Euripides' *Bacchae* as a hunter turned hunted who sees what he, as an adversary of the worship of Dionysus, is not permitted to witness in a place he is not entitled to be.¹⁰ Like Tiresias, he becomes the victim of loss of real vision, for his perception is altered at the hand of Dionysus, the manipulator of events in the tragedy: Under the delusion brought about by the god, for instance, Pentheus sees a double sun and a double Thebes, and

⁷ The earliest account is in Hesiod, *Catalogue* fr. 217a (see T. Renner, "A Papyrus Dictionary of Metamorphoses," *HSCP* 82 [1978] 277–93); cf. the versions of Stesichorus (apud Pausanias 9. 2. 3) and Acusilaus (apud Apollodorus, *Bibl.* 3. 4. 4). On the history of the Actaeon myth, see especially J. Heath, *Actaeon, the Unmannerly Intruder* (New York 1992) 1–23; C. Schlam, "Diana and Actaeon: Metamorphoses of a Myth," *CA* 3 (1984) 82–110; L. R. Lacy, "Aktaion and a Lost 'Bath of Artemis,'" *JHS* 110 (1990) 26–42. See also J. Fontenrose, *Orion: The Myth of the Hunter and the Huntress* (Berkeley 1981) 33–43 and P. M. G. Forbes Irving, *Metamorphosis in Greek Myths* (Oxford 1990) 197–201.

⁸ Cf. Apollodorus (previous note). In Ovid's version (*Met.* 3. 138 ff.), which is close to that of Callimachus and Apollodorus, a sexual significance is placed on Actaeon's deed. See Lacy (previous note) and J. Heath, "The Blessings of Epiphany in Callimachus' *Bath of Pallas*," *CA* 7 (1988) 72–90; also idem, "Diana's Understanding of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*," *CJ* 86 (1991) 233–43.

⁹ See Bernidaki-Aldous (above, note 4) 73; Devereux (above, note 4) 44–45.

¹⁰ E.g. *Bach.* 472: ἄρρητ' ἀβακχεύτοισιν εἰδέναι βροτῶν and 912–13: σὲ τὸν πρόθυμον ὄνθ' ἀ μὴ χρεὼν ὄραν / σπεύδοντά τ' ἀσπούδαστα.

he mistakes Dionysus for a bull.¹¹ Pentheus is also compared directly to Actaeon several times in the tragedy (*Bacch.* 230, 337–41, 1227, 1291), and like his mortal cousin he is torn apart for his trespass (*Bacch.* 1121 ff.).¹²

The first intrigue of *Miles Gloriosus*, aimed at the slave Sceledrus, contains many of these same elements: pursuit of an animal, invasion of space he is not entitled to, unintentional sight of the forbidden, reversal of status from hunter to hunted, and distortion, or loss, of real vision. But, as one could naturally expect in the inverted world of comedy, in the place of mythical hunters and goddesses, the characters are an ape-chasing slave and a clever *meretrix*.

Like the three mythical Thebans, Sceledrus is presented in the act of hunting, for he has pursued an ape over the neighborhood rooftops, as he explains to his fellow slave Palaestrio (284–85):

SC. simiam hodie sum sectatus nostram in horum tegulis.
PA. edepol, Sceledre, homo sectatu's nihil nequam bestiam.

The use of pursuit first hints that Plautus, or the unknown author of the original, the 'Αλαζών, has in mind the theme of the intrusive hunter found in the myths. Certainly, the playwright could have employed any number of standard mechanisms to allow Sceledrus to discover his charge's secret, such as overhearing a conversation (a very commonly used strategy in comedy, after all), but instead the author has used a rare device, chasing after an animal, that permits the slave access to an area which has been so vigorously restricted by Philocomasium's protectors.

As in the case of Actaeon and Tiresias, it is by mere chance that Sceledrus has intruded upon Philocomasium, as the slave is careful to emphasize in his very first words of explanation to Palaestrio (287–89):

*forte fortuna per impluvium huc despexi in proxumum:
atque ego illi aspicio osculantem Philocomasium cum altero
nescioquo adulescente.*

And it is precisely for his *inscitia*, as well as for his *stultitia*, that Sceledrus begs forgiveness (540–43):¹³

SC. Periplectomene, te opsecro
per deos atque homines perque stultitiam meam
perque tua genua— PE. quid opsecras me? SC. inscitiae
meae et stultitiae ignoscas.

¹¹ *Bacch.* 616–31, 918–22. See W. C. Scott, "Two Suns over Thebes: Imagery and Stage Effects in the *Bacchae*," *TAPA* 105 (1975) 333–46, and J. Gregory, "Some Aspects of Seeing in Euripides' *Bacchae*," *G&R* 32 (1985) 23–31.

¹² On Euripides' comparisons of Pentheus to Actaeon, see Heath (above, note 7) 10–18 and C. Segal, *Dionysiac Poetics and Euripides' Bacchae* (Princeton 1982) 33 and 166.

¹³ Cf. Palaestrio's remark to Sceledrus at 335: *vin iam faciam uti stultividuum te fateare?* At 408 f. he again refers to Sceledrus' *stultitia*. Cf. Ovid, *Tristia* 2. 105: *inscius* *Actaeon vidit sine veste Dianam* (noted by A. W. Bulloch, *Callimachus: The Fifth Hymn* [Cambridge 1985] 224).

The slave further pleads that he did not look upon Philocomasium with any malicious intent, again reinforcing his claim that he had not acted deliberately (561–63):

nunc demum a me insipienter factum esse arbitror
 quom rem cognosco: at non malitiose tamen
 feci.

Nevertheless, such extenuating circumstances have no weight at all on the final verdict.¹⁴ Just as Actaeon and Tiresias, each acting οὐκ ἐθέλων, are no less guilty—in divine judgment and in accordance with the Κρόνιοι νόμοι—than they would have been had they been deliberate voyeurs, so too Sceledrus is punishable, and therefore has to be removed, despite the inadvertency of his transgression.¹⁵

The motif of the hunt continues to be utilized in the second act, for while Sceledrus incurs guilt while in pursuit of a beast, Palaestrio serves as the hound that will seek him out and bring him down. His function in the role is established early, even before he discovers that Sceledrus is the culprit he is trying to find. When he vows to find the invader of Philocomasium's carefully guarded privacy, he too uses hunting imagery for the inversion in store (259–61):

et quidem ego ibo domum
 atque hominem investigando operam huic dissimulabiliter dabo
 qui fuerit conservos qui hodie siet sectatus simiam.

Thus Palaestrio intends literally to track down (*investigando operam dabo*) the hunter (*qui siet sectatus*). The same roles are spelled out again a few lines later when Palaestrio pictures himself as a hunting dog and regards the still unidentified offender as his quarry (268–69):

si ita non reperio, ibo odorans quasi canis venaticus
 usque donec persecutus volpem ero vestigiis.

The use of *odorans persecutus* gives emphasis to the roles Palaestrio envisions, for as the hound he will now stalk Sceledrus the hunter, thereby making the guilty Sceledrus a comic Actaeon.¹⁶ Sceledrus is not only pursued, but he is also presented with the possibility that he will be torn apart, again reminding the audience of Actaeon and also of Pentheus. For

¹⁴ See Callim. *Hymn* 5. 96 ff. and Bulloch's remarks (previous note) 48–50. In his account of Actaeon, Ovid drives home the unwittingness of the deed (*Met.* 3. 142): *quod enim scelus error habebat?*

¹⁵ At *Bacchae* 810 ff. Pentheus begins to be persuaded to witness the worship of Dionysus against his rational will. Tiresias, however, is recompensed by Athena for his invasion, but neither Actaeon nor Pentheus is granted any such alleviation; see R. G. A. Buxton, "Blindness and Limits: Sophokles and the Logic of Myth," *JHS* 100 (1980) 31.

¹⁶ The hunting imagery is echoed later at 581, when Sceledrus remarks on Palaestrio's cunning: *numquam hercle ex ista nassa ego hodie escam petam*. See W. Forehand, "The Use of Imagery in Plautus' *Miles Gloriosus*," *RSC* 21 (1973) 13–14.

example, in her confrontation with the slave, Philocomasium threatens both blindness and mutilation (368–69):

PH. tun me vidisti? SC. atque his quidem hercle oculis— PH. carebis, credo,
qui plus vident quam vident.

Elsewhere, Palaestrio says that he has committed a capital offense against his legs and head (294) and he speaks of cutting out Sceledrus' tongue (318).

As for Philocomasium herself, she manifests power to maneuver Sceledrus in two ways: First, she works on him directly to impair his vision, leading him to question whether he saw what he actually had seen and therefore to be in no position to be able to reveal her secret to the soldier, and, second, she undergoes a metamorphosis into her own twin sister, Dicea. By utilizing the breach in the wall (of which Sceledrus, of course, has no knowledge),¹⁷ Philocomasium achieves the feat unique in Plautine comedy of successfully appearing to be two different persons at once in the same place.¹⁸ And not only does she remain herself and also transform herself into another woman, but by a calculated soliloquy meant to be overheard by Sceledrus, she also gives the appearance that as Dicea she has just been rescued from dangerous waters. Naturally, she invokes none other than Ephesian Diana (411–14):¹⁹

inde ignem in aram, ut Ephesiae Dianae laeta laudes
gratisque agam eique ut Arabico fumificem odore amoene,
quom me in locis Neptuniis templisque turbulentis
servavit, saevis fluctibus ubi sum adflictata multum.

Here she calls upon the very goddess who in Callimachus' version of the myth had, from the water, instigated the demise of the hunter Actaeon, just as the Κρόνιοι νόμοι were brought to bear when Athena was seen in the water by Tiresias. Philocomasium has verbally evoked something which the spectators have been watching develop through the second act, for they know that she really is *adflictata multum*, severely compromised by Sceledrus' unintentional sight of her. Like the offended deities, Philocomasium must have vengeance upon the one who saw her against her will: *neque me quidem patiar probri falso inpune insimulatam* (396). Thus will she forestall any revelation of what she wishes to keep secret.

This evocation is further developed by the name, Dicea, that Philocomasium has chosen for the imaginary twin sister, for by it

¹⁷ The breach in the wall is itself a folktale motif, as was shown more than 110 years ago by E. Zarncke, "Parallelen zur Entführungsgeschichte im *Miles Gloriosus*," *RHM* 39 (1884) 1–26; cf. B. Brotherton, "The Plot of the *Miles Gloriosus*," *TAPA* 55 (1924) 128–36.

¹⁸ See Palaestrio's advance notice to the spectators at 150 ff.: "et mox ne erretis, haec duarum hodie vicem / et hinc et illinc mulier feret imaginem, / atque eadem erit, verum alia esse adsimulabitur."

¹⁹ See Lacy (above, note 4) 32–33.

Philocomasium sets herself up as the dispenser of justice whose privacy has been violated. The fictitious appellation is revealed to the slave shortly after the sacrifice and is naturally fair game for the punning found at 438 when Sceledrus asserts that the woman before him really is Philocomasium: ἄδικος *es tu, non δικαία*. By selecting “Dicea” Plautus has highlighted the role of Philocomasium as avenger, and Sceledrus as one doomed δίκην διδόναι.

Now, it is true that the idea of the imaginary twin sister is Palaestrio's and that Philocomasium is working on his basic instructions, but it is essential to observe that within the broad outlines of the slave's plan she is the one who uses her own native ingenuity and cunning at being Dicea in order to perplex Sceledrus. As Palaestrio himself observes at 189-92, she is just the right woman to make the deception plausible:

os habet, linguam, perfidiam, malitiam atque audaciam,
confidentiam, confirmitatem, fraudulentiam.

qui arguat se, eum contra vincat iurejurando s

domi habet animum falsiloquum, falsificum, falsi-

domi habet animatum falsumquoniam, falsumcum, falsumrum, domi dolos domi delenifica facta domi fallacias.

dolii dolos, dolii defensione facta, dolii fallacias.

190

Indeed, she works the scam so well that the flustered Sceledrus even expresses his fear that he and Palaestrio have lost their true identities (426 ff.).

Not only is the slave finally removed as a threat by this comic legerdemain, but at the present moment, as in the case of Pentheus, the other mythical hunter turned hunted, he becomes the victim of altered, unreal vision because of what he has seen and at the hands of a person who has no real existence. That is, just like Dionysus' guise as the Stranger, Philocomasium's "metamorphosis" is so successful that Sceledrus no longer has the same vision that he had at the beginning of the act, as he finally confesses to Periplectomenus (547-57):

meruisse equidem me maxumum fateor malum
et tuae fecisse me hospitae aio iniuriam;
sed meam esse erilem concubinam censui,
quoi me custodem erus addidit miles meus . . .

550

vidi (qur negem quod viderim?)

sed Philocomasium me vidisse censui.

He is confessing that he has earned his punishment not because he saw Philocomasium, but because he has seen Dicea, who as the audience knows does not really exist. He is now convinced that he did not see what he saw and he has accepted that there are certain matters in which he is not entitled to share, and certainly not to reveal, save at his own peril (565–67):

egone si post hunc diem
muttivero, etiam quod egomet certo sciam,
dato excruciadum me.

And so, in an interesting exchange at the end of the act, Periplectomenus advises Sceledrus that if he hopes for the love of the gods, he will restrain his tongue as well as his eyes, that is not to see what he has seen nor to say what he has seen.²⁰ For Periplectomenus, while pretending that it is only with the greatest difficulty that he brings himself to forgive Sceledrus, makes his meaning quite clear: Those in power have acted to deprive the slave of his vision because, inadvertently or not, he stuck his eyes where they have no business. And so Sceledrus pays the heavy penalty of his infelicitous, uninvited sighting.²¹

Now blinded to the reality, as it were, Sceledrus leaves the stage vanquished physically and mentally (*nam illius oculi atque aures atque opinio / transfugere ad nos*, says Periplectomenus at 589–90) to be seen no more himself, only heard indirectly from the depths of the soldier's wine-cellar (818 ff.), where he wishes neither to see the soldier and conspirators nor to be seen by them. The very last thing we hear of him is that he is asleep and that his eyes are closed.²² And now that the conspirators have finished with him, he acknowledges only that he must not reveal what he is convinced he has seen. He from this point on wilfully remains alone in the dark but he has achieved no great advancement in insight at all; that is, he does not realize how or why he has been duped. In fact, even at the end of the deception, he still misunderstands the situation completely, believing instead that he has been set up to be sold, should he tell the soldier about the affair he originally thought he saw (579–80: *una hic et Palaestrio / me habent venalem: sensi et iam dudum scio*).

In sum, Sceledrus has stumbled upon a dangerous truth to which he was not entitled and which then pursues him relentlessly, forcing him to question both the truth ("I saw") and untruth ("I did not see") and to suffer thereby the dangers of forbidden sight. Sceledrus then is not only the hunter hunted but also has become both the unseeing and the unseen, hiding himself from the light and effectively removed for transgressing the boundaries established for him. Palaestrio, working on Philocomasium's behalf, serves as the instrument of his fellow slave's punishment and uses hunting imagery early in the play to depict the investigation he will undertake to protect her. Philocomasium assumes the ability to metamorphose herself upon emergence from the water and has as her purpose *glaucumam ob oculos obicere*. Such elements are consistent with Plautus' delight in inversion by which the lowly are exalted and the mighty placed into subordinate roles.²³ Indeed, as Zagagi has well stated, "comedy

²⁰ Periplectomenus drives the lesson home at 571–73: "ne tu hercle, si te di ament, linguam comprimes, / posthac etiam illud quod scies nesciveris / nec videris quod videris."

²¹ See the word-play on his name and *scelus* at 289, 330, and 494.

²² 826–27: PA. *qui lubitum est illi condormiscere?* / LU. *oculis opinor.*

²³ Thus, for example, at 219 ff. Periplectomenus urges Palaestrio to lead him and the others as their general. See E. Fantham, *Comparative Studies in Republican Latin Imagery* (Toronto

is able to make the most of the evident discrepancy between everyday reality and the prodigious events of myth.”²⁴

The slave’s fate is a fitting prelude to the soldier’s, for Pyrgopolynices is also connected with hunting and he also suffers from problems of vision.²⁵ It is surely no accident that Plautus makes the soldier’s very first command in the opening lines relate to the eyes, for he wants his shield polished so brightly that it will dazzle the sight of the enemies arrayed against him (*ut . . . praestringat oculorum aciem in acie hostibus*, 3–4). By the end of the play, it is the soldier who is dazzled and who suffers from distorted vision, ready to believe that the disguised Pleusicles is a one-eyed sailor and that Acroteleutium is his neighbor’s wife and that she wants an adulterous affair with him.

At the beginning of his delayed prologue, Palaestrio had stated ambiguously *ait sese ultro omnis mulieres sectarier* (91; cf. 778), and, given the mendacious nature of the soldier as explicated here and in Artotrogus’ earlier remarks (19 ff.), it appears that Pyrgopolynices claims that all the women hunt after him. The second intrigue of the play, however, shows that in fact the soldier is another victim of the inversion of hunting roles, for as soon as he learns that Periplectomenus’ “wife” is languishing for his sexual favors, he, like Sceledrus, becomes the pursued both as the object of the invented woman but also of the conspirators who, wanting to see Philocomasium safely out of his grasp, fabricate the story of the adulterous wife. Shortly after the maid Milphidippa enters at 986, Palaestrio even tells the soldier that he is being hunted (990):

viden tu illam oculis venaturam facere aucupium auribus?

Later he advises Milphidippa also to be a hunter (*tu cetera cura et contempla et de meis venator verbis*, 1029). And, at the conclusion of the piece the slave from the house of Periplectomenus says that he will hunt for soldier (1380); the word he uses is *investigabo*, the same Palaestrio had used at 260 for tracking down the slave who had seen Philocomasium.

Like Sceledrus also, the soldier is fooled by appearances: He readily, even eagerly, believes that Acroteleutium is the wife of his neighbor and that Pleusicles is a one-eyed sailor. In these matters of the sight of the hunter Pyrgopolynices resembles Pentheus more than Actaeon or Tiresias, for, like the Theban king, he watches the forbidden (here, the prospect of adultery) from a hiding place at the instigation of the deceiver Palaestrio (*st tace! aperiuntur fores, concede huc clanculum*, 985),²⁶ and he has

1972) 107–08, E. Segal, *Roman Laughter*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1987) 99–136, and D. Konstan, *Roman Comedy* (Ithaca 1983) 29–31.

²⁴ Zagagi (above, note 2) 32.

²⁵ See Forehand (above, note 16) 8 and 11.

²⁶ With the exception of the *Amphitruo*, no extant Plautine comedy exhibits a successful adulterous affair. See G. E. Duckworth, *The Nature of Roman Comedy*, 2nd ed. (Norman, OK 1994) 150.

completely surrendered himself to the manipulator (*tibi sum oboediens*, 1129). Milphidippa herself makes a direct allusion to a Dionysian aspect of the soldier's deception at 1016: *cedo signum, si harunc Baccharum es.*

The three mythical Thebans undergo transformations into opposites at the hand of the gods, and the soldier also is subjected to inversions: Whereas at the beginning of the comedy, he is the one eager to blind the enemy with his shield, now he is the one who has been overwhelmed by the appearance of a beautiful woman who, as the putative wife of his neighbor, is forbidden to him; Palaestrio himself calls the pending affair "dazzling" (*condicio nova et luculenta*, 952) and the woman herself also is dazzling (*luculenta ac festiva femina*, 958). Moreover, in the first scene of the comedy Pyrgopolynices personifies his sword, which longs to make mincemeat of the enemy (*quae misera gestit fartem facere ex hostibus*, 8), and in a striking irony at the end of the play, the cook Cario iterates the same idea in his exchange with Periplectomenus (1397–98):

PE. vide ut istic tibi sit acutus, Cario, culter probe.

CA. quin iam dudum gestit moecho hoc abdomen adimere.

Pyrgopolynices is now the victim of violence, rather than the author of violence he was in the opening scene.

Both Sceledrus and Pyrgopolynices are taken in by women who have no real existence and they are deceived by what they think they see. The audience knows of course that Philocomasium transforms herself into Dicea through the breach in the wall, and they are painfully aware from Periplectomenus' windy speech between the two deceptions that he has never been married (678 ff.). At the end, however, Pyrgopolynices *sees* that he has been deceived (*verba mihi data esse video*, 1434); that is, he has at last gained insight and is now in a position both to acknowledge the justice of the deception and to make a general application of the lesson he has learned (1435–37):

Iure factum iudico:

si sic aliis moechis fiat, minus hic moechorum siet,
magi' metuant, minus has res studeant.

Such a realization is in stark contrast to that of Sceledrus who, when the conspirators have finished with him, acknowledges only that he must not reveal what he thought he had seen and he sits alone in the dark of the cellar having achieved no real advancement in perception at all.

As noted earlier, Plautus had identified the original of the *Miles Gloriosus* as the Ἀλαζών, and scholarship has been sharply divided on the degree to which Plautus has altered it.²⁷ We are thus left with an

²⁷ A good overall summary of various views of Plautus' workmanship in the *Miles Gloriosus* has been given most recently by H. D. Jocelyn, "The Life-Style of the Ageing

unanswerable question: Was the mythic framework of the deceptions taken over from the Greek comedy or is it Plautus' own invention? Even if he took it over from the Ἀλαζών, Plautus expected his audience to be familiar enough with myths to recognize them and enjoy their comic application. And the mechanisms employed are certainly consistent with Plautus' delight in reversing the status of his characters. In any event, the utilization of mythic patterns, and the new comic twists on them, do indeed "make the most of the evident discrepancy between everyday reality and the prodigious events of myth," and serve Plautus well in depicting a comic world turned upside down.

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Bachelor and Theatrical Improvisation (Plaut. *Mil.* 596–812)," in L. Benz, E. Stärk, and G. Vogt-Spira (eds.), *Plautus und die Tradition des Stegreifspiels* (Tübingen 1995) 107–22.

Propertius 1. 3: Cynthia Rescripted

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In Propertius 1. 3, the drunken lover arrives at the bedside of his sleeping mistress and compares her, in a cluster of similes, to a series of mythical figures. He desires to touch Cynthia but fears waking her, so he offers gifts to the sleeping woman. When the moon shines through the windows, Cynthia awakens and complains about the lonely night which she has spent without Propertius. A number of critics have discerned two distinct portraits of Cynthia in Propertius 1. 3, an idealized sleeping Cynthia represented through the mythological similes and the real awakened mistress who angrily scolds her lover. R. O. A. M. Lyne writes, "in 1. 3, belief in romance is forced to yield to an awareness of prosaic reality."¹ Similarly, Hans-Peter Stahl sees "an illusion which had yielded again to the real-life, abusive woman . . .,"² and Leo C. Curran writes of "an imaginative vision of the ideal" and of "a contrasting reality."³

While these commentators all distinguish between an ideal and a real portrait of Cynthia, more recent scholars have argued that elegy does not present a portrait of a real flesh-and-blood mistress.⁴ Rather, as Maria Wyke notes, "the characteristics of elegiac women are determined by the general idioms of the elegiac discourse of which they form a part."⁵ The elegiac woman is a literary construct shaped, in part, by generic conventions,⁶ and thus the woman in elegy is a *scripta puella*⁷—the creation of the poet, as is the male speaker. In light of this view of the depiction of the elegiac mistress, the proposed existence of a portrait of the "real" Cynthia in 1. 3 calls for revision: Although 1. 3 appears to present a real

¹ R. O. A. M. Lyne, *The Latin Love Poets From Catullus to Horace* (Oxford 1980) 99–100.

² H.-P. Stahl, *Propertius: "Love" and "War"* (Berkeley 1985) 75.

³ L. C. Curran, "Vision and Reality in Propertius 1. 3," *YCS* 19 (1966) 189.

⁴ For some examples of this argument, see D. F. Bright, *Haec Mihi Fingebam: Tibullus in his World*, Cincinnati Classical Studies, n.s. 3 (Leiden 1978) 99–123; I. M. Le M. Du Quesnay, "The *Amores*," in J. W. Binns (ed.), *Ovid* (London 1973) 2–3; P. Veyne, *Roman Erotic Elegy* (Chicago 1988) 58 ff., 91; M. Wyke, "Written Women: Propertius' *Scripta Puella*," *JRS* 77 (1987) 47–61; eadem, "The Elegiac Woman at Rome," *PCPhS* 33 (1987) 153–78; eadem, "Mistress and Metaphor in Augustan Elegy," *Helios* 16 (1989) 25–47.

⁵ Wyke, "Mistress and Metaphor" (previous note) 35.

⁶ Wyke, "Elegiac Woman" (above, note 4) 170.

⁷ For this term, see Wyke, "Written Women" (above, note 4).

woman, Wyke points out that "realism itself is a quality of a text, not a direct manifestation of a 'real' world."⁸ Thus, the distinction that was formerly drawn between an ideal and a real Cynthia is more appropriately described as one between an idealized and a realistic representation of Cynthia.

The purpose of this study is to examine more fully the presence of realistic and idealizing elements in the representation of Cynthia in 1. 3. While the use of mythological examples, similes, and conventional devices presents an elevated portrait of the elegiac woman and creates an idealized image, the use of dialogue and everyday features and settings presents a lifelike portrait and creates a realistic image. This examination will show that a distinction between an initial, idealized description and a later, realistic one is not clear-cut,⁹ for both portraits mingle idealizing and realistic elements. This study will focus, first, on the way in which the initial, "idealized" description of Cynthia reflects the realistic dramatic circumstance of the male speaker, specifically his return from a drinking party; next, on the generic conventions present in the later, "real" description, specifically echoes of the portrait of the elegiac lover which the poet constructs in 1. 1 and throughout the collection; and finally, on the way in which these generic conventions lead to a reassessment of the tone of Cynthia's speech in the second half.

The elegy begins with three comparisons (1–6) in which Cynthia is compared to heroines in exotic settings. This stylized description presents an elevated and idealized portrait of Cynthia. In the verses immediately following the mythical exempla, the setting is described (7–10):

talis visa mihi mollem spirare quietem
Cynthia non certis nixa caput manibus,
ebria cum multo traherem vestigia Baccho,
et quaterent sera nocte facem pueri.

10

The reader learns that Cynthia both *was seen* by the speaker and also *seemed*¹⁰ to the speaker to be similar to the women of the similes, and finally that the speaker was drunk. In response to the last revelation, Curran

⁸ Wyke, "Mistress and Metaphor" (above, note 4) 27. On representation and reality, see D. Kennedy, *The Arts of Love* (Cambridge 1993) 1–23.

⁹ For others' comments upon the problematic division between the idealized and the real in 1. 3 and upon the relationship between the poem and reality, see A. W. Allen, "Sunt qui Propertium malint," in J. P. Sullivan (ed.), *Critical Essays on Roman Literature: Elegy and Lyric* (London 1962) 132–34; idem, "'Sincerity' and the Roman Elegists," *CP* 45 (1950) 145–60; D. Harmon, "Myth and Fantasy in Propertius 1. 3," *TAPA* 104 (1974) 152, 165; R. Hodge and R. Buttimore, *The "Monobiblos" of Propertius* (Cambridge 1977) 87, 98; R. O. A. M. Lyne, "Propertius and Cynthia: Elegy 1. 3," *PCPhS* 16 (1970) 60–61; R. Maltby, *Latin Love Elegy* (Bristol 1980) 65; F. M. Dunn, "The Lover Reflected in the Exemplum: A Study of Propertius 1.3 and 2.6," *ICS* 10 (1985) 249.

¹⁰ This ambiguity was first noted by E. Fraenkel, "Die klassische Dichtung der Römer," in W. Jaeger (ed.), *Das Problem des Klassischen und die Antike* (Leipzig and Berlin 1931) 55 ff. On the lover's subjectivity, see Dunn (previous note) 240 ff.

writes, "the frank admission of his drunkenness in 9, following the careful qualification of *visa mihi* in 7, begins to raise doubts about the initial vision; we realize that it is seen through the eyes of a lover who is quite drunk."¹¹ Thus, the romantic perception and idealization of Cynthia is to be attributed, at least in part, to the speaker's intoxication. However, the speaker's drunkenness does not simply influence the general tone of the similes,¹² for Cynthia herself is described in terms appropriate to the drinking party.¹³

The first simile compares Cynthia to Ariadne lying on the deserted shores as Theseus' ship sails away: *Qualis Thesea iacuit cedente carina / languida desertis Cnosia litoribus.* Ariadne is described as *languida*, weak or inactive. However, *languidus* is also used of an intoxicated gaze and carries a "latent resonance" of drunkenness,¹⁴ a resonance which is no less appropriate for describing the condition of the drunk speaker than for describing Cynthia. In addition, this adjective sometimes refers to the post-coital lover,¹⁵ but the speaker never, in this poem at least, accuses Cynthia of infidelity.¹⁶ Therefore this adjective does not seem to reflect Cynthia's faithfulness or lack thereof. However, Cynthia's complaint about the speaker's infidelity includes this very adjective—*meae consumpti tempora noctis / languidus* (37–38)—and the *convivium* offered ample opportunity for sexual encounters.¹⁷ While the sexual connotations are not so obviously applicable to the speaker as the drunken ones—there is no external evidence

¹¹ Curran (above, note 3) 196. See also Hodge and Buttimore (above, note 9) 87; Lyne (above, note 9) 69; Maltby (above, note 9) 65.

¹² In this passage, the speaker's drunkenness encroaches upon the description of Cynthia. The speaker reveals his condition with the admission that he was dragging his drunken steps, *ebria . . . vestigia*. As F. W. Locke (*The Explicator* 18.5 [Feb. 1960] Item 31) notes, at first it appears that the adjective *ebria* modifies the feminine *Cynthia*, rather than the neuter plural *vestigia*. The grammatical ambiguity momentarily conflates the speaker and his mistress, as the language appropriate to describe the speaker's drunkenness is apparently transferred to Cynthia. Lyne (above, note 9) 69 notes that with one possible exception, "there is nothing closely similar to the Propertian usage, in which a part which exhibits symptoms of the drunkenness of a whole is actually said to be drunk." The novelty of the construction creates and thus emphasizes the grammatical ambiguity.

¹³ These three comparisons have received much attention, but no one fully examines the possible influence of the *convivium*. Although F. Cairns, "Two Unidentified *Komoī* of Propertius I. 3 + II. 29," *Emerita* 45 (1977) 325–53, has analyzed this poem in the generic context of the *komos*, and although he identifies the night-turning-to-day motif in 2. 29 as "symposiastic" (338), he does not examine the possible symposiastic content of 1. 3.

¹⁴ Harmon (above, note 9) 157.

¹⁵ M. Rothstein on 1. 3. 38: *Propertius Sextus Elegien*, 2nd ed. (Berlin 1920; repr. Dublin/Zürich 1966).

¹⁶ Lyne (above, note 9) 67 writes about the sexual sense: "here it is ruinous to the picture the poet is carefully building up."

¹⁷ See J. Griffin, *Latin Poets and Roman Life* (Chapel Hill 1986) 84 and the sources cited therein. This reading would also answer the concern expressed by Lyne (above, note 9) 61–62, that Cynthia accuses the male speaker of returning to their bed having left another woman, whereas the male speaker seems to have come from a drinking-party, not from another woman: The two are not mutually exclusive.

to corroborate Cynthia's charge¹⁸—the language of the simile is certainly suggestive of the drinking and sexual activity characteristic of the *convivium*.

The second simile compares Cynthia to Andromeda asleep after being freed from the rocks: *qualis et accubuit primo Cepheia somno / libera iam duris cotibus Andromede* (3–4). *Accumbere*, which means “to lie at rest,” is appropriate for describing Cynthia's dramatic circumstance—clearly, she sleeps. But Curran suggests that “*accubuit* must carry some of the same sexual connotation here that it does elsewhere in Propertius.”¹⁹ This sexual innuendo, like that of *languidus*, may be attributed to the speaker's earlier activities.²⁰ Indeed, *accumbere* also means “to recline at a banquet.”²¹ This verb recalls the couches of the drinking party from which the speaker returns, and thus the poet continues to describe Cynthia in terms appropriate for, or perhaps appropriated from, the *convivium*.

The correspondence between the language of the second simile and language describing the speaker's reaction to his sleeping mistress further links the description of Cynthia with the world of the *convivium*. Upon seeing Cynthia, the speaker attempts to approach her and is urged by Amor and Bacchus to embrace her (11–16):

hanc ego, nondum etiam sensus desperditus omnis,
molliter impresso conor adire toro;
et quamvis duplici correptum ardore iuberent
hac Amor hac Liber, durus uterque deus,
subjecto leviter positam temptare lacerto
osculaque admota sumere tarda manu . . .

15

The poet describes the motivation for the speaker's drunken attempts upon his mistress with Bacchic imagery. *Liber, durus* (14) recalls *LIBERA iam duris* (4).²² The verbal echo calls attention to the presence of the god *Liber* in the description of Cynthia and links it to the world of Bacchus.

Bacchus is, in fact, implicit in all the similes: This second one suggests the god's name; the first comes from the myth of Bacchus, Ariadne, and

¹⁸ The speaker's obvious desire for Cynthia does not preclude an earlier sexual encounter, as 2. 22, 23–24 attests to the lover's immense sexual energy.

¹⁹ Curran (above, note 3) 197.

²⁰ Locke (above, note 12) identifies this verb with “the condition of the poet.” He suggests, however, that the poet “engages in a fantasy which projects Cynthia as the mythological women and himself as their lovers,” because of his drunken state. I am suggesting that it is his dramatic reality, rather than his fantasy, which conditions the verb.

²¹ W. A. Camps, *Propertius. Elegies: Book I* (Cambridge 1961) 48; Lyne (above, note 9) 67, imagines that Cynthia lies in a position that resembles someone reclining at a table, and he suggests that the verb intimates the physical structure of Cynthia's bed.

²² See Curran (above, note 3) 196–97 and Hodge and Buttmore (above, note 9) 89. Curran notes other resonances of Bacchus in the description of the male speaker. Harmon (above, note 9) 153 writes: “The lover in a Bacchic pose is a familiar sight from the literature of revelry; we think, for example, of the ivy-crowned Alcibiades, who unmistakably portrays himself as Dionysus when he bursts in upon the symposium.”

Theseus;²³ and the third describes a follower of Bacchus. Given the dramatic circumstance of this particular poem, the Bacchic imagery could well reflect the proximity of the *convivium* in the narrative. The speaker ostensibly returns from a drinking party, and wine invokes Bacchic imagery and mythology. Griffin notes that the cups, tripods, mosaics, and paintings at the *convivium* “were very likely to have Dionysiac themes.”²⁴ He adds that wild parties, in life and in verse, appear to have taken on Dionysiac features, and “the Dionysiac orgies of Messallina, featuring not only wine but regular maenads and thyrsi, were no doubt only an exaggeration of the sort of thing that went on elsewhere.”²⁵

The presence of maenads at the *convivium* suggests that Propertius continues to describe Cynthia in the convivial context in the third simile, which introduces the Thracian bacchant, tired out from dancing and lying in the grass: *nec minus assiduis Edonis fessa choreis / qualis in herboso concidit Apidano* (5–6). There is obviously a general connection between drinking parties and dancing.²⁶ In 2. 3, moreover, Propertius explicitly compares the Bacchic chorus and the dance at the *convivium*: *quantum quod posito formose saltat Iaccho, / egit ut euhantes dux Ariadna choros . . .* (17–18). This comparison suggests that the description of Cynthia in the bacchant simile of 1. 3 reflects the dramatic proximity of the drinking party.²⁷ The fact that this maenad is specifically identified as Thracian is also significant. Horace, in the only earlier passage in which the adjective *Edonis* occurs, writes of a party to celebrate Pompey’s homecoming: *non sanius, / bacchabor Edonis* (*Odes* 2. 7. 26–27). The reveler describes himself as acting like a bacchant at a drinking party, and this bacchant is specifically Thracian. The Horatian passage further suggests that this image is imported from the *convivium*, the world which the speaker has just left—at least physically, if not entirely in thought.

The description of the sleeping Cynthia in 1. 3 suggests Ovid’s warning about the dangers for women falling asleep at a drinking party: *nec somnis posita tutum succumbere mensa: / per somnos fieri multa pudenda solent* (*Ars* 3. 767–68). A woman attending the *convivium* should not fall asleep, since shameful things can befall a sleeping woman. The speaker in 1. 3 also imagines that Cynthia may suffer shameful things while she sleeps: *et quotiens raro duxi suspiria motu, / obstipui vano credulus auspicio, / ne qua tibi insolitos portarent visa timores, / neve quis invitam cogeret esse suam* (27–30). It has been noted that the suppressed desire of the speaker

²³ See W. Hering, “Properz I 3,” *WS* 85 (1972) 52, on these similes and the myth, and A. Włosok, “Die dritte Cynthia-Elegie des Properz (Prop. 1,3),” *Hermes* 95 (1967) 338 ff. and Curran (above, note 3) 196–97, 207 for these similes and Catullus’ version of that story.

²⁴ Griffin (above, note 17) 69.

²⁵ Griffin (above, note 17) 84.

²⁶ See 3. 10. 21–23 and Griffin (above, note 17) 65 and the sources cited therein.

²⁷ For a more complex reading of the relationship between 1. 3. 5–6 and 2. 3. 17–18, see Harmon (above, note 9) 158.

and his inclination to approach his sleeping mistress (13–16) are transferred onto the assailant whom the speaker imagines forcing himself upon an unwilling Cynthia.²⁸ However, the idea of assaulting a sleeping woman may not be inspired simply by the speaker's desire, or by mythical precedents,²⁹ but also by the events and setting of the *convivium* from which the speaker supposedly returns. Less specific traces of the drinking party appear in the portrait of the *sleeping* Cynthia who seemed *mollēm spirare quietem* (7). Several drinking parties end in sleep,³⁰ and Ovid describes the drunken sleepers at a banquet as *compositi* (*Am.* 2. 5. 22), an adjective with which Propertius describes Cynthia's eyes (1. 3. 33). Also, in Ennius, the sleep which is *mollissimus* (*An.* 12. 363–65 Skutsch) follows a drunken celebration.³¹

On the dramatic level, the speaker's drunken entrance disrupts the peaceful scene which he describes. As Archibald W. Allen notes, "there is a brutal realism in the lover's entrance which could not be in sharper contrast with the calm loveliness of the girl."³² Similarly, on the narrative level, the presence of the realistic world of the *convivium* in these similes contrasts sharply with the idealization of Cynthia. The opening similes present a portrait of Cynthia through the use of mythological exempla featuring gods and heroines.³³ Moreover, commentators have noted that the diction is heightened and the syntax is contrived.³⁴ These features of the opening couplets elevate Cynthia's status and represent her in an idealized manner.³⁵ However, the language of the similes also reflects the world of the *convivium* from which the speaker returns. Realistic images of drinking, revelry, and sexual activity intrude upon the exotic, romantic, and heroic,³⁶ undermining the idealization. Thus, the portrait of Cynthia in the first half of the poem is based upon realistic as well as idealizing elements.

The world of the *convivium* enters the poem physically at line 21, when the speaker approaches Cynthia, places his garland on his mistress' head, and gives her apples, apparently from the party. The transference of the tokens coincides with the transference of perspective. For at this point the

²⁸ Curran (above, note 3) 203; Harmon (above, note 9) 161; Lyne (above, note 1) 118; Lyne (above, note 9) 74; Maltby (above, note 9) 70; L. Richardson, *Propertius. Elegies I–IV* (Norman 1977) 155.

²⁹ On mythical precedents, see Włosok (above, note 23) 332 and the sources cited therein; Maltby (above, note 9) on 1. 3; B. Otis, "Propertius' Single Book," *HSCP* 70 (1965) 19–20.

³⁰ Prop. 3. 17. 13 ff., 42; Hor. *Odes* 3. 21. 4; Plato, *Symp.* 223c–d.

³¹ Harmon (above, note 9) 153–54.

³² Allen, "Sunt qui" (above, note 9) 133. See also Maltby (above, note 9) 65.

³³ Curran (above, note 3) 190; Lyne (above, note 1) 98.

³⁴ Curran (above, note 3) 192–93; Hodge and Buttmore (above, note 9) 87–88; Lyne (above, note 1) 99; Lyne (above, note 9) 66.

³⁵ Lyne (above, note 9). See also Maltby (above, note 9) 65.

³⁶ Lyne (above, note 1) 99–100 adds that certain aspects of the myths, such as the fact that Ariadne had been deserted and would have "harsh things to say to her Theseus," foreshadow the "real world" and Cynthia's response to Propertius.

form of the narration changes, and the third-person references to the sleeping mistress become second-person.³⁷ Thus the poem seems to move toward a more realistic description which includes the woman directly.³⁸ Indeed, Cynthia appears to return the apples which the speaker bestows upon her—*munera de prono saepe voluta sinu* (26)³⁹—and Antonie Wlosok interprets the exchange of the apples as part of a movement toward the dialogic.⁴⁰ However, the exchange of apples and the move towards the dialogic do not necessarily herald the presence of a real woman, but rather a more realistic representation of the elegiac mistress.

The apples, a traditional lover's gift,⁴¹ may simply characterize what follows as elegiac, without signaling any complementary movement from the ideal to the real, for it is the elegiac more than the mythical or the real world which shapes the final picture of Cynthia. The final picture presents a Cynthia rewritten in the role of the elegiac lover rather than as the elegiac beloved—the role which she has previously occupied in Book 1. Cynthia seems to display those elegiac sentiments which the lover Propertius expresses throughout his poetry and especially in 1. 1,⁴² and these generic conventions undermine the realistic quality of her discourse and create a new image of Cynthia.

The second half of the poem begins when the rays of the moon open Cynthia's eyes: *luna moraturis sedula luminibus, / compositos levibus radiis patefecit ocellos* (32–33). This juxtaposition of *luminibus* and *ocellos* recalls the beginning of the collection (1. 1–4):⁴³

Cynthia prima suis miserum me cepit ocellis,
contactum nullis ante cupidinibus.
tum mihi constantis deiecit lumina fastus
et caput impositis pressit Amor pedibus . . .

³⁷ Hering (above, note 23) 66.

³⁸ Maltby (above, note 9) 69.

³⁹ While there is some debate about whose lap the apples fall from, Camps (above, note 21) 50, P. J. Enk, *Sextus Propertii Elegiarum: Liber I (Monobiblos)* (Leiden 1946) 41, Richardson (above, note 28) 155, Rothstein (above, note 15) 80, and Wlosok (above, note 23) 345 suggest that the apples fall from Cynthia's lap.

⁴⁰ Wlosok (above, note 23) 346.

⁴¹ See Cairns (above, note 13) 327 n. 3; Enk (above, note 39), on 24; Hodge and Buttiglione (above, note 9) 93 n. 23; Lyne (above, note 9) 72; Maltby (above, note 9) 69; Wlosok (above, note 23) 345 n. 1.

⁴² For an analysis of emotional parallels within the poem, see G. Petersmann, "Properz I 3," *Latomus* 37 (1978) 954 ff., who recognizes the elegiac style of Cynthia's report of her deeds in lines 41–46. Wyke, "Mistress and Metaphor" (above, note 4) 33, writes that "even the physical features, psychological characteristics, direct speeches, and erotic activities with which Cynthia is provided often seem subject to literary concerns. Thus the realist devices of the Propertian corpus . . . often direct us instead toward the features and habits of characters in other Augustan texts." However, the implications of the intertextual literary quality of Cynthia's discourse, which has been described as tragic (Wlosok [above, note 23] 351–52) and as natural (Hering [above, note 23] 72), remain largely unexamined. On the intertextuality, see Cairns (above, note 13) 335–36; Curran (above, note 3) 205; Harmon (above, note 9) 161–65.

⁴³ Hering (above, note 23) 68.

1. 1 describes the poet's first encounter with love, both love for Cynthia and love in the form of Amor. The lady, with her lunar associations,⁴⁴ affects the poet, and this confrontation between *lumina* and *ocellis* is the beginning of the poet's career as an elegist, of his elegiac poetry. This echo of the beginning of the collection raises the possibility that 1. 3 presents the roles as reversed and that Cynthia, now the one affected by the moon, will speak as the elegiac lover usually does.

The wakened Cynthia begins to speak: *sic ait in molli fixa toro cubitum* (34). Literally, she is in bed propped up on her elbow, but the verb *figo* is used to describe Propertius' passion, which results from the darts that Amor has fixed in his breast (2. 13. 2). *Fixa* then could suggest here that Cynthia is "pierced" by love's arrow⁴⁵ and in the position of the elegiac lover. Indeed, the language echoes that which describes the speaker in 19, where he stands before his mistress, *fixus*.⁴⁶ Cynthia's first pose recalls the speaker's posture in relation to his *domina* (17), suggesting that on a figurative level she is now in the position he previously occupied.

Cynthia's first words associate her thematically with the elegiac tradition when she accuses the male speaker of having been expelled from the closed doors of another woman: *tandem te nostro referens iniuria lecto / alterius clausis expulit e foribus?* (35–36). It is worth considering the parallels between this passage and 1. 16.⁴⁷ Although Cynthia's accusation in 1. 3, expressed in terms of the traditional motif of the *paraklausithyron*, seems to be at odds with the speaker's apparent return from the *convivium*, the accusation need not be taken literally. Cynthia, when she accuses the male speaker of unfaithfulness, speaks about him in the same way that he usually speaks about her,⁴⁸ by echoing the form which expresses her unfaithfulness in 1. 16, where the male lover lies outside the door (22) while she is in the arms of another (33).⁴⁹ The reference to doors may simply be an appropriation of the thematic imagery of elegiac poetry which articulates the supposed unfaithfulness, emphasizing Cynthia's new posture in this poem as the lover in a reversal of roles with the male speaker.

⁴⁴ On Cynthia's lunar associations, see E. N. O'Neil, "Cynthia and the Moon," *CP* 53 (1958) 1–8.

⁴⁵ On the lexical ambiguity of *figo* in line 19, see Lyne (above, note 9) 71. Lyne suggests that in this passage *fixa* is "specially chosen to sound hard and purposeful" (75).

⁴⁶ Lyne (above, note 9) 75.

⁴⁷ For a complete discussion of the correspondences, see E. Courtney, "The Structure of Propertius Book 1 and Some Textual Consequences," *Phoenix* 22 (1968) 253–54; Otis (above, note 29) 18–22.

⁴⁸ Lyne (above, note 9) 62 notes that Propertius often accuses Cynthia of infidelity.

⁴⁹ Both Courtney (above, note 47) and Otis (above, note 29) accept that the unnamed woman inside is Cynthia. For promiscuity expressed in terms of the *paraklausithyron*, see also 2. 6. 1–2: *Non ita complebant Ephyraeae Laidos aedis, / ad cuius iacuit Graecia tota fores . . .* On doors in Propertian elegy, see P. Pucci, "Lingering on the Threshold," *Glyph* 3 (1978) 52–73.

Cynthia's speech further recalls the themes and the language usually associated with the Propertian male lover. Cynthia expresses her wish that the male speaker should experience the terrible nights which he causes her to endure: *o utinam talis perducas, improbe, noctes, / me miseram qualis semper habere iubes* (39–40). Cynthia characterizes herself as wretched, echoing words of the poet as elegiac lover—*miserum me* (1. 1. 1). Cynthia's words also recall the lover Propertius' earlier claim: *in me nostra Venus noctes exercet amaras* (1. 1. 33), but now she is the one suffering.

Cynthia goes on to explain her activities during the absence of the speaker, and her language further suggests that she occupies the role of the elegiac lover: *interdum leviter tecum deserta querebar / extero longas saepe in amore moras* (43–44). The verb *querebar* typifies the lament that is elegiac poetry.⁵⁰ Moreover, the adverb *leviter*, which modifies her complaining, suggests the technical description of the elegiac genre, which is presided over in Propertian poetry by a *levis Musa* (2. 12. 22).⁵¹ This language recalls the lament typical of the elegiac lover. Rather than expressing a moral reaction to the male speaker's supposed betrayal, Cynthia emphasizes her waiting in a painful emotional cry,⁵² a *querella*⁵³ mirroring the *querella* of the poet in 1. 16. 39.

Reading Cynthia as elegiac lover rather than as realistic woman sheds light upon an interpretive difficulty in this section of the poem. Commentators have been disturbed by Cynthia's description of herself as *lapsam* (45). Hodge and Buttimore, for example, write: "'Lapsam' seems so close in meaning to 'sopor impulsi' that it is hard to assign it a clear place in the sequence of events."⁵⁴ This adjective is difficult to reconcile with Cynthia's literal posture as she falls asleep, but it is consistent with Cynthia's poetic pose as elegiac lover. For the poet describes the male lover's subjugation to love with this very same adjective—*aut vos, qui sero lapsum revocatis, amici, / quaerite non sani pectoris auxilia* (1. 1. 25–26). In 1. 3, *lapsam* hints that Cynthia too has fallen victim to passion. This echo of the language of 1. 1 suggests on a figurative level that she is in the dramatic position usually occupied by the elegiac lover.

Finally, Cynthia ends her speech with the last words of the poem: *illa fuit lacrimis ultima cura meis* (46). *Cura*, a word used to describe the elegiac beloved, appears in 1. 1 when Propertius warns others not to abandon their lovers but to stay in an accustomed love: *sua quemque*

⁵⁰ Cf. Horace, *Ars 75*; Nisbet and Hubbard on *Odes* 2. 13. 17–18; M. L. West, *Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus* (Berlin 1974) 6–9. For *querellae*, see *Odes* 2. 13. 24–25, 3. 21. 2, Tib. 1. 2. 9, Prop. 1. 7. 8, and C. Saylor, "Querelae: Propertius' Distinctive, Technical Name for his Elegy," *Agon* 1 (1967) 142–49.

⁵¹ See also 2. 34. 31 and Ovid, *Am.* 1. 19: *nec mihi materia est numeris levioribus apta*.

⁵² Włosok (above, note 23) 348–49.

⁵³ R. Thomas, "Review Article: Turning Back The Clock," *CP* 83 (1988) 68.

⁵⁴ Hodge and Buttimore (above, note 9) 97. See also Camps (above, note 21) on 1. 3. 45; Lyne (above, note 9) 65.

moretur / cura . . . (1. 1. 35–36). Cynthia, who has expressed her concern that the male speaker has spent the evening with another woman, uses language which reflects Propertius' warning about unfaithfulness.⁵⁵ However, in this context the roles are reversed. Cynthia uses the very word which often describes the lover Propertius' passion for her (1. 15. 31, 3. 17. 4). Now, the behavior of the male speaker seems to have become the source of *cura*, and Cynthia appears in the role previously occupied by the lover Propertius.

Commentators have labelled Cynthia's speech angry and abusive. Lyne writes of a reality which includes Cynthia's "fearsome and well-documented temper,"⁵⁶ while Stahl suggests that Cynthia lets loose "the full power of her wrath."⁵⁷ Robert Maltby adds that, as the poem progresses, "it is not Cynthia's beauty but her wrath which now has mythological proportions."⁵⁸ However, the generic conventions suggest not simply an expression of anger, but also an expression of love.⁵⁹ To the extent that Cynthia's words mirror those of the Propertian lover, she may be seen not simply as an enraged, "petulant" and "shrewish,"⁶⁰ or "hot-tempered"⁶¹ woman but also as a loving mistress.

Read as an expression of love, Cynthia's speech contradicts the male speaker's fearful expectations that his awakened mistress would savagely scold him as she had in the past: *non tamen ausus eram dominae turbare quietem, / expertae metuens iurgia saevitiae* (17–18). The description of her savagery as *expertae* (18) suggests that what is to come is familiar. However, the Argus simile which heralds the second portrait of the wakened mistress suggests that what follows is novel: The speaker is likened to Argus transfixed by the unknown horns of Io—*sed sic intentis haerebam fixus ocellis, / Argus ut ignotis cornibus Inachidos* (19–20). This simile equates Cynthia with the horned Io who causes such astonishment, and the fact that the speaker places a garland upon Cynthia's forehead—*tuis*

⁵⁵ D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Propertiana* (Cambridge 1956) 14, writes the following on these lines: "BB. rightly give *cura* its ordinary meaning 'anxious thought,' *illa* referring not to *Sopor* in 45 but to *moras* in 44."

⁵⁶ Lyne (above, note 1) 99–100.

⁵⁷ Stahl (above, note 2) 75.

⁵⁸ Maltby (above, note 9) 65.

⁵⁹ Hodge and Buttimore (above, note 9) 96 note that "hostility is only one element in Cynthia's response." They state (98): "her anger and self-pity come from love." Harmon (above, note 9) 161 ff. reassesses the nature of Cynthia's speech and categorizes it as the lamentation of a "conventional heroine." Thus she, in appearing to share Propertius' heroic fantasies in the opening lines, is "a woman of kindred nature to his own" (165). Cairns (above, note 13) recognizes that Cynthia speaks of herself in the generic terms of an excluded lover, and concludes (336) that "her application to herself of topoi associated with the *exclusus amator* forms within her speech a wry parallel to the unsuccessful *komos* which she imagines Propertius to have conducted earlier that night." This phenomenon, as Cairns sees it, is part of the question of admission/exclusion, and, although he suggests that the "persona of 1. 1 lurks very near the surface" (350), it is in the character of Propertius, not in the character of Cynthia.

⁶⁰ Hodge and Buttimore (above, note 9) 87.

⁶¹ Curran (above, note 3) 200.

. . . *temporibus* (22)—emphasizes this equation. The comparison, with what Harmon describes as the “sudden mention of the unknown,”⁶² suggests the presence of a novel Cynthia rather than the familiar angry mistress whose outpouring of wrath would be nothing new. This novelty could be identified as the peaceful nature of the slumbering Cynthia before she awakens. However, the novelty could also lie in the fact that the generic conventions in the second portrait of Cynthia rewrite her as a Cynthia unknown in the first two poems, a Cynthia who plays the role of the elegiac lover.

In short, by reversing Cynthia’s role in this way, the poet allows the reader to see a different aspect of her nature than that identified by the speaker⁶³—and by earlier commentators. The speaker suggests that Cynthia will be savage, and commentators have identified an angry tone which is seen as indicative of the real Cynthia. The poet, however, creates, by means of the very words more usually found in the mouth of the first-person authorial speaker himself, a portrait of a loving mistress.⁶⁴ And in light of this analysis of the generic nature of this second portrait, Cynthia could be seen as the ideal woman that the lover Propertius desires.

Evidence from Propertian poetry supports the possibility that this Cynthia, who displays a passion equal to that of Propertius the lover, embodies his ideal mistress.⁶⁵ In 1. 1, the lover appeals to witches for help in winning over Cynthia and turning her into a loving mistress because he himself is unable to win her love (17–22):

in me tardus Amor non ullas cogitat artis
nec meminit notas, ut prius, ire vias.
at vos, deductae quibus est fallacia lunae
et labor in magicis sacra piare foci,
en agedum dominae mentem convertite nostrae,
et facite illa meo palleat ore magis.

20

The description of Gallus’ passion in 1. 13 illuminates the link between Propertius the lover’s desires in 1. 1 and the Cynthia of the second half of 1. 3. In 1. 1 her conversion would be manifested by a pale complexion. A pale complexion is also indicative of Gallus’ submission to passion in 1. 13—*perditus in quadam tardis pallescere curis / incipis, et primo lapsus abire gradu* (1. 13. 7–8). The description of Gallus’ passion echoes the

⁶² Harmon (above, note 9) 159. See also Lyne (above, note 9) 71, on the suggestion of “sheer amazement at the fantastic sight” implied by this simile.

⁶³ The speaker’s apparent inability to perceive the reciprocally passionate tone of Cynthia’s speech is necessary for the continuation of an elegiac song which features their relationship. As Veyne (above, note 4) 90 notes, “passion calls for a repetitive song that prevents any evolution toward an epilogue.”

⁶⁴ Hering (above, note 23) 71 adds that her jealousy reveals her true love.

⁶⁵ See 3. 8 for Propertius’ explicit desire for a mistress who reveals her affections through abusive behavior. Lyne (above, note 9) 62 suggests that she acts like a suspicious spouse. Touching upon the phenomenon for which I argue, Lyne adds that she is “claiming the rights of the ‘wife’ that Propertius in his loving moments wants to see in her.” Cynthia, then, becomes what Propertius wants her to be.

language of Cynthia's second portrait in 1. 3, suggesting that she too has submitted to passion. Thus the final portrait of Cynthia presents her as the lover's ideal mistress—the one sought after in 1. 1.

In conclusion, it is difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between an initial, idealized portrait of Cynthia and a later, realistic one. In the first half of the poem, elements of dramatic realism encroach upon the mythological, and the poet's construction of Cynthia's portrait owes as much to realism as to idealizing. In the second half, Cynthia uses language typical of the elegiac lover. These generic conventions cast her in the role of a loving mistress rather than simply that of an angry woman. As such she would seem to be Propertius the lover's ideal mistress. In the end then, the Cynthia of the second portrait is no less idealized than that of the first.

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Observations on the Text of Artemidorus, *Onirocritica* Book 1

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The most recent edition of the *Onirocritica*, that of Roger A. Pack, appeared in 1963.¹ An Arabic version had been discovered in 1959, too late for Pack to make use of it,² but he later³ established that its Vorlage derived from the archetype independently of the ancestor of the known Greek manuscripts, and is therefore of significant textual value. In this paper I examine Pack's text of Book 1 systematically in conjunction with the Arabic version (henceforward abbreviated as "Ar"), and note all changes to the text warranted by Ar's readings. For the sake of completeness, I have also summarized the textual improvements made by other scholars since Pack's edition appeared.⁴ I have not incorporated the numerous changes to the

¹ *Artemidori Daldiani onirocriticon libri v* (Leipzig 1963); references to Pack in this paper, unless otherwise specified, are to this edition, and citations of the Greek text are taken from it.

² It was eventually edited by Toufic Fahd, under the title *Artémidore d'Éphèse: Le Livre des songes traduit du grec en arabe par Hunayn B. Ishāq* (Damascus 1964); subsequent references to Fahd are to this edition. Citations of the Arabic version, usually given in translation, have been based upon it, and verified against a facsimile of the manuscript, which Professor G. M. Browne placed at my disposal.

³ In "On Artemidorus and his Arabic Translator," *TAPA* 98 (1967) 313–26.

⁴ I refer repeatedly to the following: G. W. Bowersock, *Fiction as History: Nero to Julian* (Berkeley 1994), henceforward "Bowersock"; G. M. Browne, "Ad Artemidorum Arabum," *Le Muséon* 97 (1984) 207–20 ("Browne I"), "Ad Artemidorum Arabum II," *Le Muséon* 103 (1990) 267–82 ("Browne II"), "Ad Artemidorum Arabum III," *Le Muséon* 105 (1992) 173–86 ("Browne III"); D. Del Corno, review of Pack, *Gnomon* 37 (1965) 669–79 ("Del Corno I"), "Appunti al testo di Artemidoro Daldiano," in *Studi in onore di Anthos Ardizzone* (Rome 1978) 321–28 ("Del Corno II"); G. Endress and D. Gutas (eds.), *A Greek and Arabic Lexicon: Materials for a Dictionary of the Mediæval Translations from Greek into Arabic* (Leiden 1992–) ("Endress and Gutas"); A. J. Festugière (trans.), *Artémidore. La clef des songes* (Paris 1975) ("Festugière"); R. Pack, "On Artemidorus and his Arabic Translator," *TAPA* 98 (1967) 313–26 ("Pack I"), "Artemidoriana from the Escurial," *TAPA* 100 (1969) 331–36 ("Pack II"), "Artemidoriana Graeco-Arabica," *TAPA* 106 (1976) 307–12 ("Pack III"), "Artemidoriana Qualiacumque," *BASP* 16 (1979) 121–24 ("Pack IV"); F. Rosenthal, "From Arabic Books and Manuscripts XII: The Arabic Translation of Artemidorus," *JAOS* 85 (1965) 139–44 ("Rosenthal"); E. Schmitt, *Lexikalische Untersuchungen zur arabischen Übersetzung von Artemidors Traumbuch* (Wiesbaden 1970) ("Schmitt"); H. Schwabl, "Kleinigkeiten zu Artemidor," *WS* 100 (1987) 85–89 ("Schwabl I"), "Weitere Kleinigkeiten zu Artemidor," *WS* 102 (1989) 123–32 ("Schwabl II"), "Dritte Kleinigkeiten zu Artemidor," *WS* 102 (1989) 123–32 ("Schwabl III"), "Textkritische Nachlese zu Artemidor," *MCr* 25 (1992) 343–67 ("Schwabl IV"), "Weitere textkritische Nachlese zu Artemidor," *ICS* 18 (1993) 249–62 ("Schwabl V").

apparatus which Ar necessitates, but I hope eventually to produce a new edition of the *Onirocritica* in which they will be included. I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Gerald M. Browne for making available his correspondence with Professor Pack, and for looking over this paper and making suggestions for its improvement (as well as for directing my dissertation,⁵ from which this paper is largely drawn).

3. 9 ἐνυπνίου καὶ ὄνείρου: Ar “visions and confused dreams” (7. 6–7); we should probably read ἐνυπνίων καὶ ὄνείρων, with V.

3. 10 ἄλλοις: Ar “other places” (7. 7). Pack (apud Browne II, 268) suggests reading ἄλλοις <τόποις>.

3. 11 καὶ * * ἐπειδὴ: from here to σύγγραμμα (12) Ar has “and since I assume that you will see that this treatise will not follow what is proper if the beginning in it is not made from this concept” (7. 8–9), i.e. καὶ ἐπειδὴ <μὴ ἐντεῦθεν ἀρξάμενον> ἄκοσμον κτλ (Browne II, 267–68). It should be noted, however, that Hans Schwabl (IV, 344–45) takes “if the beginning in it is not made from this concept” as Ar’s rather free translation of καὶ ὅσπερ οὐκ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς γενόμενον, and suggests merely inserting something like <ἄλλως> after ἄκοσμον.

3. 13 For εἶναι read εἰναί.

3. 14 For ἐνυπνίον read ἐνυπνίου.

3. 17 For ἔσυτά read ἔσυτὰ.

4. 1 σώματος μόνου L¹V: σώματος LSAr. Pack has concluded (II, 334–35) that μόνου is to be deleted.

4. 2 <ἀ . . . ψυχῆ>: Ar here translates “and some of them are from the soul and the body together” (8. 11–12). Browne (I, 208) suggests a restoration of <ἀ δὲ ἵδια καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς τῆς αὐτῆς> with the loss resulting from homoioteleuton. Where ἵδια appears in the prior two clauses, Ar renders it من قبل; the presence of this phrase in the third clause suggests ἵδια again. Cf. also 16. 1, where Ar has “the soul and the body together,” again rendering καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς τῆς αὐτῆς (7. 19–20). As for the transposition of the nouns, Rosenthal (141) attributes a similar instance (“sister and daughter” at 18. 16 for θυγατέρα καὶ ἀδελφήν at 9. 9) to Arabic idiom.

4. 18–21 ἡ . . . ἀνώγοι: Schwabl (II, 130–32), after Hercher, regards this passage as an interpolation; therefore, he argues, Reiske’s <τὸ ὅν> is unnecessary, and Ar shows no trace of it. The passage should be relegated to the apparatus, and Reiske’s emendation abandoned.

5. 2 καταποθὲν Reiske: πάντοθεν LV: Ar here (11. 1) reads “he travelled (لَسَّ) on the sea and . . .” Perhaps πλέοντι δῆθεν is a likelier reading; cf. Schmitt, 163.

5. 8–9 καὶ . . . τοιαῦτα: om. Ar (Fahd 11 n. 9). Hercher was probably correct in considering this passage an interpolation; cf. Del Corno I, 676.

⁵ *Artemidorus Arabus: Toward a New Edition of the Onirocritica* (Urbana 1997).

5. 15 ἀν τι ρήσεως Enthoven: ἀντιρρήσεως L: ἀντιθέσεως V: <ἄν> ἀντιρρήσεως Ar (“about which no one will disagree” [11. 14–15]). Ar’s reading is to be preferred; see Pack III, 308.

6. 12 ἔτυχεν οὐκ ἀλόγως: Browne (III, 173) suggests that, since Ar reads “since it was drawn from imagination and reason, and the dream’s manifestation [lit. “what is seen of it”] was in accordance with rationality and reason” (13. 8–9), mentioning “reason” twice, Artemidorus may have written . . . ἔτυχεν <οὐκ ἀλόγου>, οὐκ ἀλόγως ἄμα θεωρούμενα . . .

6. 14 φάντασμα L: φάσμα VS and possibly Ar (“what we have said” [13. 10], i.e. φάσμα perhaps interpreted as φάσις). The likelier reading, therefore, is φάσμα.

7. 3 μόνῳ: om. Ar. Hercher was probably correct in deleting the word.

7. 8 ὃ (τὰ L) δὲ κοινά: Ar “And some of the dreams [i.e. ὃ taken as the anaphoric pronoun, not a relative presumptive to ταῦτα in 8] are those which he previously mentioned as being common” (14. 14–15); the added phrase may support Schwabl’s contention (IV, 347–49) that instead of σημαίνει in 7. 8 we should read σημαίνειν in indirect discourse.

7. 9 κατ’ ὄνταρ: om. Ar; correctly deleted by Hercher.

7. 11 Before ήλιον, Ar adds “And as for some of them, one sees therein what is seen, like . . .” (15. 4–5; Fahd n. 5), perhaps having read (and misunderstood) something like <ὅσα δὲ μετέωρα, ταῦτα> ήλιον τε (LV) καὶ . . .

7. 15–16 καθολικὸς L: καθολικὸς αὐτοῦ VAr (“all of what we described” [15. 10]). The reading of V and Ar is to be preferred.

7. 21 τούτοις: Ar “to this man” (16. 2), i.e. probably τούτῳ, with L.

7. 22 τοῦ¹ V: τοῦδε τοῦ LAr (“of his life . . .” [16. 3]). Again, the reading of L and Ar should be followed.

7. 23 τοῦ παντὸς σώματος: om. Ar; Hercher was correct to delete the phrase.

7. 23 For καί read καὶ.

7. 23 τετυφλῶσθαι L: τυφλοῦσθαι VAr (“a person saw in his sleep that his vision was failing” [16. 4]). The present infinitive seems more likely.

8. 23 λέγειν V: δειπνεῖν LAr; read δειπνεῖν (so Del Corno I, 674 and Pack I, 321; see also Schwabl II, 132–36).

8. 26 After σταυροῦσθαι Ar adds “or that the lightning-bolt fell upon him and burned him” (18. 4–5; Fahd n. 4), i.e. <κεραυνοῦσθαι>, omitted by homoioteleuton; see Pack III, 308.

9. 5–6 φιλεῖ . . . ἀποβαίνειν: Ar “it indicates what befalls friends and relatives” (18. 12–13); Browne (I, 208) suggests reading φιλεῖ <φίλοις> καὶ τοῖς πέλας ἀποβαίνειν, explaining the loss of φίλοις as due to homoiarchon.

9. 6 οἰκειότητα τῶν χρειῶν: Ar “what is suitable to each and every one of them” (18. 13), i.e. perhaps τῶν χρειῶν <αὐτῶν>, with the loss due to homoioteleuton.

10. 21 After τὸ αἴτιον Ar adds “because that was found not to be correct” (21. 12–13); Browne (III, 173–74) suggests a Vorlage of οὐ γάρ <όρθως εἶχεν· οὐ γάρ> ἐνὸς ἰδόντος . . . , another homoioteleuton error.

10. 26–27 οἵ . . . ὄψει (ὄψεσιν L): Ar “which will comprehend them, and hears that from different people [i.e. ἄλλοις, with L] and in different ways [i.e. διαφόροις ὄψεσιν, again with L]” (22. 6–7). The readings of L, supported by Ar, are to be preferred.

11. 9 φύσει V: κατὰ φύσιν LAr (“a natural thing” [23. 6]; the variation against “the natural affairs” [23. 4] for τὰ φύσει in 11. 8 suggests a variation in Ar’s Vorlage and in the archetype).

11. 10 τῶν οὐ (L¹: om. L) βλεπομένων L: τῶν οὐχ ἐπομένων VAr (“which does not fit” [23. 6]), more likely the correct reading.

11. 12 γίνεται . . . τάκουσιν†: Ar “like the one who is greedy if he sees in his sleep that he evacuates the bowels” (23. 8); Pack (I, 323) suggests a Vorlage of . . . τοῖς εὐπόροις <οὐκ αἴσιον> τὸ θακεύειν. See also Del Corno I, 678 and, for an alternative explanation, Schwabl II, 136–38.

11. 19 πάντως Reiske: πάντων LV: Ar “to every dream, of necessity” (24. 4–5), possibly <πάντως ἐπὶ> πάντων, a homoiarchon error.

12. 6–7 δύο δὲ τρόπους καθολικοὺς: Ar “as for this, which comprises both those two classes” (24. 10–11); Ar supports reading τούτους after δὲ, with V.

12. 12 διανοίας L¹V: μετανοίας L Hercher: <καὶ> διανῦσαι Reiske Ar (“and setting out for” [25. 7]). Reiske’s emendation should be accepted; see also Schwabl II, 138–42.

12. 16–17 μεταναστῆναι . . . πτῆσιν: Ar “thereupon he travelled and withdrew from it [his abode]” (25. 10); read οἰκίας, with V, for οἰκείας.

12. 21 οὕτως V: πάλιν LAr (“then” [26. 2]; cf. Schmitt, 386); read πάλιν.

12. 21 οἰκείαν L: οἰκίαν VAr (“abode” [26. 3]); the reading of V and Ar is preferable.

13. 15–16 εἰς δωμάτιον εἰσδραμὼν: Ar “and he ran and entered a room that was there” (27. 6); Browne has suggested (through personal communication) a Vorlage of εἰσελθὼν (with L) εἰς δωμάτιον ἔκει δραμὼν.

14. 14–15 οἶον . . . τοιοῦτοι: Ar “As for the dreams which are commendable in the two areas together: e.g.” (29. 2–3); Browne (III, 174) proposes a Vorlage of οἱ <μὲν> ο<ὖ>ν . . .

15. 8–10 τοσαύτας . . . αὐτῷ: garbled by Ar: “he obtained [so Rosenthal, 141] from the number of days the extent of what was sufficient for him, and that loaf which he saw that he got from the sun [i.e. ἡλίου, with L] determines it” (30. 6–8); see G. Strohmaier, *OLZ* 62 (1968) 134. It seems probable that for θεοῦ we should read ἡλίου, with L and R.

15. 14 τοιοῦτοι L: οἱ τοιοῦτοι VAr (فهي مثل [30. 13], which rendered οἱ τοιοῦτοι at 15. 4 [Ar 30. 2]); this more likely reflects the archetype.

15. 15 *¹ . . . *²: for the status of the lacunae in Ar, see Pack I, 314; Schwabl (II, 142) proposes reading <σταυροῦσθαι> μέλλοντα πλεῖν ἢ <ἄγαμον ὄντα>.

15. 16 ὁ μὲν: Ar “it points out to the poor man” (31. 2), which supports reading τῷ μὲν with L (pace Pack’s apparatus, L does not read τῷ here but does read τῷ at 15. 17; see below).

15. 17 ὁ δὲ: Ar “and it points out to the slave” (31. 2–3), i.e. τῷ δὲ; this is also L’s reading, though again Pack’s apparatus does not make this clear.

15. 17 ὁ¹: Ar “it points out to the one voyaging on the sea” (31. 3), i.e. τῷ; L here reads τῷ; see above at 15. 16.

17. 2 οὐδὲ . . . ἔω: Ar “near morning, not to speak of the times before that” (33. 5); possibly Ar read οὔτε πρὸς αὐτῇ τῇ ἔω <οὔτε πρὸς αὐτής> . . . , with the additional words lost in L and V through haplography.

17. 3 Ἐτι καὶ L: Ἐπεὶ V: Ar “And further . . . for . . . ” (33. 9–10); perhaps “Ἐτι καὶ ἐπεὶ . . .

17. 7–8 At the beginning of the new sentence, Ar adds “And men have in common” (34. 1), possibly from a Vorlage such as . . . πάντες, <καὶ κοινά> τέκνα . . .

17. 10–11 διάγειν . . . ὑπαιθρίους (ὑπαιθρίους τὰ πολλὰ L): Ar “and as for most of them [i.e. τὰ πολλὰ, with L], their shelter is not under the sky” (34. 4).

17. 11 κοινὰ: Ar “public and common” (34. 5); this probably reflects L’s κοινὰ πάντων, which should be read.

17. 11–12 τὰ . . . καλοῦμεν (καλούμενα L): Ar “and as for the customs that are called [i.e. καλούμενα, with L] private, in what is between men, concerning them there is diversity” (34. 5–6). Again L’s text is preferable.

17. 17 <καὶ>: Ar “And also” (34. 12); Browne (III, 174) suggests a Vorlage of <ἔτι δὲ καὶ>.

18. 4 οὐκ ἀναιροῦσι: Ar “that keeps them from the killing of” (35. 2); perhaps Ar read something like νόμιμον παλαιὸν <καθ’ ὃ> γύπας οὐκ ἀναιροῦσι . . .

19. 9 For ἔπειτα * * ἀνατρέφεσθαι Schwabl (II, 150–51) suggests reading <εἰπεῖν καὶ τοῦ> ἀνατρέφεσθαι.

19. 12–13 ἢ . . . ὕλην: Ar “or essence and matter” (37. 8); see Schmitt, 30. Fahd, however, takes only “or essence” to render ἢ εἰς ὕλην, and “and matter” to be an addition (37 n. 7). Pack (*per litteras*) has accepted Meineke’s deletion of εἰς², which Ar supports.

19. 13 After “and matter” Ar adds “and so alters them” (37. 8), possibly having read ἢ [εἰς del. Meineke] ὕλην <έτέραν>; the verb used is حرف, perhaps a pun on ὕλην.

19. 16–17 ὑγρᾶς τε καὶ ξηρᾶς L: ξηρᾶς τε καὶ ὑγρᾶς VAr (“dry and wet” [37. 11]); this is more likely the correct order.

19. 18 ταῦτα . . . βίβλος: Ar “And so [i.e. perhaps ταῦτα μὲν <οὖν>] this is what is in the first treatise of this work” (37. 12–13); Ar supports V’s περιέχει, rather than L’s ἔχει or Hercher’s περιέξει.

19. 19 ἡ . . . δευτέρα <* *>: Ar “And as for what is in the second treatise, we describe in it” (37. 13–14). Schwabl (II, 150–51) is supported by Ar in his unwillingness to accept Hercher’s assumption of a lacuna.

19. 23 περὶ (καὶ L) θανάτου: Ar “and death” (38. 1); Ar’s Vorlage reflected L, which should be followed.

20. 14–15 τέχνη (τέχνην V, om. *Suda*) . . . ἐντελῆς (ἐντελῆ V) ἔσεσθαι: Ar “thinks that every art [lit. “an art of the arts”] becomes perfect for him and straight without his nature’s being agreeable to that” (39. 9–10); Ar follows V, probably correctly.

20. 18–19 ἄκριτα (ἀδιάκριτα V) νόμιζε (Hercher: νομίζειν LV): Ar “one must not interpret them” (40. 1–2). Browne (II, 268) suggests a Vorlage of <δεῖ> ἄκριτα νομίζειν; see also Schmitt (258), who points out that ἀδιάκριτος is rendered differently at its one appearance (219. 22 [Ar 401. 3]).

21. 15 τῷδε V: τόδε LAr (“this dream” [41. 14]), which should be read.

21. 19–20 ὁν² . . . αὐτοῖς (om. V, ὁν . . . αὐτῶν L): Ar “against his will” (42. 4); this tends to support Del Corno’s suggestion (II, 324–25) that we delete ὁν and read αὐτῶν with L.

22. 2–3 ὅπου . . . δύναται: Ar “and it is not possible for them to go where they want, nor to carry themselves” (42. 12–13); Browne (III, 175) suggests a Vorlage of ὅπου γε <οὐ βαδίζειν> οὐδ’ ἔαυτὰ βαστάζειν.

22. 3 οἴκον LV: τὴν οἰκείαν Hercher: Ar “his country” (42. 15), which probably supports Hercher’s emendation (but cf. 45. 19 [Ar 85. 12], where οἴκον is rendered as it is here).

23. 11 ἀγαθόν· <διαθήσονται> γὰρ τὰ φορτία: Ar “this dream frequently indicates that their litter becomes lighter” (45. 5–6). Ar supports Hercher’s addition; see Pack III, 308–09. However, ἀγαθόν is not expressed; nor is βλάπτει in 23. 9. Browne (through personal communication) suggests a possible Vorlage of ἀπονώτερα τὰ φορτία πολ<λάκις σημαίνει. πολ>λοί . . . ; cf. Schmitt, 276.

23. 18 ἔχει (Hercher: ἔστι LV) δὲ ὥδε: Ar’s و seems to support Pack’s suggestion of ἔστι δὲ ὥδε, ad loc.

23. 24–24. 1 θυγάτριον (θυγατέρα L) . . . τὴν om. Ar (see Fahd 46 n. 6). If we assume that Ar’s Vorlage read θυγατέρα, with L, in 23. 24, and followed V in 24. 1 by reading ὃς for αὖ and omitting τις τὴν, then the remaining loss is easily explained by homoiarchon and homoioteleuton: ὃς ἔδοξε <θυγατέρα αὐτῷ γεγενῆσθαι, καὶ ἐδανείσατο. καὶ πάλιν ὃς ἔδοξε> θυγατέρα κτλ.

24. 3–4 [οὔτως ἄρα (οὔτως γὰρ L) . . . θυγάτηρ]: Ar “for this is the relation of the daughter” (46. 9–10); i.e. Ar did not omit the passage. We should probably read γὰρ, with L; cf. Schmitt, 289.

24. 6–7 ἀγαθῶν . . . ἥδυ: Ar “for this dream indicates [i.e. δηλοῖ, with V] a good thing that will be given to them and the time in which they expect [i.e. ἐλπίς, with V] that and have need of it” (46. 12–13). Ar does not construe ἀγαθῶν with καιρῶν, and supports Hercher in his decision to follow L in omitting τι . . . ἥδυ.

24. 13 ó V: om. LAr (“a son” [47. 4]), perhaps correctly.

24. 22–23 πρεσβύτιδι . . . δαπάνας: garbled by Ar (“And if the woman is old, wealthy and the possessor of property, that indicates that she will become poor and her wealth will be destroyed” [47. 13–15]). Ar favors L’s word-order (εὐπορείαν οὐσῇ πενιχρᾶ), and seems to have understood ἔχουσῃ for οὐσῇ.

25. 5 κτημάτων (κτῆσιν L): Ar “his age will become great” (48. 4). Rosenthal (141) suggests reading not سنه but شنه, “his things”; cf. Schmitt, 169. But Browne (through personal communication) argues that the archetype may have been κτῆσιν [om. Ar, by homoioteleuton] <ώς ύπερ ήλικίαν>; cf. 61. 17 (Ar 114. 2) and 61. 21 (Ar 114. 8).

25. 9–10 ἀθλητῇ . . . προσγορεύει: Ar “And as for wrestlers and workers [i.e. καὶ ἐργάτῃ, with V] and those who fight alone and everyone who works with his hand and exerts himself, this dream warns them . . .” (48. 10–12); Ar omits νόσον (Fahd 48 n. 9). Browne (III, 175) suspects that Ar wrote not بيده, “with his hand,” but بيدته, “with his body.” In any case, for δὲ read δὲ καὶ ἐργάτῃ, with V.

25. 17 εἰς² om. Ar, del. Pack (*per litteras*); cf. 19. 12.

26. 4 ἢ . . . διαδήματος om. Ar (Fahd 49 n. 9); cf. Schmitt, 114 n. 5 and 118. Reiske seems to have been correct in deleting this passage.

26. 9–10 καὶ . . . καλεῖται: Ar’s version of this (“for if he possesses something, he has control over it” [50. 1–2]) follows the translation of . . . μείζονα τὴν κεφαλὴν ἔσεσθαι (26. 5–6 [Ar 50. 2] “so that with it they may promote their affair”), as in L and V; for an argument that this (and not 26. 9–10, where Pack, following Gomperz, transposes it) is the proper position, see Del Corno II, 326–27 and Schwabl IV, 354–55.

26. 13 πόνους V: πόνον νόσον L: πόνον καὶ νόσον L^c: Ar “toil and travel” (50. 10), i.e. perhaps πόνον καὶ νόστον.

26. 15–16 καὶ . . . λειπομένη L: τῆς κατὰ φύσιν γινομένης V: Ar “than its natural size” (50. 11–12), which suggests that V should be followed.

26. 22 ἄρχοντι V: ἄρχοντι καὶ προφήτῃ LAr (“commanders and prophets” [51. 7]); the latter should be read.

27. 2 εὐπορίαν: Ar “a good condition and wealth” (51. 11–12). Browne suggests (through personal communication) that the Vorlage may have been something like εὐπορίαν σημαίνει <καὶ πολλὴν πρόσκτησιν>; cf. Schmitt, 172.

27. 6 δηλοῦσι V: οῖς δὲ ἐπιδέχεται καὶ δεσμὰ σημαίνουσιν LAr (“And it also indicates arrest and imprisonment in the case of the one in whom that is feasible” [51. 16]). L’s text should be read; see Schmitt, 180.

27. 19 ώς γὰρ V: καὶ γὰρ LAr (“for” [52. 11]); the latter is preferable.

27. 21 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο: Ar “for” (52. 15), which lends support to Reiske’s διὰ τὸ τὸν.

28. 4 ἀπορίαν L: ἀτυχίαν V: Ar “bad conditions” (53. 13–14); this more likely supports reading ἀτυχίαν, since ἀπορίας at 28. 5–6 is rendered differently (“the falling away of wealth” [53. 15–16]).

28. 10 βλαβήσεται LV: <αὐτὸς> βλαβήσεται Hercher Ar (“the harm will be given to him himself” [54. 4]). Hercher’s suggestion is probably correct; see Pack III, 309.

28. 11 οὕτω V (om. L): αὐτὸς Ar (“the harm will be given to him himself” [54. 7]). Again αὐτὸς should be read; see Pack III, 309.

28. 13 ἐπὶ δὲ V: ἐπειδὴ καὶ LAr (“for as for the whole body . . . ” [54. 8–9]). The entire sentence (28. 13–15), deleted by Hercher, is not omitted by Ar. The brackets should remain, but L’s text should be printed.

28. 18 ψιλὴν ἔχειν Hercher: ψιλὴν ἔχειν δοκεῖν LAr (“And if a person sees that the hair fell off” [54. 12]): ἔχειν ψιλὴν V. L’s text is probably correct.

28. 20 ὃν διαφύγοι V: καταφύγοι L: Ar “he will be saved . . . if he flees” (54. 14–15). Browne (II, 269) suggests that this reflects a Vorlage of διαφύγοι <εἰ φύγοι>; it should be noted that Schwabl (IV, 355) demurs, as do Endress and Gutas (178).

29. 12–13 For σημφορᾶ̄ read συμφορᾶ̄.

29. 16–17 τῶν ιδίων: Ar “or one of his family who is not a barber or one other than his family who is not a barber” (56. 5–6); Browne (I, 208–09) suggests a Vorlage of <ἢ τις> τῶν ιδίων <ἢ ἄλλων>.

29. 17–18 πένθη . . . σημαίνει: Ar “that indicates sadness or great harm and great afflictions in which he will become involved, and prisons” (56. 6–8). Breen (*Le Muséon* 101 [1991] 179–80) argues that “the scribe of Ar had ἢ δεσμωτήριον after πένθη in his text. This would have dropped out subsequently through homoioteleuton with αἰφνίδιον.”

29. 20–30. I τοῖς . . . <όνυχισθέντας>: Ar “and as for the rest of men, that indicates harm that will be done to them either by one whom they see or have seen cutting their nails or by someone else” (56. 12–14); Browne (III, 175–76) suggests a Vorlage of τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς βλάβην <ἢ> ὑπὸ [cf. V] τῶν ὄνυχισάντων, ἔαν [± γε] ἴδωσι <τοιούτους> τινὰς ἢ [cf. τινὰ ἡ L] ὑπ’ ἄλλων τινῶν.

30. 2 φαμεν V: φασιν L and perhaps Ar (“it has become customary for it to be said” [57. 1]). The likelier reading, then, is φασιν.

30. 14 οἶον V: ὃν τὸ οἶον L: αὐτῷ οἶον Hercher Ar (“obedient to him” [58. 4]). Hercher’s conjecture should be accepted; see Browne II, 269.

30. 15–16 εὔμορφα <ἢ τὰ> ὠτα: Ar “the ears are good in goodness of forms” (58. 6–7); instead of Hercher’s supplement, Browne (II, 269) suggests εὔμορφα <ἢ καὶ εὔρυθμα τὰ> ὠτα (though Schwabl [IV, 356] favors simply . . . <τὰ> . . .).

31. 8 After καταδύονται Ar adds “just as the dead enter the hollow of the earth” (59. 10), which corresponds to V’s ώς εις ἀπογαιωμένον [sic] οὐν τόπον τοντέστιν εις ἀποθανόντα καταδύονται. Browne (I, 209) suggests an archetype of ώς εις ἀπογαιώμενον τόπον οι ἀποθανόντες καταδύονται (but Schwabl [IV, 357] prefers ώς εις ἀπογαιώμενον ουν αὐτόν, τοντέστιν εις ἀποθανόντα, καταδύονται).

31. 11 ἀπόντος V: ἀποθανόντος LAr (“his brother’s death” [59. 12]). L’s text is to be preferred; see Browne I, 209.

31. 12 διὰ . . . κληρονόμος: Ar “And as for the messenger of death, it was on account of the ears; and as for the inheritance, it was on account of the wheat” (59. 13–14); Browne (II, 269–70) reconstructs the Vorlage as <ἀποθανόντος μὲν> διὰ τὰ ὡτα [cf. L], κληρονομία δὲ διὰ τοὺς πυρούς [cf. L], with V’s κληρονόμος instead of κληρονομία in the archetype; Schwabl (IV, 357–58) is skeptical, as are Endress and Gutas (129).

31. 17–21 ἐπιβουλὴν . . . παραδέξασθαι (Reiske: for L and V see Pack’s apparatus): Ar “that indicates an affair in which he will be deceived, which will befall him from slander, and that he will hear extraordinary news. And as for the ears of the other animals, when one sees them in sleep, the interpretation accords with the supposition regarding that animal” (60. 2–6). This suggests a Vorlage (and archetype) similar to V: ἐπιβουλὴν ἔχειν ἐκ διαβολῆς σημαίνει καὶ τὰ τῆς ἄλλης ἀκοῆς (cf. Rosenthal, 143) διὰ τῆς ὥράσεως (either translated later as “when one sees them in sleep” or omitted entirely) παραδέξασθαι (interpreted as future, or perhaps παραδέξεσθαι was read), ἀκολούθως δὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῷων κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐκλαμβάνειν (± δεῖ).

32. 10–11 ἔνδειαν . . . ἔχει: Ar “it indicates that he will be in need of money, and that he will be in unemployment, for money is in the position of the eyes” (61. 7–8). Browne (III, 176–77) reconstructs the archetype as τὸ δὲ ἀμβλυώττειν ἔνδειαν ἀργυρίου <καὶ ἀπραξίαν σημαίνει· ἀργυρίου> μέν, ὅτι καὶ τὰ ὅμματα πήφους ἔχει.

32. 11 οἱ (om. L) ἀμβλυώττοντες: Ar “from the weakness of his sight” (61. 9); Browne (III, 177) suggests that Ar’s Vorlage lacked οἱ, with L, and that it should be deleted.

33. 3 ὁ . . . αὐτῷ: Ar “it indicates that he will find one who will liberate him and serve him” (62. 7–8). Browne (II, 270–71) suggests restoring the archetype as ὁ δὲ ἔξει <τοὺς ἀπαλλάξοντας αὐτόν, ὁ δὲ> τοὺς ὑπηρετήσοντας αὐτῷ. (Schwabl [IV, 359–60], however, considers “one who will liberate him and serve him” “offenbar nicht mehr als die falsche Verdeutlichung von τοὺς ὑπηρετήσοντας αὐτῷ.”)

33. 8 στρατιώτῃ L: στρατιώτῃ, οὐ γάρ προκόψει VAr (“for the soldier, for it indicates that he will not succeed” [62. 13–14]). The additional words should be included in the text.

34. 12 νεωτέραν V: νεωτέραν καὶ ἀδελφὴν LAr (“the younger . . . or the younger of the two sisters” [64. 15]). Again the additional words should be included.

35. 3–4 ἔτι . . . εἰ V: εἰ δέ (for δὲ in Pack's apparatus) LAr ("And if" [66. 1]); L's text is the more likely.

35. 8–9 ἢ . . . δύνηται (δύναται L): Ar "or because the pain is in the position of the eye in that place, and so he cannot bring anything close to it" (66. 5–6). According to Browne (II, 271), "Ar's Vorlage may have read ἢ ἀνίαν ὥσπερ ὄφθαλμὸν ἔχοντι ἐκείνῳ τῷ μέρει μηδεμίαν ὕλην προσφέρειν δύναται [cf. L]," with the archetype perhaps ἢ ἴνα ἀνίαν κτλ. (Schwabl [IV, 360–61], however, considers emendation unnecessary.)

35. 12 καὶ . . . ἡτοσιν: Ar "and thus the lowest part coöperated with the sublime" (66. 8–9); cf. V: καὶ οὕτως τὰ ἡτονα τοῖς κρείττοσιν, probably the correct reading.

35. 15 ἐπίσταται L: ἐπίσταται τοῦτον VAr ("knows that stranger" [66. 11]). V's text is to be preferred; cf. Schmitt, 383.

35. 24 βελτίονα [όντως]: Ar "since the nose is good in condition" (67. 3). Browne (III, 177) suggests that the Vorlage was βελτίονα ὄντα, misunderstood as βελτίονος ούσης. Schwabl (IV, 361–62) is probably correct in emending to βελτίονα <ὄντω> ὄντως.

36. 2–4 δύο . . . σημαντικά: Ar "And if a person sees in his sleep that he has two noses, that indicates a difference that will occur between him and the one who is better than he, or between him and the people of his house. And I said 'a difference occurs' precisely because what one sees double without its being naturally thus indicates a double opposition" (67. 7–12). Browne (II, 271–72) suggests that Ar read στάσιν, with L, at 36. 2; ὑπερέχοντας ἢ οἰκείους, again with L, and στάσιν for στάσεις, at 36. 3; and τὰ παρὰ φύσιν διπλᾶ [cf. V] <διπλῆς> στάσεώς ἐστι σημαντικά at 36. 4. Schwabl (IV, 362–63) disputes the need for the last emendation, but if we accept it the text reads δύο δὲ ἔχειν ρίνας στάσιν πρὸς τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας ἢ οἰκείους σημαίνει· στάσιν μέν, ἐπεὶ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν διπλᾶ. <διπλῆς> στάσεώς ἐστι σημαντικά.

36. 21 ἢ δὲ (εἰ δὲ γαμηθεῖσα V): Ar "and as for the married woman" (69. 10), which suggests that we should read ἢ δὲ γαμηθεῖσα.

36. 22 γυνή τε καὶ ἀνὴρ L: ἀνὴρ τε καὶ γυνὴ VAr ("men and women" [69. 11]), probably the correct order.

37. 9 ιδεῖν Hercher: ἢ ἴδοι L: om. V: Ar "if a man sees" (70. 3), supporting Pack's suggestion (ad loc.) of εἰ ἴδοι.

38. 17 ἤδη L: ἔτι VAr ("also" [72. 9]); the latter should be read.

38. 23 [καὶ . . . ἀποδώσει] del. Hercher: Ar does not omit this passage ("And if a person sees that his teeth are broken, he will pay off his debt little by little" [72. 17–73. 1]); this confirms Del Corno's opinion (II, 322) that it should not be bracketed.

38. 23 Ar "little by little" (قليلاً قليلاً, 73. 1) more likely reflects V's κατὰ μικρὸν than L's κατὰ λεπτὸν; cf. Schmitt, 356 and 367. The text should follow V.

39. 1 διὰ λόγου: Ar “with speech and word” (73. 3), perhaps διὰ <φωνῆς καὶ> λόγου; cf. 38. 15 (Ar 72. 7–8), where διὰ λόγου καὶ φωνῆς was rendered “with word and speech.”

39. 13 ἀπολέσαι (ἀπολέσθαι L): Ar “fall out” (73. 17); this more likely reflects L’s text, which should be printed.

39. 19–22 αὐξήσαντες . . . ἐκπίπτωσιν]: Ar “And if one sees that some of the teeth have become long and have increased in size, that indicates contention and controversy that will occur in the dreamer’s house, for harmony is not associated with them [i.e. the teeth]. And if he sees that they move but do not fall out, that indicates the same thing” (74. 6–10). Browne (III, 177–78) suggests a Vorlage of αὐξήσαντες δέ τινες τῶν ὀδόντων καὶ ὑπερμεγεθήσαντες στάσιν κατὰ τὸν οἶκον τοῦ ἰδόντος ἔσεσθαι σημαίνει, ἐπειδὴ τῇ ἀρμονίᾳ οὐκέτι χρῶνται καὶ ὅταν σαλευόμενοι μὴ ἐκπίπτωσιν <, ταύτῳ σημαίνουσιν>. The inclusion of the phrase deleted by Hercher confirms Del Corno’s opinion (II, 322–23) that it should not be bracketed.

39. 23 ἥ¹ L: καὶ V: Ar has asyndeton (“black, corroded . . . ” [74. 11]); this probably reflects V, which should be followed.

39. 23 σεσηπότας (καὶ βεβρωμένους add. V) ἥ κολοβοὺς: Ar “corroded, bent and rotten” (74. 11–12), i.e. βεβρωμένους καὶ κολοβοὺς καὶ σεσηπότας; see Schmitt, 101 with n. 5. V’s text should probably be followed.

40. 4 μόνοις Hercher: μόνον L: μὲν V: Ar gives no direct equivalent for any of these (cf. Fahd 75 n. 5); μὲν may have appeared in the Vorlage, in confirmation of Del Corno’s opinion (II, 325): “fra le due letture offerte dalla tradizione manoscritta, si può propendere per μὲν.”

40. 10–11 ἀργύρεοι δὲ ὀδόντες . . . σημαίνουσι (ἀργυροῦς δὲ ἔχειν ὀδόντας . . . σημαίνει V): Ar “and if he sees that his teeth are silver, that indicates” (75. 14–15); this probably reflects V’s text, which should be followed.

40. 20–21 καὶ . . . πράξει: Ar “and his tongue will utter the word” (76. 10). Browne (III, 178) suggests that this points to an archetype of καὶ τῇ [cf. τῇ LV] <γλώσσῃ τῇ> διὰ λόγου πράξει.

At the end of this chapter, Ar adds “And if a person sees that his teeth fall out and he takes them and gets them with his hand or with his chest, that indicates that his children will cease and none will be begotten for him after that, and his children will not continue, or they will not be brought up. And if he sees that he sees with his teeth and with his tongue, that indicates that the affairs of his upright house will become bad with words that he will utter” (76. 10–15). The clumsiness of the Arabic here, especially toward the end, may point to a Greek Vorlage, though probably a rather corrupt one. If “he will utter” (76. 15) represents Greek λέξει, then the passage could have been lost through homoioteleuton with πράξει (40. 21). The Vorlage may be hypothetically reconstructed as follows: εἰ δέ τις ἐκβαλὼν τοὺς ὀδόντας τῇ χειρὶ ἥ τῷ στέρνῳ λαμβάνειν νομίσειε, τῶν τέκνων στερηθήσεσθαι σημαίνει καὶ οὐκέτι τεκνώσειν, τὰ δὲ τέκνα οὔτε μενεῖν οὔτε

τραφήσεσθαι, εἰ δὲ τοῖς ὄδοισιν ἡ τῇ γλώσσῃ ὥρᾶν νομίσειε, τὰ τῆς ἐντελοῦς [cf. 20. 15 (Ar 39. 9)] οἰκίας διαφθερεῖσθαι σημαίνει τοῖς λόγοις ἂ λέξει.

41. 6 Pack notes (*per litteras*) that the punctuation after δύναται should be a comma.

41. 8–9 καὶ . . . σημαίνει: Ar “And thus also is the state of the tongue that falls from the mouth in wickedness, for whenever this condition of the tongue indicates damage that befalls in words, there is from it degradation” (77. 11–14). Browne (through personal communication) reconstructs the following possible archetype: καὶ ἡ (with V) ὑπὲρ τὸ στόμα πίπτουσα αὕτη [δὲ] καὶ ἐκ (cf. L) προπετείας λόγων βλάβην <καὶ ἀσχημοσύνην> σημαίνει.

41. 11 πεφυκνίας ἐκ τῆς γλώττης V: ἐν τῇ γλώττῃ πεφυκνίας LAr (“. . . grows on his tongue” [77. 16]); the latter is more likely correct.

41. 14 For κακὰν read κακὸν.

42. 2 ὑπερφάσ: expanded by Ar as “throat or palate” (79. 1); see Schmitt, 88. Browne (III, 178) suggests that this may reflect a Vorlage of <ἐκ τῆς φάρυγγος ἡ> ἐκ τῆς ὑπερφάσ, with the absence of the additional words from L and V due to homoiaarchon.

42. 12–13 ἀμφότεροι L: ἀμφότεροι ταχὺ VAr (“both of them . . . quickly” [79. 15–16]); V’s text should be read.

43. 12 Ἀφηρῆσθαι (Hercher: ἀφαιτεῖσθαι L: ἀποκεκόφθαι V) . . . τῆς κεφαλῆς (τὴν κεφαλὴν V): Ar “that his head is struck” (82. 6–7); this probably reflects V, which is to be preferred.

43. 23 τὸν: Ar “what” (83. 1), i.e. an inanimate pronoun, which supports Schwabl (IV, 364–65) in his contention that τὸ should be read.

44. 12 After ὄντι Ar adds “with a thing in which he is trusted” (83. 15). There may be a lacuna here; cf. V, which adds τῆς οἰκίας, perhaps correctly.

44. 13 καταγνώσεως V: τοῦ κατεγγωσθῆναι L: Ar “until his misdeed is recognized” (84. 1); this probably reflects L, which should be followed; see Schmitt, 184.

45. 13 θάνατον V: ἀποθανεῖν LAr (“that he will perish” [82. 5]); the infinitive is to be preferred.

45. 18 κελεύει L: προαγορεύει VAr (“indicates” [85. 10]). The latter should be read; see Schmitt, 349.

45. 21 οἰκείαν L: οἰκίαν VAr (“dwelling” [85. 13]), the more likely reading.

46. 4–5 πολλοὶ . . . ἔτυχον: Ar “And many of those who see this dream have proceeded to leadership and direction” (86. 5–6). Fahd in his notes on this passage suggests that Ar omits ἐπ’ ἀρχὰς . . . ὥρμήσαντες, and that “to leadership and direction” supplies <τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ ἡγεμονίας> for the lacuna noted by Hercher in 46. 5. Strohmaier (*OLZ* 62 [1967] 275 n. 1) rejects this suggestion, and Del Corno (II, 325) and Schwabl (II, 153–54) argue persuasively against the need to assume a lacuna. It seems likely that

Ar took ὄρμήσαντες as a form of ὄράω, with ἐπὶ τούτοις depending upon it; this would account for “who see this dream.”

46. 11 τὴν¹ . . . ἔαυτοῦ: Ar “When one sees that his head is” (87. 3); this probably reflects V’s ἔαυτοῦ δοκεῖν κεφαλὴν ἔχειν, which is to be preferred.

46. 19 βιαίου . . . βιαίους θανάτους V: βιαίους . . . θανάτους LAr (“death by force” [88. 1]), probably correctly.

46. 21 φοροῦσι V: ἔχουσι LAr (“which has” [88. 2]; cf. Schmitt, 119 and 331). Again L should be followed.

46. 23 εἱρκτῇ V: εἱρκταῖς LAr (“those arrested” [88. 7]). L again.

47. 2 ἀδελφοῦ L: ἀδελφοῖς VAr (“of brothers” [88. 14]). V preserves the likelier reading.

47. 3 νόσον L: νόσον σημαίνει VAr (“it indicates diseases” [88. 13]); V’s text should be read.

47. 9 τινι γίγνοιντο L: φαίνοιντο V: Ar “one sees that they become” (89. 7–8), which perhaps more likely reflects V; cf. Schmitt, 434. The text should read τινι φαίνοιντο.

47. 10 σωμάτων L: κτημάτων VAr (“things” [89. 10]), which should be read; cf. Del Corno II, 674.

47. 11–12 παθόντες . . . σημαίνουσιν om. Ar (Fahd 89 n. 7). If Ar “they indicate” (89. 9) renders not L’s προαγορεύουσι (47. 10–11) but V’s σημαίνουσι, then the omission is explained by homoioteleuton; σημαίνουσι, therefore, is to be preferred.

47. 14 γυναιξίν L: γυναιξὶ σημαίνουσιν VAr (“that indicates . . . in the case of women” [89. 13]), which should be read.

48. 1 ὅ τι (δ’ add. L) ἂν: Ar “And so I will say that if” (90. 14); this follows L, with ἂν understood as ἔὰν. For ἂν, then, δ’ ἂν should be read.

49. 1 χειρῶν ἀποβαλλόμενοι V: τινος ἀπολλύμενοι L: χειρῶν ἀπολλύμενοι Ar (“. . . of the hands, if they are destroyed” [92. 3]), probably the correct reading.

49. 8 τάναντία: Ar “the like” (92. 12); Reiske’s suggestion of <οὐ> τάναντία should be accepted.

49. 11 ἀργοὺς: expanded by Ar to “idle and not active” (92. 15); see Schmitt, 279. Browne suggests (through personal communication) that this may reflect a Vorlage of ἀργοὺς <καὶ ἀπέργονφ>.

49. 15 For ἀγρίαν read ἀργίαν.

49. 18 ἀναφανῆναι L: ἀναφύναι VAr (“will grow” [93. 5]), which should be read.

49. 22 For γὸρ read γἀρ.

50. 3 τοιγαροῦν L: τοιγάρτοι V: Ar ﻰـذـكـرـ (94. 4); this more likely reflects V, which is therefore to be preferred; see Schmitt, 427.

50. 5 After ὁ ὄμφαλὸς, Ar adds “when a man sees it sick” (94. 6), perhaps having read ὁ ὄμφαλὸς <νοσῶν>.

50. 8 Before στερηθῆναι, Ar adds “either” (94. 9), i.e. <ἢ>. Cf. V: γενέσθαι δυσχερὲς ἢ [sic, ut videtur] ἢ στερηθῆναι.

50. 11 ἄπαιδι: Ar “everyone who is childless” (95. 1–2); therefore, as Browne (II, 272) points out, we should read <ἄπαντι> ἄπαιδι.

50. 25 κάκεινο L: κάκεινο πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις VAr (“for this reason . . . together with what we have said” [96. 1–2]). The fuller text should be printed.

51. 2 τοῦ σώματος: Ar “that the man possesses” (96. 4); Breen (*Le Muséon* 101 [1988] 180) suggests that we should read τοῦ κτήματος.

51. 5 After φροντίδας (VAr: φροντίδα L), Ar adds “and if one sees that he eats his liver, he killed his son and took his money” (96. 8); Breen (*Le Muséon* 101 [1988] 180–81) reconstructs this as <ἡπαρ δὴ [read δὲ] φαγεῖν τὸν νιὸν ἀποκτείναντα τὰ χρήματα ἀφελεῖν>.

51. 7 After δὲ, Ar adds “the cleverness of a man and the place where he hoards his money” (96. 11); Browne (through personal communication) suggests reconstructing this as <σύνεσιν καὶ τὰ κειμήλια>.

51. 8–9 ἀδελφοὺς . . . τέκνα: Ar “brothers and sisters and the rest of the relations and children” (96. 14–15); Browne (I, 209) proposes reading ἀδελφοὺς καὶ <ἀδελφὰς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους> συγγενεῖς καὶ τέκνα.

51. 12 ἀπολλύμενα . . . ἀπολλύσθαι VAr (“And if they are lost, they indicate that the thing that they indicate will be lost” [97. 3–4]): om. L. Pack (*per litteras*) suggests emending ἀπολλύσθαι to ἀπολεῖσθαι.

51. 13–14 ἐπεὶ . . . ἐπεὶ: Ar “for . . . because” (97. 8–9); the variation in Ar suggests to Browne (II, 272–73) that the Vorlage was V’s ἐπεὶ . . . ὅτι.

51. 14 τέκνων: Ar “procreation” (97. 9); Browne (II, 272–73) suggests reading <τοῦ> τεκνοῦν.

53. 11 γόνου τε LV: γόνατα Hercher: Ar “knees” (if we read برك; see Schmitt, 80), which tends to support Hercher.

53. 12 πολλάκις . . . ἀδελφοὺς . . . διατείνει: expanded by Ar to “And what the knees indicate frequently happens and their interpretation is connected with brothers” (100. 15–16), perhaps more likely reflecting L’s καὶ πρὸς than V’s πρὸς.

53. 14 ἔτι . . . σημαίνει: Ar “and they are interpreted to refer to freed slaves” (101. 1); Browne (III, 178–79) proposes a Vorlage of ἔτι καὶ πρὸς [cf. V] ἀπελευθέρους ἔστι [cf. L] ληπτέα.

54. 1 τῆς νεῶς ἐρεσσομένης: Ar “when the ship travels on the sea, being calm” (102. 1); this may suggest τῆς νεῶς ἐρεσσομένης <διὰ γαλήνης>, with the phrase lost in L and V through homoioteleuton; cf. 140. 19.

54. 3 τοῖς: Ar “many feet” (102. 5); Browne (III, 179) suggests that <πλείσι> was present in the Vorlage before πλείονας (54. 4).

54. 11 Pack (*per litteras*) suggests that ἐκεῖ was originally present after βαδίζουσιν, and was lost through visual similarity to ἀεὶ.

54. 12 At the end of the sentence, Ar adds “because they walk upon that reel which is there” (102. 16); see Strohmaier, *OLZ* 62 (1967) 274. Browne (through personal communication) suggests a Vorlage of <ώς βαδίζοντες ἐπὶ τροχῷ>; cf. Schmitt, 195.

54. 13 καὶ τούτῳ L: αὐτῷ V: Ar “him also” (103. 1), which suggests καὶ αὐτῷ.

55. 7 τρίτον (δὲ L): Ar “then . . . after that” (104. 10). After the omission of δεύτερον in 55. 6, Ar could hardly have said “thirdly”; Ar may, however, support the contention of Schwabl (IV, 365–67) that instead of τρίτον (± δὲ) τὸ, we should read καὶ.

55. 8 τὸ . . . ἔστιν Hercher: τὸ μὲν ποσὸν τοῦτο L: τοῖς μὲν τὸ ποσὸν τοῦ εἴτε V: Ar “as for quantity, it is” (104. 11), perhaps τὸ μὲν ποσόν, τὸ . . ., with τοῦτο taken before ἀγαθὸν in 55. 9 (“that is commendable” [104. 12–13]), i.e. τοῦτ’ ἀγαθὸν.

55. 8–9 ἐκ μικροῦ μέγαν (μέγα L) γενέσθαι: Ar “as if the small thing becomes large” (104. 11–12), i.e. μέγα, with L.

55. 9 μεῖζω V: μεῖζον LAr (“larger than it is” [104. 12], i.e. ἐκ om. Ar) should be read. Pack’s apparatus omits the accent on μεῖζον, but it is present in the manuscript.

55. 14 βραχὺ V: μικρὸν L: Ar صغير “small” (105. 4), which more likely reflects μικρὸν; cf. Schmitt, 288 and 367.

56. 9 οἰκουροῦσιν αἱ γυναῖκες: Ar “their vision is in the interior of houses, and they have not power” (106. 5–6); see Schmitt, 128. Browne (through personal communication) suggests that the Vorlage may have been οἰκουροῦσιν <ἄκυροι οὐσ>αι {γυναῖκες} οτι οἰκουροῦσι <μὴ κυριεύουσα>αι {γυναῖκες}.

56. 24–25 παντὶ . . . γεγονέναι: misunderstood by Ar (“And as for what the significance is of the recollection of gold and silver: when it becomes copper, it also indicates the like of that” [107. 5–7]); see Rosenthal, 143. Ar omits παντὶ δήπουθεν (Fahd 107 n. 3), which is probably an incorporated marginal gloss.

57. 10 λίθινόν V: λίθον LAr (“stone” [substantive; 108. 4]), which should be read.

59. 15 λύπας L: δίκας τῷ ιδόντι VAr (“a dispute in which the possessor of the dream will fall” [109. 11–12]); the latter is preferable.

59. 20–21 After ιδόντος Ar adds “and what those crafts indicate as regards the condition of the one who sees them” (110. 6). Browne (through personal communication) suggests a Vorlage of . . . ιδόντος, καὶ τὶ κάκειν<αι σημαίνουσι περὶ τοῦ ιδόντος κ>αὶ ὄσσα . . .

59. 25 διχονοίας καὶ στάσεις L: διχόνοιαν καὶ στάσιν V: Ar “contradiction and difference of opinion” (110. 11); this probably reflects a Vorlage of στάσιν καὶ διχόνοιαν; see Schmitt, 301 and 414.

60. 19–20 οὐδὲ . . . διδάσκεται: Ar “for one who learns the writing of the Greeks does not go into slavery” (112. 2). Pack (*per litteras*) suggests that this may represent a Vorlage of οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐν δουλείᾳ Ἐλληνιστὶ διδάσκεται. Cf. Festugière, 61 n. 3.

60. 25 παρακόψαι L: κατακόψαι VAr (“will become exhausted from his illness” [112. 7–8]), which should be read.

61. 8 τὸ τοπικὸν L: τὸν τόπον V: Ar “the nature of the place” (113. 6), more likely reflecting V’s text.

62. 1 τὸν ἀγῶνα: Ar “the place of wrestling in the time of wrestling” (114. 10–11), i.e. τὸν ἀγῶνα <παρὰ τὸν ἀγῶνα>, with the loss occurring through homoioteleuton.

62. 5–6 ἐταίρας (Hercher: ἐτέρας L: εἰς ἐταίρας V) ἔρωτα· ἔοικε: Ar “is similar to the love of a profligate woman” (115. 2–3), as if ἔρωτι were read and taken with ἔοικε. Ar then adds “and her spending secret hours in adulterous love” (115. 3). This could possibly reflect ἐταίρας <εἰς ἐτέρους> κτλ; cf. L and V. Ar omits γὰρ, with L.

62. 13 προαγορεύουσι V: προαγορεύει L: Ar’s use of the singular (“indicates” [115. 9]) more likely reflects L.

62. 15 σάλπιγγι V: τῇ σάλπιγγι L: Ar “with the instrument called *salpinx*” (115. 14); the use of the article probably means that Ar reflects L.

62. 17 οἰκετῶν LV: οἰκείων Hercher Ar (“relations” [116. 3]); see Schmitt, 127. Hercher’s emendation should be accepted.

63. 2 ἀνατρέχει V: περιτρέχει LAr (“wind around” [116. 12]), which should be read.

63. 8 πενθικοῖς Hercher: πυθικοῖς LVar (“used in divination” [117. 3–4]) Robert; see Festugière, 64 n. 7 and Pack IV, 121–22.

63. 16 ἀναπλάσματα L: πλάσματα VAr (“a book of fabrication of poetry” [117. 13–14]), which should be read; see Bowersock, 146–47.

63. 19 δουλεῖαι Hercher: ἀπολίαι L: om. V: ἀγωνίαι Pack (III, 309): ἀπωλεῖαι Ar (“misery” [117. 16]), which should be read; see Bowersock, 147.

63. 22 ἀναπλάσματα LVar (“representation” [118. 4]); Bowersock (147) is probably right in suggesting that the correct reading is δράματα ἢ πλάσματα (cf. 63. 16), though Schwabl (I, 86–87) argues for ἀναπλάσματα in both instances.

63. 22 ἢ βιβλία LV: Ar “in a book” (118. 4), i.e. ἐν βιβλίῳ; in either case, as Bowersock (147) argues, “a gloss to explain πλάσματα.”

64. 3 τισὶ L: τινὶ VAr (“a man” [118. 12]), which should be read.

64. 3–4 κερδῶν . . . σεμνύνουσι: Ar “the poets, because of what is given to them of benefit, praise” (118. 11–12), which seems to suggest that V should be followed: κέρδους χάριν ιδίου οἱ ποιηταὶ σεμνύνουσι.

65. 7 τὸ V: τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ καὶ ὄπωσον LAr (“And similarly to that also” [120. 11]). L’s text should be read; see Strohmaier, *OLZ* 62 (1967) 271 n. 3.

65. 18 ἢ . . . γνώμην del. Reiske (correctly), om. Ar; cf. Fahd 121 n. 11.

65. 24–66. 1 ἔπειτα . . . νόσον: Ar “and this dream also indicates a quarrel that will take place between the rich and poor people because of land, and it is for the rich and the poor that it indicates illness” (122. 3–5). Browne (III, 179–80) suggests a Vorlage of . . . πρός τινας <ἀπόρους> μάχην τοῖς εὐπόροις, τοῖς δὲ ἀπόροις <καὶ εὐπόροις> νόσον.

66. 3 ἀπλοῦν L: δὲ . . . ἀπλῶς VAr (“And . . . in short” [122. 8–9]) should be read. Ar does not add anything here, pace Fahd 122 n. 3.

66. 7 τὸ ζῆν del. Hercher (correctly), om. Ar.

66. 11 Ἐγκρίνεσθαι L: Ἐγκρίνεσθαι δὲ δοκεῖν VAr (“And if one sees that he is tested in wrestling” [123. 1]). The latter is to be preferred; cf. Schmitt, 191.

66. 12 ἡλικίαν V: προσδοκίαν LAr (“when they expect it” [123. 3]), more likely the correct reading; see Pack III, 309–10.

66. 15–16 μέταλλον: Ar “the place of one who is not fit for it” (123. 6–7); this seems to support Krauss’s emendation, ἀτιμίαν. Cf. Fahd (123 n. 7) and Schmitt, 147.

66. 18 Παλαίειν L: Παλαίειν δὲ VAr (“And if he sees that he wrestles” [123. 8]), which is perhaps more likely.

66. 18 φίλω L: φίλων VAr (“of his friends” [123. 8]), which should be read.

67. 1 μάχοιντο V: παλαίοιντο L: Ar “he wrestles with him” (123. 11), more likely reflecting L.

67. 10 τῇ γῇ δοῦναι: Ar “he will fall thrown to the ground” (124. 6); Browne (II, 273) suggests a Vorlage of . . . τῇ γῇ δοῦναι <πεσόντα>.

67. 13 After τινά, Ar adds “of his relatives” (124. 10), i.e. <προσήκοντά> τινα or possibly τινὰ <τῶν τούτῳ προσηκόντων>; cf. 186. 4 (Ar 337. 11) and Schmitt, 408.

67. 23 ἄσχημον γίνεται: Ar “becomes loathsome in a boxing match” (125. 3–4), perhaps <ἐν τῇ πυγμῇ> ἄσχημον γίνεται or ἄσχημον γίνεται <τότε> κτλ.

68. 3 <τῇ πάλῃ [Pack (*per litteras*) corrects this to πάλῃ] καὶ> Hercher: om. Ar (Fahd 125 n. 9); Del Corno (II, 325–26) argues persuasively against the inclusion of the phrase.

68. 10 τὸ ἀθλα LV: τὸ ἀθλὸν Hercher (tentatively, in his apparatus) Ar (“the competition” [126. 2]). Hercher’s reading was correct.

69. 8 καὶ ἐμφαγόντες: understood by Ar as “when they bathe and eat” (127. 15), possibly <λούονται> καὶ ἐμφαγόντες.

70. 9 μὴ εὑρεῖν ὃ ἔζητει V: ἐφῶειση (ἐφ’ ω̄ εἰσήει Bursian) μὴ εὑρεῖν L: Ar “his entry into the bath, and that he did not find water in it” (129. 7–8), i.e. perhaps ἐφ’ ω̄ εἰσήει <βαλανείῳ> μὴ εὑρεῖν ὃ ἔζητει.

71. 10 [ὑδροποτεῖν]: Ar “to drink warm water” (131. 8–9), i.e. θερμοποτεῖν (see Pack III, 310).

71. 23 ἀναστρέφεσθαι V: ἀναστρέφεσθαι πονηρὸν εἶναι LAr (“if one sees that he is . . . that is bad” [132. 10–11]), which should be read.

73. 14 τίττρια† LVAr (“citron” [135. 7]); see Rosenthal, 143. Pack (I, 314) suggests that the word should not be obelized. Cf. also Schwabl II, 155–56.

73. 19 δανειστῆ L: δανεισταῖς VAr (“creditors” [135. 12]), which should be read.

74. 3 For κατατομάς read κατατομὰς.

74. 4 σημαίνουσι L: σημαίνει VAr ("it indicates" [136. 7]), which should be read.

74. 5 After τὰ τοιαῦτα, Ar adds "by iron" (136. 6); Browne (II, 273–74) suggests a Vorlage of τὰ τοιαῦτα <σιδῆρῳ>.

74. 9 ἄπρακτοι: Ar "it is bad for him and it indicates violence" (136. 13), i.e. perhaps <πονηροὶ καὶ> ἄπρακτοι.

74. 16 δακρύουσι VAr: δάκρυα L; but Ar "his eyes shed few tears" (137. 5), with cognate accusative, may suggest δακρύουσι . . . ὀλίγα <δάκρυα>, which would resolve the lacuna in L noted in Pack's apparatus.

75. 11–12 ἐπάγει . . . ἐλέγχει L: ἐπάγουσιν . . . ἐλέγχουσιν V: Ar "they indicate . . . they bring to light" (138. 13); this more likely reflects V, which should be followed.

75. 17 σημαίνουσιν L: σημαίνουσιν ἢ τά γε νῦν ἐλπιζόμενα οὐ τελειοῦσιν VAr ("indicates . . . or that what they hope for will not be accomplished for them" [139. 6–8]), which should be read.

76. 4 ἥδη: Ar "also" (140. 2), which may reflect ἔτι; see Pack III, 310.

76. 5 After βόεια, Ar adds "it indicates toil" (140. 2), reflecting Hercher's conjecture of βόεια <πονηρὰ> (see Pack III, 310), or perhaps more likely <μοχθηρὰ>; cf. 169. 15 (Ar 303. 14), where μοχθηρὸς is similarly rendered.

76. 18 οὔτως ὑπὸ ὄψοποιῶν: Ar "as cooks prepare it" (141. 2); this reflects Festugière's emendation: οὔτως <ώς> ὑπὸ ὄψοποιῶν (75 n. 21).

76. 24–77. 2 ὁ γέ . . . παραμένει: Ar "for he does not eat the meat of a man from the people of his house, and it indicates that he himself will be satisfied and will not need and that which is eaten will starve, because everything that is eaten is destroyed" (141. 9–11). Pack (*per litteras*) corrects φαγών (76. 24) to φαγὼν. Endress and Gutas (241) propose the following Vorlage for Ar: οὐ γέ τινος τῶν οἰκείων ἔφαγε σάρκας· καὶ τὸν ὃν ἔφαγε κατακορέσθαι καὶ αὐτὸν τε οὐδὲν <δὲ> δεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ βρωθέντα λιμώσσειν ὅτι οὐδὲν> μέγα τῶν ἐσθιομένων παραμένει; the possibility of a homoioteleuton error is tempting, but it is hard to imagine why Artemidorus would have written anything so redundant as ἀνδρὸς οὐ γνωρίμου οὐδὲ οἰκείου, ἐπεὶ οὐ γέ τινος τῶν οἰκείων ἔφαγε σάρκας. Reiske suggested μέγα <μετὰ> τὸν ἐσθιόμενον παραμενεῖ; Festugière (76 n. 23) omits μέγα from this, and Schwabl (I, 87) has a similar suggestion: . . . αὐτὸς δὴ οὐ δὴν μετὰ τὸν ἐσθιόμενον παραμενεῖ. In this Schwabl hears an echo of Homeric language ("vgl. Il. 6, 131 und 139 f., auch 5, 407"), which may account in part for Ar's difficulty with the passage.

77. 2 εἰκός γε: Ar "and especially because" (141. 11), which may reflect εἰκός γε ὅτι; cf. Hercher's εἰκός γὰρ ὅτι.

77. 7 τοὺς πόδας: Ar "the foot of the child" (142. 3), i.e. perhaps τοὺς πόδας <τοῦ παιδὸς>.

77. 11 ἀγαθαῖ: Ar "very good" (142. 5), perhaps <παντελῶς> ἀγαθαῖ (cf. 76. 15 [Ar 140. 15]) or <σφόδρα> ἀγαθαῖ (cf. 109. 2 [Ar 201. 4]).

77. 16 ἡ δικῶν: Ar “who themselves procured it” (142. 10); Schwabl (V, 250–52) suggests reading εἰδικῶν or ιδικῶν.

78. 5 ὑπὸ . . . τετῆχθαι: Ar “another than he subdues him, just as salted fish is pressed” (143. 15–16). Browne (II, 274) suggests a Vorlage of <ώς> ὑφ’ <ἀλῶν> τῶν ἄλλων τετῆχθαι. Schwabl (V, 252–53), it should be noted, demurs.

78. 7 σημαίνουσι: expanded by Ar to “it is bad, indicating” (144. 5), possibly . . . τετυρωμένοι <κακοὶ καὶ> δόλον κτλ (78. 6–7).

78. 13 Before καππάρεων, Ar adds “vinegar-sauce and” (144. 12), perhaps <όξεων καὶ> καππάρεων.

78. 20 After φιλονεικίας, Ar adds “and shouting” (145. 7); see Schmitt, 436. Possibly Ar read φιλονεικίας <καὶ ταραχᾶς>; cf. 78. 23 (Ar 145. 10).

79. 19 προσκαίρους: Ar “in its time” (146. 13); see Schmitt, 408. Fahd (146 n. 12) compares Hercher’s conjecture, <κατὰ μὲν τὴν ὥραν>. Robert (*Hellenica: Recueil d’épigraphie, de numismatique et d’antiquités grecques* XII [Paris 1960] 602) suggests πρὸς καιρόν, and Pack (I, 318 n. 15) notes perhaps the most likely possibility, <κατὰ μὲν τὸν καιρὸν>.

80. 2 πότον: Ar “a sweet beverage” (147. 6–7), possibly <ήδὺ> ποτὸν; cf. 21. 9 (Ar 41. 3).

80. 23 After ταῦτα, Ar adds “benefits and” (148. 16). Browne (III, 180) suggests that the archetype read . . . ὁ τρίπους <ἢ> ἡ (or ἢ <ἢ>) ἐστία, εἰς ταῦτα <τὴν ὠφέλειαν καὶ> τὴν βλάβην . . .

81. 23–25 οὐ . . . ἀποδῶσι: simplified by Ar to “do not dance except from joy and sufficiency” (150. 9–10); the corrupt τὰρχῆ† may have suggested a form of ἀρκέω to Ar, but more likely Ar supports Festugière’s τὴν ἀρχῆν <τῇ γαστρὶ> (80 n. 1); see also Endress and Gutas, 253.

81. 27–82. 1 παραφρονῆσαι καὶ παρακόψαι: Ar “prolongation of the illness” (82. 12). Ar has omitted παραφρονῆσαι καὶ (which is probably an intrusive gloss; note the absence of καὶ in L), and understood παρακόψαι as προκόψαι.

82. 13 After ὁ ὄρχηστής, Ar adds “as long as he dances” (151. 14), possibly <όρχονύμενος (± μὲν)>.

82. 18 ποιοῦνται: Ar “it indicates” (152. 2); this seems to support Hercher’s emendation, μαντεύεται.

84. 4 κατὰ . . . καιρὸν: Ar “not in the season in which there are roses, they are bad, and if one sees them in the season of roses” (156. 4–5); see Rosenthal, 143 and Pack I, 318, who suggests παρὰ (sic LVAr) μὲν τὸν καιρὸν <κακοί, κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν> πᾶσιν ἀγαθοί.

86. 12 δεσμὰ . . . ἔλικας: Ar “they are bad because of their envelopment” (159. 15); Browne (through personal communication) suggests a Vorlage of ἄμα (cf. L) <κακὰ> σημαίνει κτλ.

87. 19 τῶν ἔταιρων [read ἔταιρῶν; see Schwabl II, 157]: Ar “than those who stand in the brothels” (161. 16); Browne (I, 210) suggests a Vorlage of τῶν ἔταιρῶν <τῶν ἐπὶ πορνείας ἔστωσῶν> κτλ.

89. 9 For σημαντικὸν read σημαντικόν.

89. 10 <τινα>: Ar “a slave” (164. 11), i.e. perhaps <τινα δοῦλον>; cf. Del Corno I, 677.

90. 9 <ἔχθραν> Hercher Ar (“treat as an enemy” [166. 2]): χώραν LV. Since the word is present, if only in Ar, for <ἔχθραν> read ἔχθραν.

90. 18 Before διὰ τῆς οἰκουρίας, Ar adds “filled her mother’s place and” (166. 11); Browne (III, 181) suggests a Vorlage of <ώς ἡ ἐαντῆς μῆτηρ> διὰ κτλ; Endress and Gutas (337) favor <ἄσπερ ἡ μῆτηρ> διὰ κτλ.

91. 4 For ἀφροδίσιων read ἀφροδισίων.

91. 17 <ό γάρ> Hercher: Ar “and the” (168. 10); Browne (I, 210) suggests a Vorlage of <ό δὲ>.

93. 5–6 Before καὶ, Ar adds “because the land is like the mother” (171. 3). Browne suggests (through personal communication) that Ar may have read ἐπὶ (cf. V) τὴν οἰκείαν <ώς μητέρα> ἀνακομισθήσεται. But the additional phrase may have been suggested by 93. 26–27.

93. 21 [<ἔτι (ἐπεὶ L) . . . βεβλημένῃ>], deleted by Hercher, is not omitted by Ar (“because of its shame and the shame of the like of this sleep” [172. 1–2]). Ar read ἐπεὶ, with L, and interpreted ὑπίσημος as if it were from ὕπνος. The text should include ἐπεὶ, and ἔτι should be relegated to the apparatus.

94. 9 πᾶν . . . κόπου: Ar here follows V (ό μὲν . . . γίνεσθαι): “every pain and toil [an expansion of οἱ μὲν πόνοι] befalls the woman, and the man continues without effort, and pleasure takes possession of him [a simplification of ἀποτεταμένῳ . . . τέρπεσθαι], and his toil becomes less [cf. Reiske’s ήττονας] in the like of this position, for it is without movement from the man” (172. 14–173. 1). The text should read οἱ μὲν πόνοι περὶ τὴν θήλειαν, τῷ ἄρρενι συμβαίνει ἀπράγμονι καὶ ἀποτεταμένῳ ἡδεσθαι καὶ τέρπεσθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ ήττονας τοὺς πόνους ποιεῖ τοῦτο τὸ σχῆμα διὰ τὸ χωρίς σαλευμάτων γίνεσθαι.

94. 18 ὅπισθεν L: ὅπισθεν παραναπίπτει ως κάμηλος καὶ κύνες τὰ δὲ ἄνωθεν VAr (“when they have intercourse, have intercourse on their back, like the camels, and some of them as to the fact that the male is above the female” [173. 13–15], i.e. Ar om. καὶ κύνες). The text should follow V.

95. 15 τοῦ . . . φιλίας: Ar “his love to her [i.e. V’s αὐτῷ], and the invalidation of the marriage” (175. 5), i.e. inversion. Ar probably read καὶ, with V, rather than ἢ, with L. V should be followed in both points.

96. 9–10 διὰ στόματος: Ar “in their mouths” (176. 12), suggesting a Vorlage of διὰ τοῦ στόματος, with V.

96. 22 οὐκ ἔχοντες V: ἃς οὐ κατέσχον LAr “whom they did not expect” (177. 14), which should be read.

97. 10 περαίνη L: περαίνειν δοκῇ V: Ar “sees . . . that she has intercourse” (178. 11), probably reflecting V.

97. 12 After γυνὴ, Ar adds “is married and” (178. 15). Browne (II, 275) suggests restoring the Vorlage as . . . γυνὴ <ἄνδρα ἔχουσα> or . . . γυνὴ <γεγαμημένη>.

98. 6 δὲ περαίνειν L: περαίνειν οὖν V: Ar , (180. 15), which more likely reflects οὖν; cf. Schmitt, 293 and 382.

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Parallel Lives: Plutarch's *Lives*, Lapo da Castiglionchio the Younger (1405–1438) and the Art of Italian Renaissance Translation¹

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Before his premature death in 1438 of an outbreak of plague in Ferrara, the Florentine humanist and follower of the papal curia Lapo da Castiglionchio the Younger left behind three main bodies of work in Latin, all still either unedited or incompletely edited: his own self-collected letters, a small number of prose treatises, and a sizeable corpus of Greek-to-Latin translations. This paper concerns primarily the last of these three aspects of his work and has as its evidentiary focus two autograph manuscripts that contain *inter alia* final versions of Lapo's Latin translations of Plutarch's *Lives* of Themistocles, Artaxerxes, and Aratus. In addition, however, to studying Lapo's translating techniques, this paper will address chiefly the complexities of motivation surrounding Lapo's choice of dedicatees for these translations. The range of circumstances will demonstrate, I hope, the lengths to which a young, little-known humanist had to go to support himself in an environment where there was as yet no real fixed, institutional place for a newly created discipline.

Lapo and Translation: Patronage, Theory, and Practice

Of the three areas mentioned, Lapo's translations represent the most voluminous part of his oeuvre and in fact it is to his translations that he owes his modern reputation. But why did this young humanist devote so much energy to translating? And why were Plutarch's *Lives* such an important part of his effort?

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R = MS Florence, Biblioteca Riccardiana, 142

F = MS Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale, Magl. XXIII, 126

The answer to these questions lies in the length of the works translated and the place they filled in the patronage process for humanists. The humanist movement was at this time still a world of disenfranchised intellectuals—at least for its lesser lights—who had to carve out a place in society for their still somewhat newly-created intellectual discipline; and Plutarch's *Lives*, individually speaking, were short. In practical terms, this meant that, for a relatively small (if, certainly, concerted) effort, the humanist translator would have a literary production suitable to send to a patron or, more importantly, to a prospective patron. The preponderance of Lapo's translating work consisted of translations of individual *Lives* of Plutarch; the other works he turned into Latin (of Isocrates, Lucian, and Flavius Josephus, *inter alios*) were either of the same size, more or less, or smaller.

As far as the popularity of Plutarch's *Lives* went, the process drove itself. In addition to dealing with relatively short works, the humanists also had a captive and multi-levelled audience. They translated not only for their own relatively small community of fellow scholars interested in the systematic appropriation of Hellas, but also for all those of whom the fast-evolving vogue for moralizing works of historical literature was taking hold, people who were not scholars, but enlightened, informed readers, from cardinals, to well-to-do merchants, to *primi inter pares*, to despots. Plutarch was perfect. As one modern critic of Plutarch's *Themistocles* has put it, "Plutarch is unique in his ability to be inoffensive without being dull."²

The *Lives* opened an historical window to the Greek and Roman past and delighted readers, all with a fashionable but not oppressive moralizing tone centered on the practice of voguish virtues, such as prudence. In a well-known passage Plutarch himself says that the works of biography are a different sort of history. In his biographies he aims at revealing the "signs of the soul," as he calls them (*τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς σημεῖα*), of the subject under consideration, not an exhaustive accounting of facts.³

² F. J. Frost, *Plutarch's Themistocles: A Historical Commentary* (Princeton 1980) 41. Montaigne would write: "But I cannot free myself from Plutarch so easily. He is so all-embracing, so rich that for all occasions, no matter how extravagant a subject you have chosen, he insinuates himself into your work, lending you a hand generous with riches, an unfailing source of adornments . . . I cannot spend the slightest time in his company without walking off with a slice of breast or wing." (From "On Some Lines of Virgil," III:5 in Montaigne, *The Complete Essays*, trans. by M. A. Screech [London 1987] 987.) In the world of the French Renaissance, the translations of Plutarch's *Lives* and *Moralia* into French by Bishop Jacques Amyot—much beloved by Montaigne (see *Essays* II:10)—greatly increased the availability and intellectual currency of Plutarch in general; see R. Aulotte, *Amyot et Plutarque* (Geneva 1967) and R. Sturel, *Jacques Amyot, traducteur des Vies parallèles de Plutarque* (Paris 1908). On Plutarch in the English Renaissance, see M. H. Shackford, *Plutarch in Renaissance England, with Special Reference to Shakespeare* (Wellesley College 1929).

³ Alex. 1. 3. Plutarch also says (*Galb.* 2. 5) that precise narration καθ' ἔκαστα is τῆς πραγματικῆς ιστορίας, thus contrasting πραγματική ιστορία with the business of writing his type of biographies. These are concerned less with the hero's place in history than with his character, and are thus complements to the *Moralia*; see J. R. Hamilton, *Plutarch. Alexander: A Commentary* (Oxford 1969) xxxviii and his source for this observation, A. W. Gomme, A

Moreover, when it came to Greek-to-Latin translations of historical and literary works, the humanists were on safer ground than when they came to philosophical literature. Episodes of polemic such as those which succeeded Leonardo Bruni's translation of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* would have been unthinkable with works of non-philosophical literature. The issue there had centered on the breaking of tradition. Alonso Garcia da Cartagena and others criticized Bruni because he had toyed with the medieval Latin version of the *Ethics*, around which almost two centuries of commentary and debate had taken place, often focussing on the interpretation of specific terms. Bruni had replaced any number of these terms with *res novae* and in the process had changed radically the prospect of analyzing Aristotle.⁴ Plutarch's *Lives*, though, had no such Latin medieval tradition and the humanists, in translating Greek history and oratory, were fully within their own, newly-revived domain of disciplines, the *studia humanitatis*.⁵

Last but not least, translating served the obvious but important pedagogical purpose of learning Greek.⁶ Manuel Chrysoloras, the supremely important Greek teacher of a generation of Florentines in the last years of the fourteenth century, had been faced with a severe problem when he came on commission to Florence from Constantinople: the absolute ignorance of the language on the part of the enthusiastic but Greekless Florentines. Thus, after quickly immersing his students in the most basic elements of vocabulary and grammar, Chrysoloras made translation the next step in solidifying their developing knowledge.⁷ For that purpose, too, the average length of the *Lives* made them ideal candidates when humanists were casting about for whetstones on which to sharpen their knowledge of the Greek language.

Historical Commentary on Thucydides I (Oxford 1945) 54–55; see also J. Buckler, "Plutarch and Autopsy," in *ANRW II* 33.6 (1992) 4788–4830, at 4789–90.

⁴ See E. Garin, "Le traduzioni umanistiche di Aristotele nel secolo XV," *Atti dell'Accademia fiorentina di scienze morali "La Colombaria"* 16 (1951) 55–104, esp. 62–68; A. Birkenmajer, "Der Streit des Alonso von Cartagena mit Leonardo Bruni Aretino," in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* 20.5 (Münster 1922) 129–210; and J. Hankins, "The Ethics Controversy," in *The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni*, ed. by G. Griffiths, J. Hankins, and D. Thompson (Binghamton 1987) 201–08.

⁵ I.e. grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry, and moral philosophy. This is not to suggest that humanists could not disagree *inter se* about translation. On the humanist cultural program, see P. O. Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought and its Sources*, ed. by M. Mooney (New York 1979) and, for recent studies and bibliography, see A. Rabil, Jr. (ed.), *Renaissance Humanism: Foundations, Forms, and Legacy* (Philadelphia 1988). For the medieval Plutarch and the fourteenth-century revival at Avignon, see R. Weiss, "Lo studio di Plutarco nel Trecento," *PP* 8 (1953) 321–42; and G. de Stefano, *La découverte de Plutarque en occident: Aspects de la vie intellectuelle en Avignon au XIV^e siècle*, Memorie dell'Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, classe di scienze morali, storiche, e filologiche, serie 4a, 18 (Turin 1968).

⁶ See R. Sabbadini, *La scuola e gli studi di Guarino Veronese* (Catania 1896) 124.

⁷ G. Cammelli, *I dotti bizantini e le origini dell'umanesimo* (Florence 1941–54) I 82–83. See also the comprehensive study of M. Cortesi, "Umanesimo greco," in *Lo spazio letterario del medioevo. 1: Il medioevo latino III: La ricezione del testo* (Rome 1995) 457–507, esp. 462–70 for intriguing observations on the actual *praxis* of learning Greek.

Many humanists tried their hand at translating some of the *Lives*; as with so much else, the early impetus came from Coluccio Salutati and his circle.⁸ Salutati himself had become interested in an Aragonese version of the *Lives*, and then in anti-pope Benedict XIII's newly-acquired Latin translation of them in 1395.⁹ But it was Jacopo degli Angeli who produced the first known humanist Latin Plutarchan translation, namely, the *Vita Brutii*, in 1400.¹⁰ Others would follow, including Angeli's translation of the *Life of Cicero* a year later,¹¹ and thereafter a spate of translations by Bruni, Guarino, Giustiniani, and Filelfo.¹² By Lapo's day, we can say with confidence that he was operating within an already clearly-established context.

Italian Renaissance ideas of translation in the 1430s were shaped both by the small corpus of theoretical statements on translation then available, and by the exigencies and circumstances surrounding the *praxis* of the art.¹³ The most important views on the subject for humanists of Lapo's generation would have been those of Cicero, St. Jerome, Manuel Chrysoloras, and Leonardo Bruni, all of whom were, in their own way, formative figures for the humanist movement in the first half of the Quattrocento.

The pseudo-Ciceronian text, the *Libellus de optimo genere oratorum*, was known to Lapo's generation of humanists as a genuinely Ciceronian work.¹⁴ "Cicero," then, had stated that he translated the oration of Aeschines against Ctesiphon and Demosthenes' reply to this work not as an *interprete* but rather as an *orator*; he strove for the same sentiments, forms,

⁸ On Salutati and Plutarch, see R. G. Witt, "Salutati and Plutarch," in S. Bertelli and G. Ramakus (eds.), *Essays Presented to Myron P. Gilmore* (Florence 1978) I 335–46.

⁹ Salutati's enthusiasm in the early 1390s for the *Lives* was due in all likelihood to the contact of his disciple Roberto de Rossi with Manuel Chrysoloras in Constantinople; see Witt (previous note) 342 and, more generally, idem, *Hercules at the Crossroads: The Life, Works, and Thought of Coluccio Salutati* (Durham, NC 1983) 302–03; cf. V. R. Giustiniani, "Sulle traduzioni delle 'Vite' di Plutarco nel Quattrocento," *Rinascimento* 1 (1961) 3–62, at 3. Certainly, it is also possible that the seeds of western interest in Plutarch were sown even in the days of the Paduan "prehumanists," as Pace of Ferrara's ownership of a Greek codex of one of Planudes' redactions of the *Moralia* demonstrates. For this possibility see P. A. Stadter, "Planudes, Plutarch, and Pace of Ferrara," *Italia medioevale e umanistica* 16 (1973) 137–62.

¹⁰ Giustiniani (previous note) 37; see there also for a list of manuscripts. It is true that Simone Autumano's 1373 translation of the *De cohibenda ira* (done at the behest of Cardinal Piero Corsini) was the first known Latin translation of a work of Plutarch in the later middle ages, but it is possessed of none of the humanist passion for Latin eloquence. See Weiss (above, note 5) 326 and de Stefano (above, note 5), where (91–129) Autumano's translation is edited.

¹¹ Giustiniani (above, note 9) 38.

¹² Giustiniani (above, note 9) *passim*.

¹³ Many issues surrounding translations of philosophical texts in the Renaissance have been addressed in B. P. Copenhaver, "Translation, Terminology and Style in Philosophical Discourse," in C. B. Schmitt, et al. (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* (Cambridge 1988) 77–110; J. Hankins, *Plato in the Italian Renaissance* (Leiden 1990); and J. Monfasani, *George of Trebizond: A Biography and a Study of his Rhetoric and Logic* (Leiden 1976). See also Cortesi (above, note 7) 470–84.

¹⁴ On its spuriousness, see M. D. Reeve in *Texts and Transmission*, ed. by L. D. Reynolds (Oxford 1983) 100–02 and the literature cited there.

or “figures” and used words suited to Latin custom; in doing so he “did not believe it necessary to translate word for word, but [preserved] the entire manner and force of the language.”¹⁵ Horace would briefly restate this principle in his *Ars poetica*.¹⁶

St. Jerome dealt with similar issues in his *Epistula LVII ad Pammachium de optimo genere interpretandi*, a title inspired by Cicero’s work.¹⁷ There Jerome makes a distinction between translating scripture on the one hand and everything else on the other (5. 2). In scripture “the order of the words is [part of the divine] mystery” and thus there is justification for translating word for word. But in translating other, non-scriptural varieties of Greek literature, Jerome avers that he has given back sense for sense. He cites Cicero as an authority for this practice.¹⁸

In his Greek instruction, Chrysoloras stressed the importance of translating *ad sententiam*. It should be done, he said, in such a way that the Greek *proprietas* went unchanged. Were one to do any differently, one would fulfill the function only of an “expositor,” not of a true *interpres*.¹⁹ The first generation of his students could not always follow his counsel, as the example of Uberto Decembrio’s excessively *ad verbum* translation of Plato’s *Republic* demonstrates,²⁰ but Chrysoloras’ approach did bear fruit in Quattrocento Italy in the work of Leonardo Bruni.

Bruni (who would die in 1444) made an important statement which codified the highest theoretical ideals of translation in the 1420s. In defending his translation of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, a translation

¹⁵ Ps.-Cic. *Opt. gen. or.* 14: “nec converti ut interpres, sed ut orator, sententiis isdem et earum formis tamquam figuris, verbis ad nostram consuetudinem aptis. in quibus non verbum pro verbo necesse habui reddere, sed genus omne verborum vimque servavi.”

¹⁶ Hor. *Ars* 131–34: “publica materies privati juris erit, si / non circa vilem patulumque moraberis orbem, / nec verbo verbum curabis reddere fidus / interpres . . .” Other Ciceronian legacies included the belief in the adequacy of Latin to represent philosophical Greek, the belief that transliterations of Greek words should be avoided if traditional Latin vocabulary was available, and the notion that translations should be comparable on an artistic level, including attention to prose rhythm. See Hankins (above, note 4) 210; see also the references to Cic. *Fin.* 3. 5 and 3. 15; *Acad.* 1. 5, 1. 10, 1. 25; *Leg.* 2. 17; *De Or.* 13–14 and 23 and the literature cited in his n. 35.

¹⁷ Hieronymus, *Liber de optimo genere interpretandi* (*Epist.* 57), with commentary of G. J. M. Bartelink (Leiden 1980); on the title, see 25–26.

¹⁸ 5. 2: “ego enim non solum fateor, sed libera voce profiteor me in interpretatione Graecorum absque scripturis sanctis, ubi et verborum ordo mysterium est, non verbum e verbo, sed sensum exprimere de sensu. habeoque huius rei magistrum Tullium, qui Protagoram Platonis et Oeconomicum Xenophontis et Aeschini et Demosthenis duas contra se orationes pulcherrimas transtulit. quanta in illis praetermisit, quanta addiderit, quanta mutaverit, ut proprietates alterius lingue suis proprietatibus explicaret, non est huius temporis dicere.” Jerome also cites Horace’s *Ars Poetica*; see 5. 5. For Jerome’s reputation within Quattrocento humanism, see E. F. Rice, Jr., *St. Jerome in the Renaissance* (Baltimore and London 1985) 84–99.

¹⁹ “Sed ad sententiam transferre opus esse aiebat hoc pacto, ut ii, qui huiusmodi rebus operam darent, legem sibi ipsis indicerent, ut nullo modo proprietas graeca immutaretur; nam si quispiam, quo luculentius apertiusque suis hominibus loquatur, aliquid graecae proprietatis immutari, eum non interpretis sed exponentis officio uti” (cited in Cortesi [above, note 7] 471).

²⁰ See Cortesi (above, note 7) 471–74, who offers a bibliographically rich discussion of Uberto.

which was at that time under attack, he adopted in his *De interpretatione recta* a number of the ideas of Cicero, Jerome, and Chrysoloras and produced thereby the first more or less systematic statement in the Latin west on the proper aims of translation. He paid attention to the need of the translator to be thoroughly familiar with both languages, to respect prose rhythm when it exists, and to translate so that the final product is comparable in art and elegance to the original. "The best translator," Bruni wrote, "will turn his whole mind, heart and will to his original author, and in a sense transform him, considering how he may express the shape, attitude and stance of his speech, and all his lines and colors."²¹ Given Bruni's towering stature in the evolving humanist community, this treatise must have had a considerable influence, and certainly the young Lapo would have been no exception to this phenomenon.

Lapo, in fact, turned out to be quite a gifted translator, adopting, as we shall see, Brunian theory, and he produced works of very high quality. Lapo's teacher, Francesco Filelfo, was highly impressed with his former student's *latinitas*. About Lapo's translations of Plutarch's *Lives* of Theseus and Romulus Filelfo wrote:

I have read those *Lives* of Theseus and Romulus of Plutarch which you have translated into Latin; over and over, as far as elegance of speech goes, I was delighted by their beauty. For the language flows and glimmers [*fluit enim oratio ac nitet*].²²

And after Lapo was long dead, Filelfo remembered Lapo's abilities with fondness and admiration. The massive 1470 Rome edition of the Latin Plutarch included a series of Plutarch's *Lives* translated into Latin by a number of different humanist translators.²³ In the volume the translations were often misattributed and, in a letter of the 1470s, Filelfo wanted to clear things up. First of all, he denied having ever translated the *Lives* of Theseus and Romulus and gave the credit (incorrectly, as it turns out) to Lapo: "I wouldn't want," Filelfo said, "the work of another to be ascribed to me." Filelfo goes on:

²¹ Hankins' translation; see "On the Correct Way to Translate," in *The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni* (above, note 4) 217–29, at 220; see also "On the Correct Way to Translate" passim as well as Hankins' discussion, at 208–10. For the Latin text, see Leonardo Bruni, *Humanistisch-philosophische Schriften*, ed. by H. Baron (Leipzig 1928) 81–96.

²² "Legi quas in latinum ex Plutarcho Thesei Romulique vitas convertisti, et semel et iterum eisque sum, quantum ad orationis elegantiam attinet, perbelle delectatus. fluit enim oratio ac nitet." (Letter edited in C. De'Rosmini, *Vita di Francesco Filelfo da Tolentino* [Milan 1808] I 131–32, also partially cited in F. P. Luiso, "Studi su l'epistolario e le traduzioni di Lapo da Castiglionchio iuniore," *SIFC* 8 (1899) 205–99, at 268–69 n. 2.) To Filelfo's praise of Lapo's translating style may be added the warm praise of a much more recent Italian critic, Remigio Sabbadini ([above, note 6] 134), on Lapo's translation of Plutarch's *Life of Themistocles*: "Lapo dà prova nel *Temistocle* di saper conciliare la fedeltà della traduzione con l'eleganza; mende di senso non mancano, ma non son tali di guastare l'insieme. La lingua è pura, il periodare slanciato e largo, la frase scelta: un vero modello di stile latino."

²³ L. Hain, *Repertorium bibliographicum* (Stuttgart 1826–38) #13125.

Moreover, my student, Lapo the Florentine, translated those *Lives*; and the index ascribes certain other *Lives* to Antonio Tudertino [Antonio Pacino da Todi]; but even though he too was my student, nevertheless he was far inferior to Lapo in intelligence and learning as well as in his power and facility of speech.²⁴

Turning to Lapo's translations of Plutarch's *Lives*, it will be best to examine the circumstances surrounding three of his translations, those of the *Lives* of Themistocles, Artaxerxes, and Aratus; this will help illustrate Lapo's search for a patron. After this, we shall move on to a brief examination of some features of Lapo's translating technique. First, however, we should get to know Lapo and learn what we can about his views regarding translation.

Lapo would, after his death, acquire a reputation as "maninconico, di natura che rade volte rideva"—"melancholic," that is, "and of a nature that rarely laughed"—according to the gossipy fifteenth-century biographer of famous Florentines, Vespasiano da Bisticci.²⁵ But there were, in his life, reasons for his melancholia, and Lapo does not hesitate to tell us about them, both implicitly and explicitly. His style of discourse is one clue and is reflective of his personality. At first glance this literary *modus procedendi* might seem to be authorial ambiguity; on second glance it might seem to be malicious cleverness; but on final reflection it is really no more than literary window-dressing revealing the conflicts raging in Lapo's melancholic and discontented mind. It is dialectical and self-reflective, and proceeds by a continuous, multi-layered counter-positioning of opinions, and is best illustrated in his final prose work, the *De curiae commodis*, or, *On the Benefits of the Curia*.²⁶

Lapo wrote the *De curiae commodis* in 1438, the year of his death, and at a time in his life when he was particularly dissatisfied with his own position in relation to the papal court. From 1435 on, Lapo had been a

²⁴ "Erant autem primae Thesei et Romuli vitae, quas index ostendebat ab me conversas. at illas ego nunquam sum interpretatus. itaque nolim mihi ascribi laborem alienum. traduxit autem illas auditor noster Lapus florentinus, ut [et?, at?] alias item nonnullas quas vitarum index ascribit Antonio Tudertino; qui etsi ipse quoque auditor fuit meus, erat tamen Lapo longe inferior et ingenio et doctrina et dicendi vi ac facilitate." (Filelfo, *Epistolae* [Venice 1502] 238, cited by Luiso [above, note 22] 261 n. 5.) Later, in a letter of 1465 to Donato Acciaiuoli, Ammanati would judge Antonio Pacino da Todi's translating as having been so bad that it would be better to read nothing at all rather than his translations: "Antonius Tudertinus, quem nости, ita inepte plures traduxit ut nullas legere praestet quam illas." He goes on to say that the translations of Bruni, Francesco Barbaro, and Acciaiuoli himself are laudable; he does not, however, include Lapo in his praises. See the letter in Pius II, *Commentarii rerum memorabilium . . . quibus accedunt Jacobi Picolominei Rerum gestarum sui temporis . . . commentarii . . . eiusdemque Epistolae* (Frankfurt 1614) 539; cited in Giustiniani (above, note 9) 8 n. 2.

²⁵ Vespasiano da Bisticci, *Le vite*, ed. by A. Greco (Florence 1970) I 582.

²⁶ There is a critical edition and annotated English translation of this work in C. S. Celenza, *Renaissance Humanism and the Papal Curia: Lapo da Castiglionchio the Younger's De curiae commodis* (forthcoming, University of Michigan Press); the following brief discussion relies on the more extensive discussion of the dialogue there.

hanger-on of the curia, having had a succession of positions in the service of various prelates. In the summer of 1438, when he wrote this work, he clearly believed—and we can see this from his letters—that he should have earned by this point a more permanent position, appropriate to his learning, and was probably quite serious when he had his interlocutors tell us that he was thinking of leaving the curia. He could have been thinking only of the post of apostolic secretary, which would have been, pragmatically speaking, the only major curial post suitable for a humanist.²⁷

The treatise, dedicated to Francesco Condulmer, the nephew of then Pope Eugenius IV, reflects these tensions, since often, when Lapo and Angelo, the two interlocutors of the dialogue, enumerate the curia's "benefits," they transmit by implication rather more information about its moral and sapiential disadvantages. Yet, on the other hand, there is also a sincere respect, awe almost, for the grandness of the curia, its internationalism, and the various opportunities it offers its denizens. The dialogue has been notoriously difficult to interpret and seems often to prevaricate. A close examination of this work reveals, however, that Lapo wrote as a well-informed but liminal figure in the socio-cultural environment of the papal curia, as an outsider who desired to become a full-fledged insider. The work, in fact, is not the cleverly couched parting shot of a fed-up hanger-on; it is instead Lapo's last-ditch, highly critical but nonetheless sincere attempt to find a patron who would allow him to join a cultural ambient at which he marvelled but from which he felt himself unjustly excluded. The circumstances surrounding his translations—their dedications, their content—all of them earlier than the *De curiae commodis*, reflect these pressures. They reflect, that is, Lapo's frustrating, continuous search for a permanent patron, one that would afford him the *otium*, the intellectual leisure, necessary to pursue his humanistic studies fully and comfortably. As we turn to the translations, our first step will be to pause briefly and take note of Lapo's ideas about the enterprise and operation of translation.

Lapo produced no grandiloquent theoretical statements on translation, but he did have some interesting thoughts on the problem. First, he justifiably considered himself in good company, busying himself with Greek-to-Latin translation. In making this step to learn Greek well enough to be able to translate, he joined an elite which was comparatively small, if compared to the growing humanist rank and file. In a preface (to the *Lives* of Theseus and Romulus) directed to Cardinal Prospero Colonna, Lapo put himself in the company of Francesco Filelfo, Leonardo Bruni, Giovanni Aurispa, Guarino da Verona, and Francesco Barbaro. He also conceded there that the praise owed to the translator was not on the same level as that

²⁷ Still, it was a long shot. Of the eighty-eight apostolic secretaries appointed in the seventy years following Martin V's 1417 accession, only about ten were humanists who came from undistinguished families. See P. Partner, *The Pope's Men: The Papal Civil Service in the Renaissance* (Oxford 1990) 15.

owed to the original author, but he believed that the two seemed nonetheless to be similar in spirit and will.²⁸

For the translations under discussion here, the best sources are two autograph manuscripts: Florence, Biblioteca Riccardiana 142 (= R) and Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale, Magl. XXIII, 126 (= F). They shed light on Lapo's technique as a translator, since they are both final copy-books, of a sort, in which we can observe him at work. Oftentimes he has in these works large, scratched-out sections, which, however, are still visible to the reader. In addition, we are treated in both manuscripts to sections of Greek texts in the margins, all in Lapo's own hand.²⁹ There we can see Lapo directly wrestling with the Greek, trying one translation, scrapping it, and moving to another. We have the unparalleled opportunity, codicologically speaking, of observing a humanist at work.³⁰

²⁸ Ed. Luiso (above, note 22) 269–70: “quamobrem cum multa iam alia, mea industria et labore, de graecis translata a nostris hominibus legerentur, perindignum esse statui, si non Plutarchi ac reliquorum imitatione in hoc quoque genere quaedam meis litteris extarent, praesertim cum hoc ipsum ab eloquentissimo viro Francesco Philelpho praeceptore meo, Leonardo Aretino, Johanne Aurispa, Guarino Veronensi, Francesco Barbaro ceterisque huius aetatis clarissimis viris factitatum esset. in quo, si non par laus debetur scriptori et interpreti, tamen animo similes et voluntate fuisse videbuntur.”

²⁹ For Lapo's Greek hand, see the Greek *Schriftprobe* of Lapo in P. Eleuteri and P. Canart, “Lapo da Castiglionchio il Giovane (c. 1406–1438),” no. LXXIV in their *Scrittura greca nell'unanimo italiano* (Milan 1991). See also P. Eleuteri, “Francesco Filelfo copista,” in D. Harlfinger and G. Prato (eds.), *Paleografia e codicologia greca: Atti del II Colloquio internazionale* (Berlino–Wolfenbüttel, 17–21 ottobre 1983) (Alessandria 1991) 1 163–79, esp. 166.

³⁰ The lack of scholarly attention to Lapo's translating techniques was pointed out by Massimo Miglio in his “Una lettera di Lapo da Castiglionchio il Giovane a Flavio Biondo: Storia e storiografia nel Quattrocento,” in *HumLov* 23 (1974) 1–30, at 5: “... finora non si è posta attenzione alla sua maniera di lavoro, come traduttore, anche se si continua a ripetere che nel primo quattrocento fu tra i migliori, se non il migliore.” Fubini suggests the possibility of a systematic plan of translation on Lapo's part; this is based on Fubini's assessment of Lapo's conviction of the superiority of Greek to Latin culture and promises of future translations given in his various dedications. See R. Fubini, “Castiglionchio, Lapo da, detto il Giovane,” in *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani* XXII (Rome 1979) 44–51, at 50. For a start on the translations, see K. Müllner, “Zur humanistischen Übersetzungs literatur,” *WS* 23 (1901) 276–99 (includes a short general discussion [276–79] and editions of Lapo's translation, with preface to Prospero Colonna, of Isocrates' *Oratio ad Demonicum* [280–89] and Guarino's translation, with preface to Leonello D'Este, of Isocrates' *Oratio ad Nicoclem* [289–99]; the Lapo edition is based on MS Florence, Bibl. Laurenz., cod. 34, plut. 90 sup., ff. 193–95 and MS Vienna, Nationalbibliothek, cod. 256, ff. 1–11); idem, “Zur humanistischen Übersetzungs literatur: Fortsetzung,” *WS* 24 (1902) 216–30 (an edition of Lapo's translation, with preface to Franciscus Patavinus, of Theophrastus' *De impressionibus*, based on MS Florence, Bibl. Laurenz., cod. 13, plut. 89 inf., ff. 153–62^v and MS Vienna, Nationalbibliothek, cod. 199, ff. 4–16^v); and idem, “Zur humanistischen Übersetzungs literatur: Schluß,” *WS* 25 (1903) 110–26 (an edition of Lapo's translation, with preface to Gaspar Villanovaensis Tudertinus, of Xenophon's *Praefectus equitum*, based on MS Vienna, Nationalbibliothek, cod. 178, ff. 37–55^v, MS Florence, Bibl. Laurenz., 42, plut. 76, ff. 107^v–33, and Bibl. Laurenz., 13, plut. 89 inf., ff. 82–95^v); L. G. Rosa, *La fede nella “Paideia”: Aspetti della fortuna europea di Isocrate nei secoli XV e XVI* (Rome 1984) 32–35 et passim; A. Carlini, “Appunti sulle traduzioni latine di Isocrate di Lapo da Castiglionchio,” *SCO* 19–20 (1970–71) 302–09 (in this article Carlini discusses the Greek codices Lapo may have used for his translations of Isocrates' *Ad Demonicum*, *Ad Nicoclem*, and *Nicocles*); and G. Resta, *Le epitomi di Plutarco nel Quattrocento*, *Miscellanea erudita* 5 (Padua 1962).

Three Episodes

Of the three *Lives* to be examined here, those of Themistocles, Artaxerxes, and Aratus, the *Life of Themistocles* is a convenient starting point, since it is first chronologically, having been finished by Lapo probably sometime in 1435.³¹ Thus the translation of the *Life of Themistocles* finds Lapo at a fairly early point in his career as a translator and humanist, before he had committed himself to a full-time job search at the papal curia and was instead casting about for patronage in his *patria*, Florence. At the outset it should be noted that it is obvious from various bits of internal data in both manuscripts under consideration that Lapo's usual practice was to translate a work first and write the preface later.³² In this case, the preface to Cosimo de' Medici is remarkably clean and shows very few changes on Lapo's part, suggesting that Lapo either had largely planned what he wanted to say or, more probably, had worked on an earlier draft somewhere else. We had best begin with an historical discussion, though, concerning the circumstances surrounding Lapo's dedication of this work to Cosimo, since they are somewhat unusual.

Why, that is, did Lapo decide to dedicate this work to Cosimo? After all, Lapo had been in all practicality cut off from Medici patronage after his mentor, the brilliant but contentious Francesco Filelfo, himself ran afoul of the Medici after a bitter and oft-studied controversy at the University of Florence.³³ When the dust had settled and Cosimo de' Medici had returned from exile in 1434, Filelfo found it prudent to relocate to Siena. It was just after this point in the story, in 1435, when Lapo decided to dedicate the *Life of Themistocles* to Cosimo.³⁴ How can this seemingly odd choice be explained?

The *Life of Themistocles* contains a number of parallels to both positive and negative perceptions of Cosimo in the Florence of the early 1430s. Plutarch, in the Thucydidean tradition (as opposed, one might say, to the Herodotean tradition), depicts Themistocles as one who could skillfully manipulate popular opinion to achieve the ends of his own carefully-aimed ambitions (thus accentuating Themistocles' *pleonexia*—his ambition-

³¹ References to the *Lives* are to the Teubner edition by K. Ziegler, *Plutarchi vitae parallelae* (Leipzig 1960–80). For the chronology of Lapo's translation, see Luiso (above, note 22) 255–56.

³² Lapo tells us as much in his dedication to Cardinal Cesarini of the *Life of Aratus* (here in Appendix II) 1: "After I had translated into Latin Plutarch's account of the peacetime affairs and military deeds of the most famous leader Aratus the Sicyonian, I determined—in line with my customary practice—to send it to some prince . . ." In addition, in both F and R, Lapo leaves himself a predetermined number of pages in the book for the preface, sometimes filling them, sometimes not.

³³ On Filelfo, see below (note 38).

³⁴ Lapo recognizes at the end of his preface that his work might indeed be *minus gratus* to Cosimo but suggests that, even if this is the case, Cosimo could profitably read the *Life of Themistocles*. See the preface (here in Appendix I), at 29.

oriented greediness) but who was also a fundamentally sound source of good counsel (thus accentuating his *euboulia*).³⁵

The Medici—and Cosimo in the eyes of his detractors was no exception—had had a populist reputation at least since the late 1370s, when Salvestro de' Medici, then a *gonfaloniere*, acted in a manner consistent with the goals of the rebelling wool-carders, the Ciompi.³⁶ Indeed it is a commonplace among historians of Florence that the abiding genius of the Medici politicians was that they were able tenuously to maintain their reputation as populists, even as the oligarchical realities of Quattrocento Florence were taking shape. Yet when Cosimo was exiled by the Albizzi-controlled Signoria in 1434, he was blamed, among many other things, for secretly nourishing the ambition to gain more power than was due any citizen of a republic.³⁷

In addition, after Cosimo returned, he was instrumental in exiling the Albizzi and creating a climate hostile to Medici opponents. Among those forced to leave was Francesco Filelfo, Lapo's teacher.³⁸ In the *Life of Themistocles*, Plutarch describes the manner in which Themistocles, making himself popular in the eyes of the public, effected the ostracism of Aristides by skillfully manipulating factional support (5. 7). Later in the *Life* we learn that Themistocles, seeing the prudence of allowing Aristides back into the game, introduced a bill, a *ψήφισμα*, allowing all exiles to return home and devote their services to Hellas (11. 1).

Analogies with the Quattrocento political system of the "Athens on the Arno" could certainly be drawn and Lapo's dedication of the treatise to Cosimo could be interpreted in many ways. But without delving too deeply into the realm of speculation, could Lapo perhaps, in directing this *Life* to Cosimo's attention, have been hinting that Cosimo call Filelfo (and by extension Lapo himself) into the fold of Medici patronage? Of course, another reading is also possible: that Lapo wished to show Cosimo an honorable ancient figure, Themistocles, who had, like Cosimo, suffered exile, and maintained all the while his integrity. Cosimo can be seen as

³⁵ Cf. Frost (above, note 2) 3–39.

³⁶ Cf. D. Kent, *The Rise of the Medici: Faction in Florence, 1426–1434* (Oxford 1978) 221.

³⁷ Cf. the act of the Signoria expelling Cosimo in A. Fabroni, *Magni Cosmi Medicei Vita* (Pisa 1788–89) II 75–79; J. Hankins, "Cosimo de'Medici as a Patron of Humanistic Literature," in F. Ames-Lewis (ed.), *Cosimo "il Vecchio" de'Medici, 1389–1464* (Oxford 1992) 69–94, at 86 n. 58; and Kent (previous note) 245–46.

³⁸ After his Florentine period came to its end with Cosimo's return, Filelfo moved to Siena. He was there until 1439. Thereafter he went on to become perhaps the single dominant personality in the humanist culture of Milan. Only in 1481 was he reconciled to the Medici, dying in Florence in July of that year. See in general A. Rabil, Jr., "Humanism in Milan," in *Renaissance Humanism: Foundations, Forms, and Legacy*, ed. by A. Rabil, Jr. (Philadelphia 1988) III 235–63, at 249–52. For Filelfo's life, see C. de' Rosmini, *Vita di Francesco Filelfo da Tolentino* (Milan 1808); and D. Robin, *Filelfo in Milan: 1451–1477* (Princeton 1991); eadem, "A Reassessment of the Character of Francesco Filelfo (1398–1481)," *Renaissance Quarterly* 36 (1983) 202–24. On Milanese culture in the second half of the fifteenth century, see E. Garin "L'età sforzesca dal 1450 al 1500," in *Storia di Milano* (Milan 1955–56) VII.4 540–97.

even more honorable, in a way, since he came back to Florence whereas Themistocles never did come back to Athens.³⁹ Given Lapo's style of discourse, one is compelled to admit that both interpretations are possible, and not mutually exclusive.

There are other suggestive resonances present in the *Life of Themistocles*. Perhaps the most notable of these is that along with the often unadorned bluntness of Plutarch's assessment of Themistocles' personality, there is a sincere admiration for the more positive attributes of Themistocles' character, including, as mentioned above, his gift for *euboulia*, sound judgment. Plutarch counts as Themistocles' greatest achievement his success in putting an end to the Hellenic wars and uniting Hellas against her foreign enemies (6. 4–5 and 7. 4). Although Lapo of course died long before the 1454 Peace of Lodi (which did more or less ensure stability on the Italian peninsula until 1494 and which Cosimo was instrumental in engineering), Lapo's choice of the *Life of Themistocles* for Cosimo was eerily prophetic as it hit the nail squarely on the head when it came to Cosimo's diplomatic gifts. Lapo's dedication of the *Life of Themistocles* to Cosimo, then, in a larger sense, shows the ideological texts and subtexts which could be attached to an act as seemingly conflict-neutral as translation.⁴⁰

In December of 1437 we find Lapo in Bologna, teaching the nephews and later managing the household of Giacomo Venier, a *clericus camerae*, or cleric of the papal chamber.⁴¹ During this period, and certainly toward the end of his stay at the house of Venier, Lapo must have been thinking of making international, specifically English, contacts. It was not unknown among humanists in the 1430s that Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, was willing in various ways to patronize Italian humanists.⁴² Indeed, it was in 1437 that Leonardo Bruni completed his translation of Aristotle's *Politics* for the Duke.⁴³ Tito Livio Frulovisi (by late 1436 or early 1437) and Antonio Beccaria (by October 1438 at the latest) had actually been able to find work in England with the Duke.⁴⁴

³⁹ See Lapo's preface to Cosimo (here in Appendix I), at 23–24. Themistocles, rather than betraying the Hellenes when asked by the Persian king to work actively against them, committed suicide (*Them.* 31. 5–7).

⁴⁰ The attempt to win patronage from Cosimo was ultimately unsuccessful, and Lapo would later turn his back on Cosimo when the Medici ruler came to Ferrara in 1438; see Fubini (above, note 30) 46.

⁴¹ Fubini (above, note 30) 48.

⁴² See A. Sammut, *Unfredo Duca di Gloucester e gli umanisti italiani*, Umanesimo 4 (Padua 1981); R. Weiss, *Humanism in England During the Fifteenth Century*, second ed. (Oxford 1957) esp. chapters III and IV on Humphrey; still useful is K. H. Vickers, *Humphrey Duke of Gloucester* (London 1907).

⁴³ Weiss (previous note) 46–49. The association of Bruni and Humphrey would not last long and did not bloom into a lengthy patron-client relationship. With the translation of the *Politics*, the story came to an end (*ibid.*).

⁴⁴ See R. Sabbadini, "Tito Livio Frulovisio: Umanista del sec. XV," in *Giornale storico della letteratura italiana* 103 (1934) 55–81; see also the edition of Tito Livio's works, *T. Livii de Frulovisi de Ferraria Opera hactenus inedita*, ed. by C. W. Previté-Orton (Cambridge

Lapo heard of the Duke's generosity in 1437 in Bologna. This was due to the praises of the Duke by Zanone da Castiglione, the Bishop of Bayeux since 1432, who was signally impressed by the Duke's patronage.⁴⁵ Directly encouraged by Zanone, and perhaps indirectly inspired by Bruni's slight contact with the Duke, Lapo was certainly aware of the Duke's leanings toward Italian humanists. Sometime during the year 1437 Lapo sent the Duke as samples of his work the *Comparatio inter rem militarem et studia litterarum* together with some translations of Isocrates.⁴⁶ Then, in December 1437, Lapo, still in Bologna, put the finishing touches on his translation of Plutarch's *Life of Artaxerxes*, which he dedicated to the Duke.⁴⁷

The preface is illustrative, if only in its typicality. Lapo begins by telling the Duke how bishop Zanone is accustomed to praise the Duke whenever Lapo and Zanone have come into conversation.⁴⁸ Lapo goes on to recount a conversation they had about the deeds and virtues of princes of antiquity, something, Lapo tells us, that often happens. They wound up, unsurprisingly, praising the deeds and virtues of the ancients and deplored the horrible condition and fortune of the modern age. Things are so bad that not only in princes but also among private men any vestige of the discipline of the ancients is lost. And even if someone is outstanding in one type of virtue, nevertheless one finds in him a whole host of vices. Thus among their own, i.e., among Italians, there is no prince who can be compared to the ancients (we see here, perhaps, Lapo appealing to the prince's British pride).

Both of them agreed on these things, but then Zanone brought up Duke Humphrey as an exception. He has all the qualities one needs, perfectly and absolutely, to be the wisest of men, the most famous of princes, and the greatest leader in war. And it is not only that the prince practices all the virtues, it is that he incites others to virtue. The prince has waged and won wars all over, has brought home impressive trophies and spoils, and in so doing has guided not only the flourishing glory of England but has also brought under his sway many cities and regions. The reputation of his name has thus spread to every corner of the west, *usque occidentis terminos*.

1932), cited in Sabbadini 56; on the dramas, see W. Ludwig, *Schriften zur neulateinischen Literatur*, ed. by L. Braun (Munich 1989) 70–97. For Beccaria, in addition to Weiss (above, note 42) ad indicem, see idem, "Per la biografia di Antonio Beccaria in Inghilterra," *Giornale storico della letteratura italiana* 110 (1937) 344–46. The presence of Frulovisi and Beccaria in England was owed largely to the intervention of Piero del Monte: Weiss, "Per la biografia."

⁴⁵ See Weiss (above, note 42) 49–50 and the literature cited there; Zanone was a student of the famous pedagogue Gasparino Barzizza, on whom see R. G. G. Mercer, *The Teaching of Gasparino Barzizza* (London 1979) and G. Martellotti, "Barzizza, Gasparino," in *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani* VII (Rome 1965) 34–39.

⁴⁶ Weiss (above, note 42) 50–51.

⁴⁷ The preface is edited from F, fols. 1–2^v in Sammut (above, note 42) 168–71.

⁴⁸ "Zanonus . . . mecum in colloquium veniens multa mihi de te narrare solitus est."

Yet, in addition to possessing military virtues, the prince also possesses the virtues of gentleness and clemency and, here's the rub, *liberalitas* and *beneficentia* in giving out money and helping those without wealth. The prince also has all the attributes of an ideal prince, which Lapo would outline about nine months later in his *De curiae commodis*. And on top of all this, finally, the prince is interested in the humanities, *in iis [studiis] quae vocantur humanitatis.*

Beyond the preface, however, there is the salient fact that, of Plutarch's *Lives*, the *Life of Artaxerxes* is the only one depicting the life of neither a Roman nor a Greek. And Lapo specifically points to Humphrey's status as someone who is not one of "ours"—not an Italian, that is—as we have seen in the analysis of the preface. In addition, the flattery a propos the Duke's military exploits in Lapo's preface matches up well with Plutarch's accounts of Artaxerxes' military derring-do, as Artaxerxes' heroism in suppressing the rebellion of Cyrus and then the Spartans is recounted in graphic detail in the *Life*.⁴⁹ Finally, Plutarch depicts Artaxerxes as having been weakened politically by being slavishly devoted to the whims of his mother and of his wife. The Duke, too, was known to have had marital problems and indeed wound up divorcing his first wife, the spirited Jacqueline of Hainault.⁵⁰ Again, then, various aspects of the content of the translated material turn out to be important, and show, perhaps, Lapo reading (and even commenting on) contemporary history with the aid of the classics.

No immediate success, however, followed this attempt to win the Duke's patronage and it cannot be said for certain that Lapo attracted the prince's attention.⁵¹ It is difficult to say whether Lapo would have had success; unfortunately Lapo caught the Duke at the twilight of his political power, and in any case Lapo himself would die about nine months after sending this material off to the Duke.

Lapo opens a window for us on early modern patronage in his dedication to his translation of Plutarch's *Life of Aratus*, directed to Cardinal Giuliano Cesarini. He writes that it is "in line with [his] customary practice" after he finishes a work of translation to send it "to some prince." Certain conditions attending Lapo's translation of the *Life of Aratus*, in fact, can give us a lens through which to view the mechanisms of patronage. But to understand this mechanism fully some background is necessary.

In 1431 Cardinal Giuliano Cesarini had assumed the leading role in the Council of Basel and in the ensuing years he and Pope Eugenius IV came

⁴⁹ E.g. *Artax.* 8–13.

⁵⁰ Favoring instead one of her ladies-in-waiting, Eleanor Cobham; see Vickers (above, note 42) 165.

⁵¹ There is no record of a correspondence between the two men, although the fact that Lapo sent along the *Life of Artaxerxes* almost a year after sending the Duke his first literary offering (the *Comparatio*, et al.) suggests that Lapo somehow considered himself encouraged. See Vickers (above, note 42) 374 and Sammut (above, note 42) 27.

increasingly to find themselves on opposite sides of the conciliarism issue.⁵² Cesarini favored the conciliarist position, that is that all authority in the church with respect to matters of faith, heresy, and reform, derived from a properly convoked council and that all Christians, including the Pope, were subject to this absolute, conciliar authority.⁵³ The Pope, naturally enough, was no enthusiast of the conciliarist position, and Cesarini and Eugenius would only be reconciled in 1438, at the start of the Council of Ferrara–Florence.

Lapo's first appeal to Cesarini for support occurred in a letter of 1436, two years before the writing of the *De curiae commodis*.⁵⁴ His first petition to Cesarini, then, was made at a time when the Cardinal was still at loggerheads with Pope Eugenius IV. Yet two years later, with the beginning of the Council at Ferrara and the arrival of the Greeks, Cesarini had reconciled himself to the papacy.⁵⁵ Indeed, at the Council he would be one of the most important actors in the Latin cast of characters.

After the Council was successfully underway in the summer of 1438 and Cesarini was obviously actively working for papal interests, Lapo chose to dedicate his translation of Plutarch's *Life of Aratus* to Cardinal Cesarini.⁵⁶ The translation itself was a work which he had completed in October of 1437.⁵⁷ He waited, therefore, almost a year to choose a dedicatee, if Lapo's own dating in our autograph manuscript can be trusted.⁵⁸ It might seem that

⁵² See J. Gill, *The Council of Florence* (Cambridge 1959); idem, *Personalities of the Council of Florence* (Oxford 1964); K. A. Fink, "Eugene IV and the Council of Basel–Ferrara–Florence," in H. Jedin (ed.), *Handbook of Church History IV* (New York 1970) 473–87 (the *Handbook* originally appeared in German [Freiburg im Breisgau 1968]); and, for further bibliography on the council, P. Viti, "Leonardo Bruni e il concilio del 1439," in P. Viti (ed.), *Firenze e il concilio del 1439*, Biblioteca storica toscana 29 (Florence 1994) II 509–75, at 510 n. 3. For an interesting examination of the roles and status of cardinals at the Council, see C. Bianca, "I cardinali al concilio di Firenze," in *Firenze e il concilio I 147–73*.

⁵³ The Council of Basel renewed aspects of Constance's *Haec sancta* and *Frequens*, including the provisions concerning the subordination of all authority, including papal authority, to conciliar authority. See J. W. Stieber, *Pope Eugenius IV, The Council of Basel, and the Secular and Ecclesiastical Authorities in the Empire: The Conflict over Supreme Authority and Power in the Church* (Leiden 1978) 10–57.

⁵⁴ For the dating, see Fubini (above, note 30) 48.

⁵⁵ The first, principal Greek delegation arrived in Ferrara on 4 March 1438: Gill, *Personalities* (above, note 52) 4.

⁵⁶ On 15 July 1438, precisely; see F, f. 18 (Luiso [above, note 22] 275 n. 3 erroneously reports f. 19).

⁵⁷ This dating is possible because of Lapo's Greek *explicit* formula on f. 46 of F, where the translation itself ends (ed. Luiso [above, note 22] 276 n. 2).

⁵⁸ Lapo alludes to an unspecified period of deliberation in choosing a dedicatee in his preface to the translation; see the preface (here in Appendix II), at 1: "After I had translated into Latin Plutarch's account of the peacetime affairs and military deeds of the most famous leader Aratus of Sicyon, I determined—in line with my customary practice—to send it to some prince. For quite a while I was in doubt and was wondering to which prince I would like most of all to dedicate this little lamplight work of mine. But both in terms of understanding, prudence, greatness, integrity, and constancy and in terms of the deeds of war and military glory, nobody really occurred to me whose life seemed to agree with the life of Aratus." Lapo goes on to say that Aratus appeared to him in a dream; after conversing with Aratus in the dream and later considering the dream encounter (as well as some choice words from a sermon

his choice to appeal to Cesarini two years earlier had been somewhat unwise, given the opposition which existed at that time between Cesarini and the papacy. But one of Lapo's favorite virtues, prudence, must have guided him in 1438 in choosing Cesarini as his dedicatee, secure in the knowledge that everybody was then on the same side.⁵⁹ Yet, even here, Lapo's choice of material is not as simple as it might seem.

Once again, the substance of the *Life* itself comes into relief. How could it not, when Plutarch describes Aratus as a natural statesman and a great hater of tyrants who "seems to have proved not so much a strict friend, as a considerate and mild enemy, changing his ground in either direction according to the exigencies of the state, loving concord between nations, community of cities, and unanimity of council and assembly beyond all other blessings" (*Plut. Arat.* 10. 2; Perrin trans.). Elsewhere Plutarch describes Aratus as being heroic without regard to personal gain, as he leads the rag-tag expedition capturing the citadel of Acrocorinth (*Arat.* 18–24). Plutarch goes so far as to express wonder at Aratus' selfless magnanimity directed toward the common good (19. 4).

Lapo could not have overlooked the relevance of these descriptions of Aratus' character to the circumstances of Cesarini's own life. Cesarini was universally admired for his integrity, even as he opposed the most powerful ruler in Christendom. And he never really gave up his conciliatorist position, even as he worked side by side with Pope Eugenius in the Council of Ferrara–Florence.⁶⁰ Indeed Lapo, uncharacteristically, heavily stresses both of the above-mentioned passages in the margins of our autograph final copy-book, almost as if lightbulbs were going on in his head as he translated them or reviewed the already translated passages.⁶¹ And in the dedicatory preface to his translation of the *Life of Aratus* Lapo finds a way to appeal to Cesarini's continued sense of mission and concern over the plight of the church, a subject on which Lapo himself was writing contemporaneously, often using much of the same terminology as he does here:

[33] But if in matters of war you are not like Aratus, certainly you are someone who has zealously engaged yourself in better activities from the time of your youth. Even so, Aratus, armed and oppressed by tyrants, did not benefit Greece more than you, clad, so to speak, in the *toga virilis* and weakened by the counsel of the wicked, have benefited the suffering Roman church; for so many years now you have tried, against its enemies, to watch over the church's status and worth, and at no small risk to

of Ambrogio Traversari), Lapo decided on Cesarini as a dedicatee (see Appendix II, *passim*). Lapo received the Greek codex in which the *Life of Aratus* was contained from Ambrogio Traversari; see L. Mehus, *Historia litteraria florentina* (Florence 1769; repr. with introduction by E. Kessler, Munich 1968) 8.

⁵⁹ For Lapo's feelings about the virtue of prudence, see his *De curiae commodis*, in Celenna (above, note 26) sec. IV.

⁶⁰ Cf. Gill, *Personalities* (above, note 52) 99 and Vespasiano's *Life of the Cardinal*, in ed. Greco (above, note 25) I 137–58.

⁶¹ F, fol. 25. See Figure 1 (opposite).

de tranquilla pax forte: adhuc prudenti aliquo duxeris
 uteretur: qui pax graviter potest: ne portentis:
 ut ea diximus ut minimusque obtemperet: & ex una
 iustitia: ut: que liceat statu temporum & postras: clara
 ac nobilis similitudinem efficeret: nec fratres viribus sed eis
 filio: non cunctis pectoribus sed parvula & abscondita.
 non faciem modo cui cunctisibus: potestibus: tyrannibus
 undique resurgens libertatem retinuerit: ueritatem
 atque: gravorum plurimos in liberae uindicari: incolamque
 servaret: Fuit autem Aratus naturae ciuilis admodum
 placata: semper ergo: ardua spartans: publicis & rebus: q.
 impetuosa: rorosior: diligenterq.: Loyalissimus: hostis
 tyrranicis nominis Amicitias: aequalitatis: ex reg. p.
 ualente: gerbat. Ex quo non uideatur tam diligenter
 amicos facuisse: q. omnes & placibiles inimici sunt.
 ut: per pasturantem.
 trax: mutatione: oportunitatis ac temporis seruirent.
 Vna ergo: eadem & omnium genitrum: ruricidii: col-
 legy: theatri: uxerat: illius: mollies: pter: q. bonorum
 uiorium: amicum: esse. Manifesto: nesci: mibella: apta:
 & clementibus: obediens: remissi: & diffidentis: animis:
 in diffundendo: sua: facta: occultando: cum: in rapido: clam:
 urbibus: tyrranicisque: oppendens: efficacissimus: formidissimus:
 conflixerit. Quare: cum: inmultis: eximis: partibus: rem: optime:
 ductis: suo: administrasset: hanc: pauciora: que: factu: pessi:
 bili: erant: offensionis: metu: relasse: uidetur. Et: cum:
 non: fere: modo: quidam: proiectis: ac: pspicatis: sive:
 uisus: inertiis: deficationes: renuntiatus: q. humoris: gravis:
 sit: oritur. &: uero: comparem: ferre: non: potest. lumini:
 bus: capientibus: sed: hominis: auctor: ergo: ac: prudenter: ma:
 nari: nefis: impudicis: q. midulis: rorberet: nec: sibi: ipsi: cossete: Nota: optimis: lucis: inge:
nientia.
Que: cum: me: factu: uedam:
sive: ex: p: pane:
cui: in: nati: uas: est: -: u-

Figure 1

MS Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale, Magl. XXIII, 126 (= F), fol. 25.

yourself. [34] Because of this, I think you have risen to this highest of ranks most deservedly (and thus in the company of the few), and that you have pursued this not with foreign wealth but by your own powers. Because of those very same powers I predict I know not what for the future.⁶²

Without explicitly condoning Cesarini's conciliarism, Lapo does applaud his continued efforts at church reform, arguing that Cesarini has benefited the church as much as Aratus benefited Greece—Aratus, the real engineer of a unified Achaean league and stalwart opponent of Macedonian hegemony.⁶³

One could even, were one so inclined, read some subversiveness into the situation. Plutarch reports the early episode in Aratus' career when he decided to overthrow Nicocles the tyrant of Sicyon, by his own efforts (*ἔγνω δι' αὐτοῦ καταλύειν τὸ τύραννον* [4. 3], or, as Lapo translates [f. 22], *statuit per se ipsum tyrannum opprimere*).⁶⁴ Might this, along with the subtleties of the preface, be a subliminal suggestion to Cesarini, insinuating what he might be able to do now that he is back with the Roman curia? Yet even stating the question this explicitly goes too far. What is important about these episodes is the manner in which messages are transmitted: psychological buttons are pushed without anything ever being made explicit. It is a mode of discourse, of thought, which is the complete antithesis of *apodeixis*.⁶⁵

Lapo and the Practice of Translation

There are various questions which come into relief when examining manuscripts and texts of this sort. What were the versions of the Greek texts Lapo was using? Since Lapo sometimes provides us with snippets of Greek, can we ascertain whether his text resembles any of the known redactions in the traditional stemmata of the work under consideration? The process of translation and the choices inherent in that process also come into play. In various ways, that is, we can observe the art of Renaissance

⁶² See Appendix II.

⁶³ Nor is this to suggest that Lapo himself at this time was a partisan of the conciliarist position; almost contemporaneously with this preface, he would write in punning fashion in the *De curiae commodis* that the Pope "has been given power not by human counsel but in a divine fashion"—a formulation where the pun has the same valence in Latin (*consilium/concilium*) as it has in English (counsel/council); of course, the treatise was dedicated to Francesco Condulmaro, the nephew of Pope Eugenius. See Celenga (above, note 26) III 22.

⁶⁴ This was due to a lack of aid from Egypt, in the person of Ptolemy, on the one hand, and from Macedon, in the person of Antigonus, on the other.

⁶⁵ Cf. R. G. Witt's "tertiary rhetoric," in his "Medieval Italian Culture and the Origins of Humanism as a Stylistic Ideal," in Rabil, *Renaissance Humanism* (above, note 38) I 29–70, at 32. This is Witt's suggested addition to George Kennedy's distinction between "primary" and "secondary" rhetoric. For these, see G. A. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times* (Chapel Hill 1980) 4 f.

translation. The intention of this final section, then, is to provide a brief selection of examples illustrating some of these issues. It makes no pretension to completeness and is highly impressionistic.

In order to gain comparative perspective, attention will also be given to another, later Renaissance translator who dealt with the same passages, the sixteenth-century Dutch Hellenist Hermann Cruser (1510–1575).⁶⁶ One thing that will emerge is that Sabbadini's provisional conclusion about Lapo's translating style was certainly correct: Lapo did know well how to reconcile a concern for Latin elegance with the literal, lexical meaning of the Greek.⁶⁷ Without being overliteral, Lapo does follow Bruni's advice:

The translator should be carried away by the power of the original's style. He cannot possibly preserve the sense to advantage unless he insinuates and twists himself into the original's word order and periodic structure with verbal propriety and stylistic faithfulness.⁶⁸

Another general aspect we can observe is that translating Greek verse gave Lapo pause. It was something he thought about quite a bit, occasionally leaving verses out in his translation, occasionally paraphrasing them. From the autograph manuscript one can see, too, that he wrote the Greek in the margins often when it came to verse, perhaps saving those passages to be translated later, after he had had more time to consider them.

We can observe some of this even at the very beginning of *Themistocles*, in the first sentence. The passage under consideration is (1. 1):

Θεμιστοκλεῖ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐκ γένους ἀμαυρότερα πρὸς δόξαν ὑπῆρχε· πατρὸς γὰρ ἦν Νεοκλέους οὐ τῶν ἄγαν ἐπιφανῶν Ἀθήνησι, Φρεαρρίου τῶν δῆμων ἐκ τῆς Λεωντίδος φυλῆς, νόθος δὲ πρὸς μητρός, ὡς λέγουσιν· 'Αβρότονον Θρήσισα γυνὴ γένος· ἀλλὰ τεκέσθαι τὸν μέγαν "Ελλησίν φημι Θεμιστοκλέα.

That is:

Now for Themistocles, certainly, it has been accepted that the circumstances of his birth were somewhat obscure for glory. For his father, Neocles, was certainly not one the most famous men in Athens, but of the deme of the Phearrhi, and of the tribe Leontis; and on his mother's side he was illegitimate, as it is reported:

I am Abrotonon, a Thracian woman by birth
But I say that, for the Greeks, I gave birth to the great
Themistocles.

⁶⁶ I use the Basel (1564) edition, *Plutarchi Chaeronei . . . vitae comparatae . . . Hermanno Cruserio . . . interprete . . .*, published by Thomas Guarinus. In addition to Plutarch's *Lives*, Cruser also translated much of the *Moralia*, as well as certain works of Hippocrates and Galen. See G. Bers, *Die Schriften des niederländischen Humanisten Dr. Hermann Cruser*, Bibliographies of Dutch Humanists 3 (Nieuwkoop 1971).

⁶⁷ See above (note 22).

⁶⁸ See Bruni, trans. Hankins (above, note 21) 221.

Cruser translates:

Themistocles obscurioribus ad gloriam natalibus fuit. patrem enim habuit Nicoclem minus clarum civem Atheniensem, Phrearium curia, tribu Leontide. genere materno nothum ferunt, ut ostendunt hi versus:

Abrotonum sum Thressa quidem, Graecis tamen illud

Dico Themistoclem me genuisse decus.

Lapo translates:

T<h>emistocli initia generis parum sane gloriosa fuere. patre enim ipsum Neocle haud claro quidem homine ex populo Phreario tribuque Leontide ex non iusta matre natum perhibent eamque Threiciam genere Abrotonum nuncupatam, sed magnum graecis, ut mihi videor dicere, Themistoclem peperit.

A number of things become clear on first glance. Here, as elsewhere, Lapo makes an attempt to remain faithful to the overall structure of the Greek prose, while rendering the material into elegant, periodic Latin.⁶⁹ Where Lapo uses an ablative absolute embedded in indirect discourse to express the notion that Neocles was Themistocles' father, Cruser writes simply "patrem enim habuit . . ." to get the point across. Cruser translates the Greek *vόθος* by *nothus*; even though this word is attested in sources Lapo would have known (e.g., Virgil, *Aen.* 7. 283 and 9. 697), still, the use of anything resembling a transliteration seems to have struck Lapo as poor form.⁷⁰ Lapo is willing to rephrase things and here makes no attempt, as Cruser does, to replicate the verse. Lapo mixes the verse quotation into the discourse. In his version, the end of the passage (from *ex non* to *peperit*) would read:

They say that he was born illegitimately [*ex non iusta matre*], and that she, a Thracian woman by birth, was named Abrotonon. But, as it seems right to me to say, she did give birth to the great Themistocles, for the benefit of the Greeks.

It could indeed be the case that the text in the Greek manuscript Lapo had before him was similar, but few of the reported variants resemble this.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Still, Lapo does not in general go as far in faithfulness to the letter as his teacher, Filelfo, who was perhaps overscrupulous. See Sabbadini (above, note 6) 134.

⁷⁰ This is especially so in the wake of Bruni's arguments, expanded from Cicero's. See, e.g., Bruni, trans. Hankins (above, note 21) 228: "And yet there has never been anything said in Greek that cannot be said in Latin."

⁷¹ For 'Αβρότονον . . . τεκέσθαι MS Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale 1673 has ἀβρότονον θρήσσης γένος· ταύτην. See C. Carena, M. Manfredini, and L. Piccirilli (eds.), *Le vite di Temistocle e di Camillo* (Milan 1983) ad loc. Manfredini argues for an affinity between this Parisinus and "il perduto codice q," which is MS Vatican City, Vat. Pal. 286. This latter is itself a twin of MS Madrid, Bibl. Escor. Φ II 7. See M. Manfredini, "Note sulla tradizione manoscritta delle 'Vitae Thesei-Romuli' e 'Themistoclis-Camilli' di Plutarco," CCC 4 (1983) 401–07, at 407. Perhaps Lapo used a text which at this point resembled one of these manuscripts.

Problems of translation can also sometimes shed light on the question of Lapo's Greek texts. Lapo's first major marginal Greek quotation in his translation of the *Life of Themistocles* occurs at 7. 5, and is as follows:

ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῖς ἀφέταις τοῦ βαρβαρικού στόλου προσμίξαντος

That is:

When the barbarian armament had arrived at Aphetae . . .

Lapo translates:

Sed cum iam barbarorum classe se ad aphe//120//tas inferente

Lapo's Greek hand is unsurprisingly very similar to the hand of his teacher Filelfo (which is itself in the tradition of Manuel Chrysoloras), and as far as the Greek orthography itself goes, it is a rare instance when one sees Lapo make a mistake in his accentuation; here is one of two cases in this manuscript, as Lapo writes ἀφέταις for ἀφετάīς.⁷² In addition, Lapo's Greek text would seem not to have been infected by the variant τοῖς, which some manuscripts have instead of ταῖς.⁷³ We can tell from the manuscript at this point, too, that Lapo probably had trouble with ἀφετάīς, since he seems to have left a blank space (for his Latin translation) and filled it in later; perhaps his confusion caused him to leave out the name of Eurybiades, which follows in the text of Plutarch. In translating Lapo employs an ablative absolute for the Greek genitive absolute and considers the meaning of the Greek verb προσμείγνυμι to be adequately represented by the Latin *se inferre*. As far as the translation goes, once again, Cruser prefers to represent things as simply as possible. His version is: "ut vero classis Barbarorum Aphetas applicuit." In other words, instead of replicating the Greek genitive absolute with an ablative absolute, he uses a finite verb.

A passage where translating style is apparent occurs at *Themistocles* 8. 1–2. The passage is as follows:

... ἀλλὰ δεῖ τῶν τοιούτων καταφρονοῦντας ἐπ' αὐτὰ τὰ σώματα φέρεσθαι καὶ πρὸς ἔκεινα διαγωνίζεσθαι συμπλακέντας. ὃ δὴ καὶ Πίνδαρος οὐ κακῶς ἔστι τοιούτων τῆς ἐπὶ τῆς ἐν Ἀρτεμισίῳ μάχης εἰπεῖν
ὅθι παῖδες Ἀθαναίων ἐβάλοντο φαεννάν
κρηπῆδ' ἐλευθερίας·

ἀρχὴ γάρ ὅντως τοῦ νικᾶν τὸ θαρρεῖν. ἔστι δὲ τῆς Εὐβοίας τὸ
Ἀρτεμίσιον ὑπὲρ τὴν Ἐστίαιν αἰγιαλὸς εἰς βορέαν ἀναπεπταμένος.

⁷² R, fol. 119^v. See Figure 2 (on the following page). On Lapo's Greek hand see above (note 29). Not only is his Greek hand similar to Filelfo's, but one suspects that he must have inherited Filelfo's innovations (which went beyond Chrysoloras) when it came to things like phonetics, diphthongs, and the proper use of aspiration and accents. See Cortesi (above, note 7) 467–68, and eadem, "Aspetti linguistici della cultura greca di Francesco Filelfo," in *Francesco Filelfo nel V centenario della morte. Atti del XVII Convegno di studi maceratesi (Tolentino, 27–30 settembre 1981)* (Padua 1986) 163–206.

⁷³ See ed. Ziegler (above, note 31) ad loc.

adhortantis valui auctoritas. Itaq
 missus est in arcem suum namibus
 eius loci angustas presidio habuimus.
 quo in loco curia eis grecis maxime q
 lacerdemonijs impium demandanti
 bus atheniensibus uero: quod rehnuos
 simul omnium nanium numero ante
 iret. indignum putatis a lijs cedere
 themistocles cognito pericolo ipse in
 pium embriadi tradidit lenitus q
 atheniensibus omimos affirmans
 ut si ad bellum strenuos se viros
 ostendiret: grecorum ergo se studia
 & voluntates in posterino emer
 siros esse. Qua uare appareat enim
 unus omnium maxime auctor
 salutis grecis exutus. effectusque
 ut atheniensis fortitudine hostes
 mansuetudine aut effaciat
 socios miscuisse uiderentur. sed cum
 iam barbarorum classe se ad aphe
 in di uero affectuoy agerentur. etiam
 in di uero affectuoy agerentur.

Figure 2

MS Florence, Biblioteca Riccardiana, Ricc. 142 (= R), fol. 119v.
May not be reproduced.

ἀνταίρει δ' αὐτῷ μάλιστα τῆς ὑπὸ Φιλοκτήτη γενομένης χώρας
Ολιζόν.

That is (Perrin's translation):

... but that they must despise all such things, rush upon the very persons of their foes, grapple with them, and fight it out to the bitter end. Of this Pindar seems to have been well aware when he said of the battle of Artemisium:

“Where Athenians’ valiant sons set in radiance eternal
Liberty’s corner-stone.”

For verily the foundation of victory is courage. Artemisium is a part of Euboea above Hestiae—a sea-beach stretching away to the north—and just about opposite to it lies Olizon, in the territory once subject to Philoctetes.

Cruser translates (at p. 106):

... verum oportere istis contemptis ipsa petere corpora collatisque manibus adversus illa dimicare. quod intelligens Pindarus recte de pugna ad Artemisium commissa videtur dixisse: Cecropidae clarum libertatis posuere fundamentum. quippe pars est audacia victoriae. Artemisium autem Euboeae est supra Hestieam ad Boream expansum litus, cuius ex adverso maxime est ex ditione, quae paruit Philocteti Olizon.

Lapo's version is as follows (f. 121):

... verum iis omnibus contemptis in ipsa corpora invadendum esse et cum ipsis consertis manibus decernendum, quam sententiam Pindarus in Artemisii praelio secutus videtur, cum diceret Atheniensium liberos manifesta libertatis fundamenta iecisse. vincendi enim initium fiducia est. est autem Artemisium Euboiae supra Hestieam litus ad Boream versum, cui Olizonus gens e regione opposita est, quae sub Philoctete quondam fuit.

Again, Lapo is more of a stylist. He expresses the necessity denoted by δεῖ with gerunds, whereas Cruser uses *oportere*. For ὁ δὴ καὶ Πίνδαρος οὐ κακῶς ἔστι συνιδὼν ἐπὶ τῆς ἐν Ἀρτεμισίῳ μάχης εἰπεῖν, Lapo stays close to the structure of the Greek and manages to avoid the awkward *quod*-construction which Cruser employs. In addition, in translating the title, Lapo's *in Artemisii praelio* is closer to the Greek and less plodding than Cruser's *de pugna ad Artemisium commissa*.

But Lapo's caution when it comes to verse is once again apparent. While both translators were loath to translate ὅθι as *quod*, Lapo chose to render the Pindaric passage in indirect statement (correctly, given the Greek construction of ἔστι plus the participle συνιδὼν), and runs it all together, uncertain, perhaps, whether the line was actually of Pindar or simply a report of a Pindaric *sententia*.⁷⁴ In Cruser's version, the verse is, once

⁷⁴ For the *sententia*, see Pindar, fr. 77, in ed. H. Maehler (Leipzig 1989).

again, translated as verse, and is set off from the text, printed on its own line and in italics in the printed edition. At the end of the passage Lapo stays close to the Greek, translating ὑπὸ Φιλοκτήτη as *sub Philocete*.

At *Themistocles* 8. 5 (f. 121^v, *marg. inf.*), Lapo quotes in Greek the four-line verse inscription present on one of the slabs of stone at the temple of Artemis (the Proseoea), which commemorated Greek victory at the battle of Artemisium. The quoted lines differ once and even then only very slightly from the scholarly consensus of the best of texts, reading ἀσίνης for ἀσίας in the first line. Lapo's Greek text is therefore similar to that represented by the UMA group, a conclusion which is also borne out by other examples.⁷⁵ Lapo does choose to translate the lines here, as does Cruser. A comparison of the two versions shows the difficulties of Renaissance translation. First, the Greek:

παντοδαπῶν ἀνδρῶν γενεὰς Ἀσίας ἀπὸ χώρας
 παῖδες Ἀθηναίων τῷδέ ποτ' ἐν πελάγει
 ναινμαχίᾳ δαμάσαντες ἐπεὶ στρατὸς ὥλετο Μήδων,
 σήματα ταῦτ' ἔθεσαν παρθένῳ Ἀρτέμιδι.

That is (Perrin's translation):

Nations of all sorts of men from Asia's boundaries coming,
 Sons of the Athenians once, here on this arm of the sea,
 Whelmed in a battle of ships, and the host of the Medes was destroyed;
 These are the tokens thereof, built for the maid Artemis.

Then, Lapo's version (from R, f. 121^v):

Innumerous Asiae populos ex finibus actos
 Cecropidum soboles fudit in hoc pelago
 Ac ubi Medorum bello cecidere cohortes
 Haec, Phoebe, statuit, virgo, <t>rophea⁷⁶ tibi.

Now, Cruser's version (pp. 106–07):

Diversas Asiae gentes certamine quondam
 Navali hoc fudit ventisono⁷⁷ in pelago
 Victor Cecropidum populus, Medisque peremptis
 Dictynna, haec posuit, clara, trophea tibi.

On the whole, Lapo's translation is somewhat more fluid than Cruser's, yet both lose something when compared with the Greek. With his *certamine*

⁷⁵ U = MS Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Gr. 138; M = MS Venice, Biblioteca Marciana, 385; A = MS Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, 1671. See also Lapo's version of the quotation from Aeschylus on f. 128 (at 14. 1).

⁷⁶ The printed edition (ed. Campano [1470], at p. 89) repeats the mistake here, printing *rophea* instead of *trophea*, further corroborating the notion that R represents a final redaction, which was perhaps even later used as the *Druckexemplar*.

⁷⁷ Is *ventisonus* a neologism on Cruser's part? Or perhaps he uses it on analogy with *ventisonax* (*Anth. Lat.* 682. I. 7). Otherwise, I have been unable to find an attestation of this word.

... *navali*, Cruser manages to transmit the idea of a naval battle, i.e. a ναυμαχία, which Lapo misses. Lapo, on the other hand, transmits the full meaning of στρατὸς Μήδων with his *Medorum . . . cohortes*; Cruser's *Medisque peremptis* does not go as far.

In another case dealing with verse, at *Themistocles* 21. 7, Lapo is missing five lines, possibly because his Greek exemplar did not have them, although there are no reported variants lacking these lines.⁷⁸ Perhaps once again Lapo's reticence concerning verse is apparent.

An interesting example of translation comes at *Themistocles* 22. 2. Plutarch describes Themistocles offending the multitude by building a temple dedicated to Artemis, which he named Aristoboule, thus giving the impression that it was he who had given the best counsel to the city and to the Hellenes. In Greek the passage runs:

ἡνίασε δὲ τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος ἱερὸν εἰσάμενος, ἥν
Ἀριστοβούλην μὲν προσηγόρευσεν, ὡς ἄριστα τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς
Ἐλλησι βουλευσάμενος.

That is:

And he offended the multitude, even causing a temple of Artemis to be built, which he called "Aristoboule," as if he had given the best counsel to the city and to the Greeks.

Lapo's original translation is as follows:

offendit autem vehementer multitudinis animos cum Dianaē templum
dedicavit, quam Aristobulam appellavit, qui optime civitatis graecorumque
saluti consuluisset.

He revises it by means of marginal and interlinear additions only slightly:

offendit autem vehementer multitudinis animos cum Dianaē templum
dedicavit, quam Aristobulam, *idest optime consulentem*, appellavit, *ut* qui
optime civitatis graecorumque saluti consuluisset.

We see, then, that Lapo believed that the Latin reader needed some explanation for the meaning of the word *Aristoboule* and thus glosses it in his translation. But that is not to say that he is not possessed of the soul of a philologist, and in his concern to represent as precisely as possible the Greek, he adds an *ut* to replicate the Greek ώς. Cruser's version is interesting:

momordit etiam multitudinem aede extruenda Dianaē, quam Aristobulen,
quasi optima consilia ipse civitati et Graecis dedisset, appellavit.

His use of a gerundive construction, *aede extruenda*, to replace the aorist participle εἰσάμενος, loses some of the subtlety of the Greek. But on the other hand, *entia non praeter necessitatem multiplicanda sunt*: Cruser's

⁷⁸ *Them.* 21. 7 (p. 183, lines 15–19, Ziegler ed.). For Lapo, see R, 135^v.

embedded clause, from *quasi* to *dedisset*, explains by implication the meaning inherent in the name Ἀριστοβούλη, without resorting to adding words, as Lapo felt compelled to do.

Occasionally Lapo will paraphrase, or add to the text in order to clarify. One example of this occurs in the *Life of Aratus*, at 15. 5. Here Plutarch relates the public attempts of Antigonus Gonatas, the king of Macedonia, to win Aratus' favor. Envious, malevolent folk seized on these attempts and wrote about them to Ptolemy in Egypt in an effort to stain Aratus' reputation. (Ptolemy was, at this point, an enemy of Antigonus, but an ally of Aratus.) In a dense passage, Plutarch comments on these intrigues:

ταῖς μὲν οὖν περιμαχήτοις καὶ διαπύροις τοξευομέναις ἔρωτι φιλίαις βασιλέων καὶ τυράννων τοσοῦτον προσῆν φθόνου καὶ κακοθείας.

That is:

So much envy, then, and distastefulness is attendant upon the passionately sought-after friendships of kings and tyrants which [are sought] from all over by fiery men.

Lapo translates:

Sic igitur amicitiae regum et tyrannorum ferventes ac repentine [perhaps read *repentini*, on analogy with Cic. *Brut.* 69. 242: *ignoti homines et repentini*] sunt et ardore //27// quodam amoris subito incenduntur; sed labefactari expugnarique quam facile possunt, et veluti ventis invidiae atque calumniae flatibus, assidue agitantur.

That is:

So are those men, then, hot and hungry for the friendship of kings and tyrants, and they are swiftly set on fire with a certain ardor of love; but they can be shaken away [from it] and overcome, and, as it were, tossed about by the winds of envy and the breezes of calumny.

Lapo finds a way to get around the awkwardness of the beginning of the passage and then adds from *sed labefactari* to *assidue agitantur*, thus providing the reader with the comment that those overly desirous of the friendship of the powerful "can be shaken away [from their ardor] and overcome, agitated just like the winds of envy and the haughtiness of false accusation." Perhaps Lapo coupled in his mind the adjective *repentinus* with the word *ventus*; this would be then a Ciceronian remembrance, not uncommon, from the *De officiis* (1. 49):

Multi enim faciunt multa temeritate quadam sine iudicio vel morbo in omnes vel *repentini* quodam quasi *vento* impetu animi incitati.

We can see, too, from the autograph, that the passage was important to Lapo, since the rare marginal bracketing is present as well as a *notabile* in the right margin of f. 27, at the beginning of the passage. It reads: "De

amicitia regum et tyrannorum." Could Lapo have been thinking at that moment of Cesarini and Pope Eugenius IV?⁷⁹

Lapo's experience is significant as much for what he did achieve in his short life as for what he did not. In his attempt to win patronage from Cosimo we saw a door close for him: The opportunity to live and work in his native city, Florence, ended. We also saw Lapo, in his choice of the *Life of Themistocles*, use the opportunity of dedicating a translation to advance an agenda—a research agenda, one is tempted to say—or even, perhaps, to level the playing field somewhat with Cosimo. Indeed, one could imagine no other way in which Lapo, given his social position, could have raised issues of exile with Cosimo. Lapo's efforts to find support as far away as England show not only the lengths to which one had to go to find employment as a young humanist, they also demonstrate the evolution of the papal curia into what amounted to a Europe-wide intellectual brokerage house for humanists. Finally, the episode of the *Life of Aratus* shows Lapo once again subtly aware of the character of the dedicatee, matching the substance of the translated work with the real or imagined characteristics he perceived in Cardinal Cesarini. In all three cases, the content of the translations turns out to be just as important as, if not moreso than, the prefaces in conjecturing the intentions Lapo may have had when he chose dedicatees.

Appendices: Lapo's Prefaces to the *Life of Themistocles* and *Life of Aratus*

The intention of both appendices is to provide coherent and authoritative texts of Lapo's dedicatory prefaces to his translations of Plutarch's *Lives* of Themistocles and Aratus, both of which have been discussed above. (The preface to *Artaxerxes* has been edited from F by Sammut [see above, notes 42 and 47]). They are not editions based on all known manuscripts, but on F and R, both of which are autographs and are done in the style which for Lapo in particular represents a final, authoritative, authorial redaction.⁸⁰ I have added section numbers for convenience and in general have punctuated for the sense as I understand it.

⁷⁹ Cruser's version follows in this case the structure of the Greek (p. 717): "atque exoptatis his et flagrantibus, ad quas magno ardore contenditur, regum et tyrannorum amicitias tantum coniunctum erat livoris et malignitatis."

⁸⁰ This has been argued more extensively in Celenza (above, note 26), "Introduction to the Latin Text."

Appendix I: Lapo's Preface to Plutarch's *Life of Themistocles*
Dedicated to Cosimo de' Medici

When reading this preface, especially sections 6–24, it is difficult not to think of the famous twenty-fifth chapter of Machiavelli's *The Prince*, "Quantum fortuna in rebus humanis possit et quomodo illi sit occurrentum." Lapo's argument is that fortune is far inferior to virtue (9) and that fortune really has very little power in human affairs, if people react correctly (10–14). Machiavelli would maintain that fortune at most has control of one half of our affairs, and would even go so far as to say that, if one could change one's nature to suit the times and circumstances, fortune would not change anything.⁸¹ There is also a structural similarity in the beginnings of the two writings. Both wind up asserting the author's opinion that fortune has a limited place in human affairs, and lead up to this by offering, first, a brief exposition of the opposing position, i.e. that there are "those" who say fortune controls most of human affairs. Both then go on to limit the place of fortune.⁸² We know that Machiavelli read Plutarch's *Lives*,⁸³ and if he read *Themistocles*, it is not unlikely that he read it in Lapo's translation, since Lapo's was the translation included in the 1470 Campano printed edition of the *Lives*, along with its preface to Cosimo.

Another link between Lapo and Machiavelli, however, could come from the work of Leon Batista Alberti, who was himself a friend and contemporary of Lapo and wrote, among many other things, an *Intercoenale* on the theme of *Fatum et fortuna* around 1440, five years or so after Lapo's redaction of the *Themistocles* preface.⁸⁴ In an involved allegory, Alberti has an interlocutor, the *Philosophus*, set forth in dialogue form a dream-vision he had with the shades, the *umbrae*, of a great crowd of the departed. From the top of a mountain as a vantage point, the shades show him a wild and raging river surrounding the mountain.⁸⁵ The first position to be set forth (and it is done by the shades) is that the lives of human beings are tossed about on this raging river and that the bigger the ship, the greater the danger of damage in time of dangerous waters. The people best prepared to deal with the caprices of the river are those who realize the dangers prior to embarkation. But even among those people, no one is really safe.⁸⁶

⁸¹ Ed. G. Sasso (Florence 1963) 211: "... se si mutassi di natura con li tempi e con le cose, non si muterebbe fortuna."

⁸² As Machiavelli puts it ([previous note] 206): "nondimanco, perché il nostro libero arbitrio non sia spento, iudico potere essere vero che la fortuna sia arbitra della metà delle azioni nostre, ma che etiam lei ne lasci governare l'altra metà, o presso, a noi."

⁸³ Cf. R. Hirzel, *Plutarch* (Leipzig 1912) 58 and 109 and K. Ziegler, "Plutarchos von Chaironeia," in *RE XXI* (1951) col. 953 and printed separately (Waldsee 1949) col. 316.

⁸⁴ In E. Garin (ed.), *Prosatori latini del Quattrocento* (Milan and Naples 1952) 644–57. On the contacts between Lapo and Alberti, see Fubini (above, note 30); Celenza (above, note 26); and Luiso (above, note 22), *ad indicem*.

⁸⁵ Ed. Garin (previous note) 646: "hunc montem circum in se ipsum rediens ambibat fluvius omnium rapidissimus atque turbulentissimus . . ."

⁸⁶ Ed. Garin (above, note 84) 648–50.

The philosopher protests: "Isn't it the case," he asks, "that, with virtue at one's side, it is better to stand steadfastly by one's ship and face all dangers . . .?"⁸⁷ The shades go on to explain that the person of "free and peaceful disposition" will wisely flee the task of guiding the big ships, since among all the people with whom one is compelled to deal in standing at the head of a ship, it is *durum sane difficileque* to preserve *dulce otium*.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, it is the task of a leader to do so, and to deal along the way with all the inconveniences that might result.

A number of observations can be made. The first is that the dream imagery in Alberti's *Fatum et fortuna* is similar in genre to the dream Lapo reports in the preface to the *Life of Aratus*.⁸⁹ In addition, the imagery of a leader being one who stands at the head of a ship, although certainly not without precedent, is common to Lapo's preface to *Themistocles* and Alberti's work. Lapo and Alberti share the notion (again, common enough) that a public leader is often deprived of *otium*. Both Lapo and Alberti make use of the idea, leaned on much more heavily by Lapo, that *virtus* can serve as an effective counterweight to *fortuna*, a position which, in his own way, Machiavelli would later take up in *Il Principe*, chapter 25. Finally, common to Alberti and Machiavelli, of course, is the metaphorical use of a raging river as a literary device to examine the vicissitudes of fortune. At the very least, then, these ideas were in the air in the humanist movement during the middle to late 1430s and early 1440s, and remained in the air long enough for Machiavelli to make use of them in *The Prince*. But it is also not out of the question that the connections are more direct and that Machiavelli knew the work of Lapo and/or Alberti.⁹⁰

AD CL<A>RISSIMUM VIRUM ET SAPIENTISSIMUM CIVEM
COSMAM MEDICEM LAPI CASTELLIUNCULI PROOEMIUM IN
THEMISTOCLIS VITAM INCIPIT FELICITER.

[1] THEMISTOCLIS Atheniensis clarissimi et sapientissimi ducis vitam latine interpretatus ad te missurus eram, humanissime Cosma, cum eius exilii recenti memoria multorum ducum et principum civitatum cladibus in mentem mihi revocatis, [2] in eam sum, quam saepe soleo, dubitationem compulsus, fortuna ne magis an virtute consilioque opus esset iis qui in florentissimis rebus publicis administrandis sine periculo vellent et cum dignitate versari.

⁸⁷ Ed. Garin (above, note 84) 650: "nonne praestat, virtute comite, navigiis recte assidere, omniaque pericula subire . . .?"

⁸⁸ Ed. Garin (above, note 84) 650–52.

⁸⁹ Here in Appendix II. I know of no study on the oneiric literature of the Renaissance, but for late antiquity and the early Middle Ages, see J. Le Goff, *The Medieval Imagination*, trans. by A. Goldhammer (Chicago 1988) 193–231.

⁹⁰ The text that follows is from MS Florence, Bibl. Ricc. 142 (= R), fols. 108–11^v.

[3] Nam cum me ad graecorum summos viros—malo enim externa in tali re commemorare quam nostra—mente et cogitatione converto, video paene innumerabiles in quibus iudicio omnium summa dignitas, summa virtus //108// fuisset, quiue in rebus perditis suo consilio et sapientia a gravissimis periculis ac prope interitu patriam vendicassent, [4] partim inter<r>eptos esse a suis civibus, partim eiectos, quosdam etiam privatos honoribus misere atque ignominiose vixisse. quo in loco huius ipsius quem dico Themistoclis fuga et persecutio et Miltiadis carcer, aliorumque complurium omni dignitate principum non dissimiles exitus subeunt. [5] quae quidem ego saepe numero mecum repetens, vehementer indignari soleo qui maximis laboribus periculisque suis salutem et incolumitatem caeteris peperissent—tantum abfuisse ut digna suis virtutibus praemia reportarent, ut quibus saluti fuissent, et a quibus ornandi erant, ab iis, ut scelerati et impii, plecterentur.

[6] Itaque interdum facile adducor ut opiner ex fortuna hominibus pendere omnia, ita et ab ea sine virtute res maximas confici et eamdem cum virtute coniunctam nimium posse, at sine fortuna virtutem nihil valere, sed esse //109// nomen vacuum et inane; [7] nec non illos sapientissimos iudicem qui ea de causa a re publica et a negotiis animo abhorrentes, quo tempore florere in iis plurimum poterant, magno quodam iudicio et consilio contemptis honoribus et magistratibus se in ocium solitudinemque contulerunt, [8] malueruntque, remoti ab omni contentione civili, obscuri et incogniti vivere quam se fortunae committere, cuius furentis impetum humana ope sustinere se posse diffiderent. haec igitur, nisi exquisitus disputentur, poterunt quibusdam vera fortasse videri.

[9] Verum ego, cum a communi intelligentia et a vulgi opinione abducere animum et ad veras rationes revocare instituo, sic intelligo. ac iudico fortunam longe virtute inferiorem esse, nec cum ea ullo modo conferendam esse, [10] et hanc imperitorum opinionem ab imbecillitate hominum desidiaque proficisci, qui, cum ipsi virtute deficiant, siquid interdum imprudentia sua offenderint, cul//109//pam omnem in fortunam reiciunt eamque veluti magnum aliquod et infestum numen perhorrescant quam, si perfecta virtute forent, contemnerent et pro nihilo ducerent. [11] neque ego hoc dico in rebus humanis non permaximum in utrunque partem momentum habere fortunam; verum si qui ita virtute se arment atque instruant ut possint adversa ferre constanter et secundis moderate uti, [12] his profecto non video cur aut adversa fortuna metuenda sit aut secunda magnopere expetenda, quae si eis sociam se praestiterit, praclare secum actum minusque sibi laborandum putabunt, [13] sin minus, haud tamen a mente consilioque desciscent, sed in se tantum atque in sua virtute omnia praesidia locabunt et eo acriori ac praesentiori animo ad rem gerendam incumbent, quo minus sibi externae opis adesse cognoscent. [14] est enim virtus eiusmodi ut tranquillis et ad voluntatem nostram fluentibus rebus languescat, asperis vero //110// et incommodis, si adhibet, magis eluceat.

[15] Nec vero id me magnopere commovet, si qui clarissimi viri, cum ad amplissimos dignitatis gradus evasissent, postea conciderunt nec eum quem suis laboribus consecuti erant, statum retinere potuerunt. [16] nam si quis recte et diligenter consyderet, facile perspiciat eos omnis inflatos opinione, cum impii cupiditate flagrarent, et cum quibus pares libertate esse debebant iis vi superiores esse niterentur, debitas et meritas temeritatis poenas dedisse. [17] quod si quibusdam eiusmodi casus inimicorum calumnia inciderunt eos aut, cum aequa tulissent, ad postremos esse restitutos aut, cum fracto animo abiectoque forent et ob levitatem naturae sibi ipsis constare non possent sed desperatione rerum ad hostes configissent, [18] consilii inopia, non fortuna in maximam se ac suos cladem et ignominiam coniecissem effecisseque ut, obscurata priori innocentia, posterioribus delictis, iuste omnia pati //110^v// putarentur, qui quidem nec magni viri nec sapientes habendi sunt. [19] quid est enim stultius quam, si in navi sis, imminente procella, abicere gubernaculum et te, contempta salute, fluctibus obruendum permittere? [20] nam acer et diligens gubernator nihil expavescit, sed fortius contra vim tempestatis insurgit, etsi eum quem cooperat cursum tenere non potest, mutata navigatione qua facultas datur in portum pervenire contendit, ut, si perierit, non negligentia sua perisse; sin evaserit, non forte, sed consilio evasisse videatur. [21] quem sapientem egregiumque [aegregiumque R] civem proponere sibi in re publica decet, siquid indigne patitur, non se abicere, sed fortunae et temporis cedere, et ad aliam oportunitatem se et suas vires reservare, qualem Athenis Aristidem fuisse accepimus et e nostris Furium Camillum, qui et pulsi irae civium concesserunt et, cum oportuna res cecidit, saluti non defuerunt. [22] itaque talium virorum quotidie //111// magis gloria claret. a quorum institutis nihil tu mihi aberrasse videris, qui nulla tua culpa seditionibus et quasi fluctibus civitatis electus, patriae iniurias ita tulisti ut in ea exilio calamitate fortunam tuam indolerent omnes, constantiam probarent, sapientiam mirarentur. [23] itaque meritissimo communi civium consensu et voluntate, summa cum gloria in patriam revocatus, perspicue declarasti, [24] tibi eiusmodi casum non delicti supplicium, sed illustrandae virtutis materiem extitisse, quae una ex omnibus virtutibus Themistocli defuit, caeteris tamen ita excelluit ut eum cunctis Graeciae ducibus anteferre non dubitem. [25] quare etsi non me latet quam imprudenter agam, qui tibi in hac tanta occupatione vitae atque urbis meis scriptis obstrepere audeam, [26] praesertim cum tibi quotidie assit Leonardus Arretinus, princeps eloquentiae huius aetatis, decus et ornamentum latinae linguae, Ambrosius abbas, Nicolaus Nicolus, Poggius, Carolus Arretinus—[27] doctissimi et eloquentissimi viri qui te suis scriptis teneant, quorum sermonibus tuae //111^v// assidue mulceant aures—decrevi tamen meorum laborum ac vigiliarum tibi aliquid impartiri, haud nescius ad summorum principum colloquia tenuissimos interdum homines admitti solere. [28] fretus igitur tua humanitate, Themistoclis res gestas a me nuper ex Plutarcho in latinum versas, quae [quid R] praeclarae mihi visae sunt atque imitatione in primis

dignae, ad te mitto, ut ex iis, siquid ad tuum usum pertinebit, deligere possis, et te eum virum pietate simul et felicitate superasse laeteris; [29] in quo, si minus tibi meus labor gratus erit, debebis tamen eas et Themistoclis nomine et Plutarchi auctoritate libenter legere. itaque ut facias te et oro et obsecro, et me, si haec probari abste percepero, plura ac maiora tuo nomine aggressurum esse profiteor. Vale. FINIS.

Appendix II: Lapo's Preface to Plutarch's *Life of Aratus* Dedicated to
Cardinal Giuliano Cesarini⁹¹

AD CLEMENTISSIMUM PATREM JULIANUM CESARINUM
SACROSANCTAE ROMANAEC ECCLESIAE PRESBYTERUM
CARDINALEM, LAPI CASTELLIUNCULI PR<O>OEMIUM IN ARATI
VITAM INCIPIT FELICITER.

[1] CUM Arati Sicyonii clarissimi ducis res domi militiaeque gestas ex Plutarcho latine interpretatus essem, easque ad aliquem principem—pro mea consuetudine—mittere statuisse. dubitanti mihi diu ac deliberanti cuinam nostrorum principum potissimum dedicarem has lucubratiunculas meas, nullus sane occurrebat cui consilio prudentia cum magnitudine, integritate, constantia, tum bellicis rebus et gloria militari Arati vita convenire videretur.

[2] Nocte igitur quadam in hac cogitatione ac meditatione defixus serius in cubiculum discessi, ubi, cum accubuisse et, ut assolet, homines ex longa ac vehementi animi intentione fatigatos, altior solito me somnus invasit. [3] ecce continuo, ut de Homero Ennius tradit de quo solebat vigilans saepissime cogitare et loqui, dormienti mihi se Aratus obtulit; siquidem somnus illud fuit, non divinatio quaedam animi et certa ac vera visio. [4] erat enim imago eius et simulacrum homine maius atque augustius, forma ipsa et figura corporis, ut apparebat, excellenti quadam et admirabili dignitate ac veneratione, quales prisci illi heroes ac semidei fuisse perhibentur, [5] ornatu vero et habitu militari quo usum illum tum arbitror esse, cum Macedonas procul a patriae finibus arcebant, cum eiiciebat tyrannos et ad libertatem Graeciam excitabat, ut me quidem, cum torve ac minaciter aspexisset, vehementer exterruerit et, loqui conantem eiusque adventus causam percontari, prae horrore vox ac verba defecerint. [6] tum //19^v// ille, vel quod ante re cognita ita paratus venisset, vel quid tum mihi esset animi divinasset, hunc in modum me prior alloqui cepit.

[7] "Quid tu, homo stulte, agis? quid moliris? quo pergis? quo tam longa deliberatio, quo tuus hic labor spectat? quid autem a me vis? quid quaeris? quid postulas? dic, obsecro, cur nunc me ab inferis excitas? cur denuo <me> in lucem revocas? [8] nonne satis tibi esse videtur, me semel

⁹¹ From MS Florence, Magl. XXIII, 126 (= F), fols. 19–20^v.

vitae huius quam vivitis labores, molestias, solicitudinesque esse perpessum, semel hominum insidias, fraudes, fallacias pertulisse, semel crudellem ac nefariam oppetisse mortem Macedonisque regis crudelitatem meo funere satiasse, ut me, cum morte omnia haec incommoda declinarim atque effugerim, etiam reviviscere velis atque eadem rursus mala calamitatesque experiri, quo mihi paulo post acerbius et contumeliosius moriundum sit? [9] qua es igitur tanta a me iniuria provocatus ut me quietum et curis omnibus solutum et liberum sollic*< i >*tare, laccessere, vexare, measque umbras ac manes frustra exagitare coneris? [10] sive enim id inimico in me animo agis iniquum te esse, quid insolentem violes, fateare necesse est, sive mei illustrandi nominis causa, longe in hoc tua te fallit opinio, cum ex eo plus ad me probri ac dedecoris quam splendoris et gloriae perventurum sit, sive quaestus ac lucri causa, sciam te nec in eo quidem quippiam profecturum. [11] tune ut me afficias gloria, principis aulam accedere, tu limen introire, tu eius bibliothecam ne dicam officinam scelerum et flagitorum sentinam veluti carcere obclusum incolere atque habitare iubeas, [12] ubi perpetuo futurus sim pulvere, situ, squalore, et sordibus obsitus, ubi neminem oblectem, nemini prober, nemini placeam, nunquam nisi exalandae [i.e. exhalandae] crapulae reverendique somni gratia legar, [13] nunquam eruditas vel etiam satis sobrias lectoris aures habeam, nunquam ipse lucem aspiciam, ubi denique ante, ut de caeteris sileam quae ne dicam pudore impediatur, nihil honesti fiat, nullum pudicum aut principe dignum proferatur verbum? [14] quibus haec tu me oculis aspicere, quibus auribus audire posse existimas? at tibi credo hoc, sumpto labore, merces aliqua permagna paratus? [15] haud quaquam, si id speras. principum satis tibi mores cogniti sunt, qui, cum ipsi sint eiusmodi, tum sui similes appetunt, his delectantur, his fruitur, hos honoribus et opibus augent, qui prope quibus sua omnia consilia seque totos crediderint, nec ad suas explendas libidines illorum opera carere ullo modo possint. [16] disertos autem atque eruditos, tum probos, sanctos, religiosos viros domi quidem quasi ad ludum et ad iocum habere //20// student, non ut ab iis boni aliquid ediscant, [17] sed ut tales et ipsi habeantur illorumque existimatione suam infamiam et turpitudinem tegant, eadem freti maiorem peccandi facultatem assequuntur quos tamen clam aderunt et depresso extictosque cupiunt; [18] nec usquam emergere aut se attollere patiuntur, nec alloquuntur fere unquam nisi coacti (quod arbitror) illorum se congressu et sermone indignos censem, reprehensioneque ab iis suorum scelerum pertimescant. [19] cogita igitur tecum antea diligentur quid agas, neu quo temere prodeas. siquid enim de me incautus statueris, haud impune erit, ipse te in somniis praeterebo, nec mente consistere unquam aut requiescere sinam."

[20] His equidem ita ab initio sum commotus atque adeo metu consternatus ut quo progredere incertus animi essem, postea vero quam paulum me collegi, mihi illius reprimere audaciam ac maledicta refellere sum visus; [21] cum dicerem haec, ipsum de suis, ut rebar, principibus vera loqui, quibus ea fortasse Lycurgi aut Draconis Solonisve legibus permissa

erant, sed de nostris impudens mendacium esse, et sive invidia et malevolentia eum ita loqui, [22] sive eorum facta ignorare, demum enervatis compluribus huius aetatis principibus teque in illis, qui et secum et cum reliquis aequalibus maioribusque suis omni virtutis genere contendere possent. [23] potestatem ei optionemque feci ut ad quem potissimum mitti vellet eligeret, quibus ille acquievit parumper et letatus eo munere ex omni numero unum te elegit, de cuius apud inferos virtutibus et ab aliis et ab iis qui tui ordinis e vita nuperrime commigrassent multa se ac divina audisse referebat.

[24] Haec mihi tum in somno visa et audita sic infixa animo impressaque sunt ut, solitus somno, vera ne an falsa forent diu mecum multumque dubitarim. [25] ac nunc quidem Arati mortui de te iudicium tantum abest ut improbem ut ne ipsum quidem si reviviscat prudentius, nec melius facturum existimem. [26] et enim, si in summo principe eoque qui caeteris principibus praefuturus sit animi magnificentiam, si sapientiam, consilium, industriam, solertiam in maximis pulcherrimisque muneribus gerendis atque administrandis quaerimus, [27] si fortitudinem, constantiam, patientiam in subeundis periculis preferendisque laboribus aut haec in te sunt omnia, aut in nullo alio profecto principe reperiri unquam poterunt, [28] si in iure dicendo puniendis improbis, bene meritis ornandis, iustitiam et aequitatem, si fidem praeterea gravitatem desideramus, ubinam ea, si in te defuerint, requiremus? [29] iam vero in eodem, si iustitiam, temperantiam, frugalitatemque laudamus, harum nobis omnium exempla virtutum abste uno maxime repetenda sunt? [30] denique //20//, si liberalitatem, beneficentiam, humanitatemque, si bonarum artium rectorumque studiorum peritiam praecipueque eorum quae appellantur humanitatis esse dicimus oportere, parum te cognitum habeat, [31] si quis haec non in te cuncta perfecta et cumulata esse concesserit, nec vero existimes velim haec a me assentandi gratia dicta, nec ex meo tantum sensu esse deprompta.

[32] Nam haec ipsa de te pluraque alia ab eruditissimo ac religiosissimo viro Ambrosio amicissimo tuo,⁹² cuius testimonium puto gravissimum saepissime praedicari et divinis laudibus ad caelum ferri audivi. [33] quod si bellicis in rebus ut Aratus versatus non es, quippe qui te ad meliora studia ab adolescentia contulisti,⁹³ non tamen ille plus armatus oppresse [lege oppressus?] tyrannis Graeciae profuit quam tu, ut ita dixerim, togatus, improborum consiliis afflictus, et laboranti romanae ecclesiae profusti cuius tu statum et dignitatem tot iam per annos adversus nefarios illorum conatus, non sine maximis tuis periculis tutatus es. [34] ex quo in altissimum istum ordinem cum paucis meritissimo ascendisse arbitror quem es non alienis opibus sed tuis virtutibus assecutus et iisdem artibus nescio quid maius futurum augor.

⁹² I.e. Ambrogio Traversari.

⁹³ Lapo shows himself aware of Plutarch's remarks about Aratus' less-than-optimal education in oratory at Plut. *Arat.* 3. 3.

[35] Sed iam quo intendit eo conferatur oratio mea. ut igitur, pater humanissime, tibi quod a me iam pridem deberi statui munus persolvatur, Aratum ipsum ad te legendum et colendum mitto, nec iam in mittendo, te fretus, illius iram minasque perhorresco, quem, te obsecro, ultiro ac sponte sua ad te proficiscentem, ut soles alios eiusmodi viros humane benigneque excipias, eiusque res gestas diligenter legas. [36] ego, si in iis legendis te delectatum esse aut meum studium non aspernatum [esse *canc.*] sensero, plura ac maiora, cum voles, editurum me tuo nomine esse profiteor. Vale.

Finis ex Ferraria xviii kalendas augusti 1438.

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
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